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Abstract 
Environmental controversies are by their nature difficult to 
resolve satisfactorily dealing as they do with the potentially 
divisive issues. At one extreme, these can be issues of land use 
and planning, pollution, conservation and resource management. 
Such issues are of immediate and personal concern to the 
parties involved. At the other extreme, they can involve 
conflicting and polarised ideologies, strong philosophical 
differences and conflicting claims to represent the public 
interest. In addition such controversies can involve political 
considerations on a local or national level. 
The use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) methods have 
been suggested in the literature as an effective mechanism for 
the resolution of such controversies. 
This study seeks to examine the effectiveness of these methods 
to resolve environmental controveries. The research is based 
upon two case studies of the use of ADR methods in resolving 
environmental controversies of widely divergent types. In order 
to facilitate the research a method of classifying environmental 
controversies was developed. 
The hypothesis of the research is that the effectiveness of ADR 
methods would be confined to relatively simple matters 
classified as environmental disputes in this research. Contrary 
to expectation, the research suggests that ADR methods may 
have a much wider application and may be a useful additional 
mechanism in helping to resolve major environmental conflicts. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Controversies over environmental matters have become 
increasingly prevalent and persistent in Australia over the past 
20 years. Various political and legal means have been used to 
attempt to resolve such controversies with varying degrees of 
success. Broadly speaking such controversies are resolved by 
adjudicative, consensual or administrative means. These three 
broad categories are referred to as Environmental Dispute 
Resolution mechanisms. The provision of satisfactory methods 
to resolve environmental controversies remains a significant 
issue for our legal and political systems. Experience in the 
United States suggests that the use of a range of consensual 
methods, usually termed Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
methods, within the existing legal and political systems may 
provide an effective solution. 
The use of ADR methods in Environmental Dispute Resolution in 
the Australian context has occurred in various guises since the 
early 1980s, but no comprehensive studies of the effectiveness 
of such methods have been reported. This represents a serious 
gap in the knowledge required to detemnine the best means for 
the efficient resolution of environmental controversies in our 
society. This study seeks to contribute to the knowledge in this 
area. 
Outl ine 
The aim of this study is to examine by way of case study some 
of the uses now being made of ADR methods in the resolution of 
environmental controversies in Australia and to investigate the 
effectiveness of that use. The following is an outline of the 
approach used to achieve this aim. 
Chapter 1 provides an ouline of the research and introduces the 
concepts of environment, dispute and resolution. 
Chapter 2 examines the characteristics unique to 
environmental controversies and uses such characteristics as a 
method of classifying these controversies. 
Chapter 3 reviews the various ADR methods to determine 
which are used in the resolution of environmental controversies. 
Chapters 4 and 5 review the current literature with respect to 
the implementation of these methods in an environmental 
context. This review involves a comparison of the experience in 
the United States and Australia. 
Chapter 6 details the research methods used to achieve the 
aim of the study. This involved a distillation from the broad 
areas of enquiry to more focussed and precise research 
questions. A research approach based upon case studies was 
selected as the means to address the questions posed. 
Chapter 7 examines the existing mechanisms used for the 
resolution of environmental controversies in New South Wales. 
This review provides a basis for determining where ADR 
methods are currently being used for the resolution of 
environmental controversies and as a means for selecting 
suitable case study examples. 
Chapter 8 presents the results of the first case study 
examining the use made of ADR methods in the Land and 
Environment Court of NSW for the resolution of environmental 
disputes. 
Chapter 9 presents the results of the second case study 
examining the use of ADR methods in the resolution of 
environmental conflicts. The study focusses on the ADR methods 
utilised by the NSW Resource and Conservation Council in its 
preparation of an interim assessment strategy for forest use. 
Chapter 10 discusses these results and draws conclusions 
about how effectively ADR methods have been implemented in 
the resolution of environmental controversies. The discussion 
concludes with a series of recommendations as to how this use 
could be made more effective. 
Definition of Terms 
Environmental Dispute Resolution. 
What is the environment? 
A broad definition of "Environment' is one tliat defines it in 
terms of: 
"the region, surroundings and circumstances in which any 
organism exists. This environment includes the natural physical 
aspects as well as the man-made surroundings with which the 
organism interacts. 
This definition is broad in the sense that it is concerned with 
the surroundings of "any organism" rather than a more 
traditional approach which perceives environment in terms of 
'the surroundings of man'. 
The anthropocentric view 
Much of Australian law applies a traditional, essentially 
anthropocentric, view of the environment which accepts that: 
'environment' includes all aspects of the surroundings of human 
beings, whether affecting human beings as individuals or in 
social groupings.2 
International Union of Local Authorities, Glossary of Environmental Terms 
(1991), lULA, Istanbul, 31. 
^Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth), section 3. 
This was a definition with wide currency throughout the 1970s 
and 1980S.3 It remains the definition used in the Environmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (the EPA Act).^ 
The anthropocentric approach has been said to involve: 
"the exaltation of human beings and their particular faculties 
(eg reason) - the placing of the human being in a pre-eminent 
position with respect to the rest of, not only terrestial 
phenomena, but the universe at l a r g e . 
Even in relatively new and updated legislation an 
anthropocentric definition continues to be used. The 
Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW) was 
amended in 1990 to provide a more expansive definition, but one 
that remains essentially anthropocentric: 
"environment" includes all aspects of the surroundings of human 
beings, including: 
(a) the physical factors of those surroundings, such as the land, 
the waters and the atmosphere; and 
(b) the biological factors of those surroundings, such as 
animals, plants and other forms of life; and 
(c) the aesthetic factors of those surroundings, such as their 
appearance, sounds, smells, tastes and textures.^ 
3See for instance the Environment (Financial Assistance) Act 1977 (Cth). 
^Section 4. 
5A Dodson, Green Political Thought: An lntroduction{A990), London, 8. 
^Section 4(1). (emphasis supplied). 
What flows from a view which perceives human beings as the 
central focus is inevitably a perspective which sees the 
'environment' in terms of a benefit or commodity for the use of 
humans. This perspective views any development 
anthropocentrically and asks what will be the extent of the 
development's effect on the amenity of human beings. This is 
essentially the perspective of much planning legislation. It 
helps to explain why such legislation is not primarily concerned 
with ecologically sustainable outcomes but more concerned 
with the facilitation of land development. 
The mitigation of environmental impacts encouraged by the EPA 
Act may well be insignificant in terms of sustainability or real 
environmental concerns (such as climate change or maintainence 
of diversity) since the effect on the amenity of man of these 
outcomes is not perceived as immediate.^ While s90(1)(b) 
speaks of "harm to the environment" it is used in the narrow 
sense as an assessment of the effect on the benefit of that 
'environment' to human beings not the effect on the environment 
per se. This assessment focusses upon the effect the 
development has on the amenities or interests of competing 
human land users. Amenity value has a much narrower and more 
limited focus than ecological value even though the latter will 
have long-term impact upon human beings. 
7K Sperling, 'Beyond Development Control: Creating a Planning Framework for 
Sustainabinty'(1997) Australian Environmental Law News, no 3, 1997 
September/October 26 at 26. 
The ecocentric view 
By the 1990s legislative definitions used in Australia were 
displaying a wider ecocentric perspective. The ecocentric view 
gives greater prominence to ecological values, placing mankind 
in his surroundings rather than at the centre. A good example of 
this shift in perspective is the definition provided in the Local 
Government (Planning and Environment) Act 1991 (Qld.): 
"environment" includes: 
(a) ecosystems and their constituent parts including people and 
communities, 
(b) all natural and physical resources, 
(c) those qualities and characteristics of locations, places and 
areas, however large or small, which contribute to their 
biological diversity and integrity, intrinsic or attributed 
scientific value or interest, amenity, harmony, and sense of 
community, and 
(d) the social, economic, aesthetic and cultural conditions which 
affect the matters referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) or 
which are affected by those matters. ® 
The wider ecocentric view has also received greater currency, 
though not always acceptance, in the courts. The High Court of 
Australia in D.R Murphy and Covehouse Australia v Queensland ^ 
reversed an eariier Queensland decision which had held that 
'environment' in the eariier Queensland Act did not include living 
^Section 1.4. 
^Unreported 3 October 1990. FC90/039. 
organisms (in this case turtles and their nesting areas) and so 
the impact of a proposed development on such organisms did not 
require consideration. 
Attempts have since been made to have courts adopt the wider 
ecocentric definition. This has not always been successful. In a 
case concerned with the effects of logging of south coast forest 
areas on the environment, the Land and Environment Court of 
New South Wales was asked to expand the definition such that 
'environment' would include: 
"not only the physical environment but also include the social 
effects (of a development) and their impact on the relations 
between social groupings"^ ° 
While allowing that the social effects of a development could be 
a relevant factor, Hemmings J stopped short of expanding 'social 
effects' to mean : 
"that an activity which is otherwise not likely to significantly 
affect the environment could be seen to do so merely because it 
excited opposition by a section of the public." 
However even to have accepted such an expansion would have 
been nonetheless an anthropocentric approach based upon the 
effects on 'a section of the public'. 
^^Jarasius v Forestry Commission of NSW & Ors (1988)71 LGRA 79 at 93. 
Similar attempts to widen the scope of the definition of 
environment are apparent on the international front. The Rio de 
Janiero Earth Summit of June 1992 defined "environmental 
protection" from an ecocentric perspective as the protection of 
discrete and interacting ecosystems: 
"The environment is threatened in all its biotic (living) and 
abiotic (non-living) components: animals, plants, microbes and 
ecosystems comprising biological diversity; water, soil and air, 
which form the physical components of habitats and 
ecosystems, and all the interactions between the components of 
biodiversity and their sustaining habitats and ecosystems.^ 
The definition of the environment and dispute 
resolution 
The notion of competing human needs is the essence of an 
anthropocentric view of the environment. However an ecocentric 
definition of environment does not sit comfortably with the 
notion of dispute resolution since implicit in dispute resolution 
is the resolution of disputes between human beings. 
This is not to say that inanimate objects could not be given 
status as parties in any environmental controversy. United 
States Supreme Court Judge W. O. Douglas in his dissenting 
11 U N Conference on Environment & Development The Earth Summit 993) 
London, Agenda 21, Chapter 16, para. 16.22. 
judgement in Sierra Club v Rogers C. B. Morton gave an eariy 
judicial expression of this view: 
•Contemporary public concern for protecting nature's ecological 
equilibrum should lead to the conferral of standing upon 
environmental objects to sue for their own p r e s e r v a t i o n . 2 
This was not necessarily a novel idea given that other inanimate 
objects such as ships or corporate entities were parties to 
litigation. Similarly permitting a dispute resolution body to 
appoint a representative of an inanimate object would not be 
significantly different from customary judicial appointments of 
guardian ad litem, executors or administrators.^^ 
Problems do arise given the competing claims of various 
interest groups to represent the interests of the environment 
generally, or inanimate objects specifically. Taking the 
definition of the environment as far as proposed by Stone may 
increase rather than diminish the intensity of the disputes 
between human beings and further exacerbate the difficulties 
inherent in resolving such controversies. 
This makes it clear that the distinction between 'environment' 
from an anthropocentric approach or an ecocentric approach is 
largely an artificial one. Strictly speaking an environmental 
controversy is never between the needs of human beings and the 
"•^Supreme Court of United States No. 70-34, April 19, 1972 reproduced in C 
D Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects 
(1974) W Kaufman, Los Altos, CA, appendix. 
I3|d., 81. 
needs of the environment, it is always between competing 
human beings even when the focus is ecocentric. This is so 
because only human beings can Value' the environment by 
attaching meaning or value to particular interests, needs or 
goals in relation to it. 
For some, the focus is upon preservation of an ecosystem, while 
for others it is upon employment opportunities or economic 
development. But either way the perspective is anthropocentric, 
since it involves attaching value to potentially conflicting uses 
of the surroundings of human beings. Given this, the two 
different approaches to the environment.do not provide any real 
assistance in classifying environmental controversies. For all 
practical purposes environmental controversies are 
anthropocentric disputes, even if one of the parties to the 
controversy perceives the environment from an ecocentric 
perspective. It is necessary to look elsewhere for a method of 
classification. 
What is a dispute? 
'Dispute' in a generic sense 
According to its ordinary English meaning the term 'dispute' is 
simply a disagreement or difference of opinion. This is 
essentially synonymous with the wider but related term 
'conflict' which means a clash of opposing principles. Boulle 
concedes this similarity but makes a distinction in terms of 
intensity. So while: 
1 1 3 0009 03209010 7 
"a dispute involves an overt and contested claim between two or 
more parties over competing interests, principles or process" 
A conflict refers to: 
•an ongoing series of disputes of severe intensity which have 
occurred over a extended period of time.'^^ 
Disputes in this general sense embrace both a dispute per se (a 
single contested claim) and a conflict (a series of contested 
claims). 
But in the field of dispute resolution the term 'dispute' has a 
distinct technical meaning which has a much narrower scope 
than a contested claim. So for the sake of clarity and 
consistency of expression, a dispute in the generic sense has 
been labelled as a 'controversy' and covers both disputes per se 
and conflicts. 
'Dispute' in a special sense 
Tillett^s points out that in the field of dispute resolution terms 
such as 'dispute' and 'conflict' are used in ways that do not 
necessarily correlate with their ordinary English meaning. 
"•̂ L Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (1996) Butterworths, 
Sydney, 12. 
"̂ Ĝ Tillett, Resolving Conflict A Practical Approach (1991) Sydney 
University Press, Sydney, 4. 
Definitions of 'dispute' in this technical sense include: 
"a dispute arises when two (or more) people (or groups) perceive 
that their interests, needs or goals are incompatible, and seek 
to maximise fulfilment of their own interests, or needs, or 
achievement of their own goals (often at the expense of 
others)."! 6 
Burton adapts this definition and describes these "interests, 
needs or goals" as "negotiable issues". He makes the assumption 
that the perception of incompatibility and the desire to 
maximise fulfilment over such interests is not fixed in the 
minds of the parties but open to some potential form of 
compromise. 
It is this possibility of compromise or negotiability implicit in 
Burton's interpretation of Tillett's definition that is the 
distinguishing feature of a dispute in this more limited 
technical sense. In a dispute in this sense the maximising of 
goals may be achieved through bargaining or negotiating 
because, even though the goals may seem incompatible, "to 
obtain that which is more important, one party may yield to the 
other on that which is less important".i® These disputes are 
open to settlement, either by a mutually agreed settlement or a 
'l^ld., (emphasis supplied). 
"•̂ J Burton, Conflict Resolution as a Political System(^9QQ) George Mason 
University, Fairfax, 11. 
I^G Tiiiett, op cit., note 15 above, 4. 
settlement imposed in adjudicative proceedings or 
administratively. 
Conf l ic t 
It is this negotiability feature of a dispute that puts it in sharp 
contrast to Tillett's definition of a conflict: 
"Conflicts exist when one or more parties perceive that their 
values or needs are incompatible. Values are incompatible if 
each contradicts or opposes the other. One need would be seen as 
incompatible with another if meeting that need is thought to 
prevent, obstruct, interfere with or in some way make meeting 
the other need less likely or effective."^^ 
In the case of a dispute, the incompatibility was to do with 
"interests, needs or goals." But as Burton pointed out, in spite of 
the appearance of incompatibility, a compromise was possible. 
In contrast, there is some different quality of the "values or 
needs" involved in a conflict that make the scope for 
compromise so much narrower. 
So it must be assumed that the values and needs perceived as 
incompatible in the case of a conflict are different in some 
significant way from the "interests, needs or goals" associated 
with disputes. Burton distinguishes the former as "relating to 
"•̂ id., 7 (emphasis supplied). 
ontological human needs that cannot be c o m p r o m i s e d . " 2 0 'Values' 
in this sense are those beliefs which have significance for an 
individual, and he offers religious or political beliefs as 
examples. 'Needs' on the other hand involve both physical or 
psychological wants. In the case of conflict, Burton asserts the 
needs at issue relate to essentially psychological wants of a 
fundamental character not seen as amenable to compromise and 
he includes in these both the need for self esteem and the need 
for a sense of identity. 
Such conflicting values and needs are seen as opposites, either 
objectively so or at least in the minds of the Individuals 
involved. As Burton emphasises, these real or perceived 
differences are seen as non-negotiable: 
"Conflict is a relationship in which each party perceives the 
other's goals, values, interests or behaviour as antithetical to 
its own."21 
Controversies over these values or needs are perceived as 
incapable of resolution. 
The other distinguishing feature of conflict is that the 
perceived incompatibility may often be underlying rather than 
overt. It may manifest itself in a superficial way in the form of 
a dispute over a particular issue, but the vehemence with which 
this incipient dispute escalates may be reflective of a depth of 
20j Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy"(1991) 
3(1) Interdisciplinary Peace Research, May/June, 62 at 63. 
2lBurton(1988), op cit., note 17 above, 11. 
conflict not previously manifested by the parties. It is the 
pervasive nature of this incompatibility which leads Burton to 
conclude: 
•When we come to conflicts, however, it is not sufficient to 
deal with particular cases and institutionalize means of dealing 
with them." 
This is said by way of distinguishing conflicts from disputes: 
•Disputes that are over negotiable interests will always exist, 
as will problems of management amongst persons who have 
common goals and values. But both can be dealt with by applying 
consensus norms, and by management techniques."22 
The assumption Burton clearly makes is that application of 
consensual norms or management techniques are not effective 
for the pervasive nature of conflicts. 
A further point is made in the literature about both the concepts 
of dispute and conflict. Gregorczuk, discussing international 
environmental disputes, places 'dispute' in a legal context: 
"as a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal 
views or interests between two parties, in which a claim or 
assertion of one party is met with refusal, counter-claim or 
denial by another."23 
22Burton(1991), op cit., note 20 above, 71. 
23H Gregorczuk, "The appropriateness of mediation in international 
environmental disputes"(1996) Australian Dispute Resolution Journal, 
February 1996, 47 at 50. 
There is however, nothing implicitly legal in any controversy be 
it a dispute or a conflict. Legal controversies are "ordinary 
disputes which are either governed by legal rules or followed by 
legal consequences".24 in the case of environmental 
controversies, the nature of the matters at issue are just as 
likely to be political as legal, either on a local, regional or 
national level. There is nothing to say that disputes or conflicts 
must necessarily be subject to legal norms. 
The categorisation of controversies as either 'disputes' or 
'conflicts' is neither clear cut nor distinct. It was considered 
that the concept of a continuum, with its sense of an unbroken 
sequence of incremental changes, could be used to trace the 
subtle shifts in perspective between a dispute and a conflict. 
This was an important step in the development of this study, 
because once utilised for this purpose, the device of a 
continuum allowed a system of classification of environmental 
controversies to be proposed as a basis for analysis. 
Controversies could be placed at some point along a continuum 
using the extent to which they exhibit interests, needs or goals 
seen as negotiable (disputes) or goals and needs seen as 
incompatible (conflicts). 
24D Easton, Introducing the Law {^9B2) CCH Australia Ltd, Sydney, 94. 
What is resolution? 
Resolution in a generic sense 
Similar definitional problems arise concerning the concept of 
'resolution'. Controversies, or contested claims, by definition 
can be the subject of some form of resolution. The distinction 
between a dispute and a conflict may be reflected in the manner 
in which these are resolved. Burton has referred to the 
negotiated or arbitrated outcome of a dispute as a "settlemenf; 
while the process of dealing with a conflict in a way that 
satisfies the inherent needs of all parties (while not perhaps 
solving the conflict) has been referred to as a "resolution'.^s For 
the sake of clarity and consistency of expression resolution in 
the generic sense needs a separate label and has been termed a 
'solution'. Solution covers both a settlement and a resolution in 
the special senses discussed. 
Settlement 
When the literature on dispute resolution speaks of settlement 
it is generally referring to the use of a mechanism to settle or 
manage the actual controversy manifested. The controversy is 
settled if a solution is imposed by an external body, that is 
adjudicatively, or if it is one provided consensually by 
negotiation or mediation between the parties. 
25j Burton(1991) op cit, note 20 above, 62. 
Resolution 
When speaking of resolving conflicts, there is an implict 
understanding that the conflict involves a larger degree of 
incompatibility between the parties. It is in order to address 
this degree of incompatibility that the mechanisms for 
resolving conflict must identify or deal with the underlying 
issues rather than merely settling its superficial manifestation. 
Conflict resolution digs deeper in an attempt to resolve the 
source of the conflict, often by addressing real or perceived 
incompatibility of v a l u e s . 2 6 
The essence of the distinction that marks out resolution from 
settlement is the attempt made to resolve underlying conflict: 
"Conflict Resolution means terminating conflict by methods that 
are analytical and get to the root of the problem. Conflict 
Resolution, as opposed to mere management or 'settlement', 
points to an outcome that, in the view of the parties involved, is 
a permanent solution to the p r o b l e m . ' ' 2 7 
Tillett's view is that conflict resolution in this sense of 
complete solution may be impossible in many situations.^s To 
expect resolution of a conflict in the fullest sense suggested by 
Burton may exclude from the definition of resolution most 
26g Tillett, op cit., note 15 above, 45. 
J Burton, op cit., note 17 above, 2. 
28g Tillett, op cit., note 15 above, 10. 
practical examples of conflict resolution. A less strict 
interpretation may allow for successful 'resolution' where the 
mechanism for resolving the conflict at least identifies the 
underlying issues (such as value conflict), even if it does not 
then overcome their incompatibility. 
A resolution in this less exacting sense may produce a solution 
to the underlying conflict (such as an agreement to disagree) 
with which Ihe parties agree they can live with once they leave 
the neutral ground of the problem-solving forum.'29 In this 
study, resolution in this less than complete sense is accepted as 
equating to 'conflict resolution.' 
Distinguishing settlement and resolution 
There are gradations in the manner in which a dispute or 
conflict can be solved. On the one extreme, a permanent solution 
where the real matters at issue are identified and addressed is 
a resolution in the fullest sense. At the other extreme, a 
temporary truce over a single issue between parties with 
fundamental differences in values is little more than a 
settlement. 
'Settlement' can be seen as the reaching of a binding agreement, 
either mutually agreed or imposed, to which the parties adhere. 
29p. Adler, "Mediating public disputes" (1990) in R J Fowler (ed) 
Proceedings of the Intemationai Conference on EnvironmentaJ Law, 
Sydney,14-18 July 1989, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 103. 
'Resolution' can be seen as the identification and addressing of 
overt and underlying conflict with a view to producing a 
permanent solution to the problem in issue within the 
framework of continuing competing needs or values even if no 
final solution is reached. 
It can be seen that the aim of both settlement and resolution are 
essentially similar, namely achieving a permanent 
understanding between the parties involved in the dispute or the 
conflict. The distinction is that settlement of a dispute 
provides a solution to the problem manifested; in the case of a 
conflict, the settlement achieved may need to co-exist with the 
incompatibility of values underlying the conflict. 
But it does not follow from this that disputes are always 
settled and conflicts are always resolved. This can be made 
clear if the distinctions between settlement and resolution 
were also plotted along a continuum, since they need not (and in 
many instances will not) overlap with the dispute/conflict 
continuum. A solution of a conflict may not be a resolution, 
indeed it might be more likely to be a settlement of a single 
issue, leaving the fundamental conflict of values unresolved. 
Conversely, a solution of a dispute may achieve a full closure of 
the controversy, because the values in dispute are not 
fundamental, such that it is possible to describe the solution 
reached as a resolution. But to then merge the two continuua 
would create a number of inconsistencies, since it would not be 
correct, for instance, to label one end of the merged continuum 
'dispute settlement' and the other 'conflict resolution' 
The Mechanisms of Dispute Resoiution 
Preston classifies dispute resolution mechanisms into three 
kinds: 
-managerial direction or administrative, 
-adjudicative or 
-consensual mechanisms-^® 
Each of these three mechanisms manage environmental 
controversies in a manner which produces solutions, ranging in 
various degrees from settlement to resolution. 
In the case of administrative means of dispute resolution, these 
mechanisms encompass environmental controversies solved by 
both administrative and executive decision. The decision-maker 
is vested with authority, usually by statute, to apply the 
relevant criteria and to exercise the authority in accordance 
with administrative law pr inc ip les . I f such decision is subject 
to review on its merits to a court or tribunal the review is 
nonetheless an administrative decision or a managerial 
direction. A merit appeal remains a re-exercise of an 
administrative or executive power and in this way is 
fundamentally different from the judicial function of a court in 
reviewing a d e c i s i o n . 3 2 For the purpose of this study, solution by 
30B J Preston, 'Limits of Environmental Dispute Resolution 
Mechamsms'(1995) 13 Australian Bar Review 148 at 149. 
31M A Eisenberg, "Participation, Responsiveness and the Consultative Process: 
An Essay for Lon Fuller"(1978) 92 ¡harvard Law Review 410 at 425. 
32B J Preston, op cit., note 30 above, 150. 
either administrative or executive decision making processes 
are labelled as 'administrative mechanisms'. 
Adjudicative mechanisms usually involve a judicial or quasi-
judicial body making a judgement in relation to an issue before 
that body.33 The decision is binding upon the parties to it and in 
the case of judicial decisions establishes a precedent which 
may be binding upon others. An example of an issue solved by 
way of an adjudicative mechanism is where the decisions of 
government ministers or officals are judicially reviewed. The 
grounds of such a review must involve alleged errors of law in 
the manner in which the minister or official has exercised his 
or her powers. 
Consensual mechanisms are essentially the ADR methods which 
are the subject of this research. These mechanisms rely on the 
consensus or agreement of the parties to the controversy to 
solve it, either alone (negotiation) or with the assistance of a 
third party (mediation). 
It Is considered that each of these mechanisms can potentially 
produce a solution which could comfortably sit at either 
extreme of the spectrum. No one mechanism has a monopoly on 
producing either settlements or full resolutions. 
33B J Preston, op cit., note 30 above, 150. 
The Concept of a Continuum 
As outlined above, the complexities associated with these 
definitional questions can be addressed using the concept of a 
continuum. Each of the three elements of environmental dispute 
resolution: environment, dispute and resolution can be dealt 
with in these terms. 
The concept of a continuum between environmental disputes and 
environmental conflicts develops into a central theme or 
structure in this study. For clarity it can be illustrated by a 
simple diagram: 





Environmental disputes in a wide generic sense are labelled as 
'environmental controversies'. The continuum ranges from the 
one extreme of an 'environmental dispute' in the sense of a 
disagreement over interests, needs or goals dealing with the 
environment, seen as incompatible but in fact amenable to 
solution. At the other extreme is 'an environmental conflict' 
where the needs or values over environmental issues appear 
essentially incompatible. 
Conclusion 
The method of nomenclature adopted is designed to systemise 
the reporting and structuring of this research. The model of a 
continuum provides the flexible method necessary because it 
takes account of the fluidity of the concept of dispute and 
conflict. Arriving at some method of placing environmental 
controversies on some point along the continuum is the next 
focus of this research. This is considered an important focus as 
it provides a structure from which the hypotheses of this study 
can be effectively examined. 
CHAPTER TWO 
CLASSIFICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERIES 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the mechanisms for resolving 
environmental controveries and indicates that different 
mechanisms may be appropriate depending upon where a 
controversy lies on the continuum between an environmental 
dispute and an environmental conflict. A method of placing 
environmental controversies along the continuum is needed. 
To achieve this purpose the nature of the characteristics of 
disputes and conflicts relating to the environment are examined 
in detail to provide one possible means of classification. 
Specific examples are then examined to show how the 
classification system might be applied. 
The mechanisms of resolving environmental 
controversies 
The distinction between dispute and conflict is important in 
determining the form of dispute resolution mechanisms which 
may be effective in environmental matters. Environmental 
disputes or environmental conflicts as defined may be suited to 
different mechanisms. So a dispute between neighbours as to 
one neighbour's building extension plans can be placed at some 
point on the controversy continuum. It involves a perceived 
incompatibility between the parties' respective interests, needs 
or goals rather than their inherent values, and so can be placed 
in the 'dispute' half of the controversy continuum. The issues in 
contention may be negotiable between the parties on the basis, 
for instance, that the extensions are modified to satisfy the 
neighbour's concerns about privacy or loss of amenity. 
Alternatively, if the parties cannot find a solution, one may be 
imposed adjudicatively. In this research this is classified as an 
environmental dispute. 
In comparison, a controversy involving an environmental 
organisation, government entities and a natural resource 
developer over commercial logging in native forests would be 
placed at a different point along the controversy continuum. It 
involves a perceived incompatibility of fundamental values, 
with the strong probability of actual incompatibility. The issues 
in contention appear non-negotiable: a compromise based upon 
agreed restrictions of tonnage or areas logged is not necessarily 
likely to be accepted by the parties. Some conservationists may 
indeed not agree to any logging of native forests. The scope of 
the difference in fundamental values is reflected in conflicting 
attitudes to forest usage: 
•You cant just save half the forest. You cani save half an 
ecosystem, anymore than you can save half a human life or half 
a sacred slte."^ 
These value differences would place It in the 'conflict' half of 
the controversy continuum. In this research, this is classified 
as an environmental conflict 
This distinction has ramifications for the appropriateness of 
the mechanisms of resolving environmental controveries. The 
purpose of this study is to determine whether one category of 
these mechanisms, namely ADR methods, is appropriate and 
effective in solving controversies lying along all or part of the 
continuum 
'Environmental dispute resolution' Is taken to mean collectively 
the range of procedures used to resolve environmental 
controversies. As discussed in Chapter One, Preston's^ 
classification of such methods is used here: 
consensual mechanisms - those mechanisms which depend upon 
the consensus or agreement of the parties to the dispute. For 
example, negotiation, mediation, neutral intervention and the 
like. 
^K Jurd, Director, Wildemess Society quoted in H Wootterv, 'Environmental 
Dispute Resolution'(1993) 15 Adelaide Law Review 33 at 49. 
2b J Preston, 'Limits of Environmental Dispute Resolution Mechanisms' 
(t995) 13 Australian Bar Review 149 at 149 
adjudicative mechanisms - those mechanisms where the dispute 
Is resolved by the determination of a judicial or quasi-judicial 
Institution. For example, litigation or arbitration before a court 
or tribunal. 
administrative mechanisms - those mechanisms where the 
dispute Is determined by the direction of a decision-maker 
vested with managerial authority. Preston describes these as 
managerial direction but the simpler term 'administrative' is 
used here. Examples of administrative mechanisms are decisions 
made by a Minister, a government bureaucrat or a local council 
and also merit reviews by a court or tribunal. 
These procedures are not mutually exclusive and can be used In 
combination. So, for Instance, consensual mechanisms may be 
used as an adjunct to adjudicative or administrative 
mechanisms. Similarly, adjudicative methods such as public 
inquiries may be used as adjuncts to the administrative 
mechanism. 
Distinguishing environmental disputes and 
environmental conflicts 
As well as identifying the controversy as one Involving Issues 
relating to the environment, some method of determining 
whether the controversy Is an environmental dispute or an 
environmental conflict needs to be found. This is essential 
before any assessment can be made as to whether consensual 
mechanisms are suited to resolve environmental controversies 
along all or part of the continuum. 
Disputes and conflicts relating to the environment have a 
number of special characteristics and these characteristics 
have been most comprehensively reviewed by Atherton & 
Atherton3. This review is examined in detail with a view to 
using these characteristics as a means of classifying 
controversies, into either environmental disputes or 
environmental conflicts. 
The extent to which a controversy displays these 
characteristics will be used to place it on the continuum 
between a dispute and a conflict. In general terms the more of 
these characteristics which are shown, the closer that 
controversy is towards the environmental conflict end of the 
continuum. 
However certain of these characteristics, it will be argued, 
carry greater weight in discriminating between an 
environmental dispute and an environmental conflict. Therefore 
an attempt will be made to identify those characteristics which 
can be used as key discriminators between environmental 
disputes.and environmental conflicts. 
3T Atherton & T Atherton,"Mediating Disputes over Tourism in Sensitive Areas, 
Part 1"(1994 ) Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal, February 1994 , 7 
at 11-17. 
The characteristics of environmental 
controversies 
Many of the characteristics reviewed here are neither unique nor 
peculiar to environmental controversies. They are evident in 
many non-environmental controversies. Additionally, a number 
of the characteristics are not mutually exclusive, that is to say 
there is a considerable degree of interrelatedness between 
them. However it is considered useful to distinguish each 
separate characteristic. 
Government is a party 
A popular misconception is that environmental controversy 
concern only developers and environmentalists. However 
research in the United States dispels this view, suggesting that 
government in its various fonns is a parly to four out of every 
five environmental controversies. This research was the result 
of a study commissioned by the US Conservation Foundation in 
1986 to examine the effectiveness of environmental mediation 
and as such is confined only to controversies subject to 
mediation, which was still in the embryonic stage at that time.^ 
The research reviewed 161 environmental controversies 
referred to mediation in the period 1974-84. These 
controversies were classified into two groups for analysis: 
site-specific and policy-level matters. 
^G Bingham, Resolving Environmental Disputes: a decade of experience (1986) 
The Conservation Foundation, Washington. 
The study analysed the parties involved in the 115 controversies 
identified as site-specific. While environmental groups and 
developers were each only involved in about a third of these 
controversies,'federal and state agencies and units of local 
government were involved in 82% of these matters."® 
The research also disclosed that the single largest category of 
these site-specific matters, 19 out of 115 cases or 16.5%, were 
controversies between govemment agencies, that is to say no 
parties other than public agencies were involved.® For example, 
in one controversy involving a regional port development, the 
parties consisted solely of 12 public agencies. 
These results are readily embraced by other writers as 
reflecting the norm for all environmental controversies, though 
the research related only to conflicts resolved by mediated 
means. This generalisation may not necessarily follow if it is 
assumed govemment bodies involved in conflicts would be more 
likely to mediate. Atherton & Atherton however accept that such 
high levels of government involvement are also typically a 
characteristic of environmental controversy in Australia, given 
that these controversies directly involve the public interest and 
govemment agencies are assumed to have responsibility to 
represent that interest.^ Fowler also adopts this view: 
•experience suggests that four out of every five environmental 
disputes will involve govemment at local, state and/or Federal 
5|d., 45. 
6|d.. 46. 
7T Atherton & T Atherton, op cit, note 3 above, 12. 
levels."® This is the view accepted here, that by their nature 
most environmental controversy involves some level of 
government involvement. 
Multiple Issues 
Environmental controversy typically involve a large range of 
issues. A large conflict may involve issues of land use, natural 
resource management and questions of air or water quality. That 
is not to say that a smaller dispute over a specific planning 
matter will not involve multiple issues. A consent authority in 
determining a development application is required under Pt 4 
and Pt 5 of the EPAA Act to take account of a large range of 
issues including: 
(i) the landscape or scenic quality of the locality, 
(ii) any wilderness areas, 
(iii)any critical habitats, 
(iv) the amount of traffic likely to be generated, 
(v) the likelihood of soil erosion, 
(vi) the amenity of the neighbourhood.^ 
But these need only be considered "so far as they are relevant", 
and most will not be considered as relevant in essentially 
planning disputes. 
J Fowler,"Environmental Dispute Resolution Techniques- What Role in 
Australia?" (1992) 9 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 122 at 128. 
^See sections 90 & 111. 
In the case of environmental conflicts the issues may also be 
interconnected and interdependent, such that a decision on one 
issue may influence all other environmental issues involved in 
the controversy. This phenomenon is described as a 'polycentric' 
problem: 
"Polycentric problems involve a complex network of 
relationships, with interacting points of influence. Each 
decision made communicates itself to other centres of decision, 
changing the conditions, so that a new basis must be found for 
the next decision." 
The difficulty with problems of this fomn is that they cannot be 
resolved by identifying each issue at the start and then solving 
them in turn, since the solution of one issue will have 
repercussions for the others. The solution of one issue may 
change the nature and scope of the others. ̂ ^ 
So, for example, in a conflict over logging a particular native 
forest compartment, a decision to permit or refuse logging in 
that area will have implications for a potentially wide list of 
issues. Logging will affect both fauna sanctuaries and flora 
diversity. The management or curtailment of logging quotas will 
have implications for the economic and social well being of the 
local community. A decision to permit logging may also have 
implications for these same issues in interconnected forest 
"•Oj Jowell, 'The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion" (1973) Public 
Law 178 at 213. 
I^ld., 167. 
areas. The conflict cannot be considered without proper regard 
for these and related issues. 
Multiple Parties 
As discussed, in the vast majority of environmental 
controversies government in some guise or other will be a party. 
In addition, there may be other parties, including prívate 
developers, environmental groups, local community groups, 
residents, unions and other affected or interested individuals. 
In many complex controversies the disputants are rarely confined 
to 'the main parties'. At a local level, a controversy ostensibly 
between a private developer and a local authority may attract the 
attention of one or more community groups. A controversy on a 
regional or national level may involve several government 
agencies, private development interests, local community groups 
and environmental groups with an international focus. 
While each of these interested parties or stakeholders has 
legitimate interests they differ markedly in degrees and style of 
organisation and have wide disparities in power and resources.^^ 
Additionally such controversies may also be protean, that is to 
say new and significant stakeholders may emerge as the dispute 
process takes place and escalates. 
I^Atherton & Atherton, op. cit., note 3 above, 12. 
So, for instance, a controversy involving the establishment of a 
copper and gold mine at Parkes in New South Wales involved 
community groups represented by the Environmental Defenders' 
Office, local graziers, the mining company, local shire 
representatives and State government authorities J ̂  Similarly, in 
environmental controversies which are referred for review to 
Commissioners of Inquiry under section 18 of the Environment 
Planning and Assessment Act (NSW) 1979 (EPAA Act) "it is not 
unusual for party numbers to be between 30 and 60 and in one 
case have been as high as 400."14 
Scientific Uncertainity 
Environmental controversies frequently raise questions of a 
scientific or technical nature which extend over a number of 
scientific disciplines. This creates the difficulty that no single 
discipline can provide a complete or precise answer to the 
scientific issues in disputed ̂  In addition, even within each 
discipline there is seldom unanimous agreement as to the 
scientific implications of various decisions or developments. 
The nature of this uncertainity is far reaching. Preston isolates 
four possible sources: 
I^The Adovale Mine Dispute, mediated in the Land and Environment Court in 
1991, see NSW Parliament, Legislative Assembly Debates (1991) 11 
December 1991 at 6480-1. 
^ ̂ Office of the Commissioner of Inquiry for Environment and Planning, Annual 
Report 1993-94, 4. 
l^T Atherton & T Atherton, op cit, note 3 above, 13. 
(1) uncertainity as to the environment: for example, does the 
area to be developed contain habitat of an endangered species of 
wildl ife? 
(2) uncertainity as to development: for example, what will be 
the volume and quality of pollutants emitted? 
(3) uncertainity as to impacts of a development: for example, 
will a pollutant have a material impact on the local, regional or 
global environment? 
(4) uncertainity as to the effectiveness of proposed mitigation 
measures: for example, how effective will habitat rehabilitation 
be in restoring damaged or disturbed ecosystems?^^ 
This uncertainity can arise either because of imperfect 
knowledge about the consequences of environmental action and 
disagreement among scientists about the interpretation of the 
data that is available; or because of the scientific biases of 
various experts in the manner and methods of data collection, or 
in many cases simply by the lack of useful research J ̂  
So, in the case of a relatively straightforward case involving 
the siting of a mushroom composting plant in a rural community, 
questions about the existence and location of water courses and 
about the estimation of effluent levels produced widely 
divergent views among the scientific experts involved J® With 
respect to one submission as to what constituted a 
"•̂ B Preston, op cit, note 2 above, 161. 
^^L Horn, "The role of mediation in international environmental lav/(1993) 
4(1) Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 16 at 28. 
^^Narrambulla Action Group Inc. v Mulwaree Council & Ors.( 1996), 
Unreported Bannon J, Land and Environment Court No 40165/95, 15 
November 1996. 
'watercourse', Bannon J said in his judgment 'a number of 
erudite gentlemen, geomorpliologists and hydrologists were 
called as witnesses and gave widely differing evidence on 
affidavit as to that issue.'^^ 
The uncertainity is exacerbated because the scientific 
information or opinion that is available is seldom value free.^^ 
For these reasons it is simply impossible to say that 
environmental controversies are scientific disputes for which it 
is possible to obtain a 'right decision'. There is no assurance 
that a 'right decision' can be achieved. The disagreement among 
scientists as to the implications of various effects concerning 
the environment and the inherent difficulty in separating 
scientific evidence and opinion from value judgements simply 
prevents this occurring in contexts of scientific uncertainity. 
This problem of scientific uncertainity and the related question 
of irreversibility has given rise, in environmental law and 
policy, to a protective approach to the environment, termed the 
precautionary principle.21 As Stein J has pointed out, the 
development of the principle 'is directed towards the prevention 
of serious or irreversible harm to the environment in situations 
of scientific uncertainity'.22 
12. 
Susskind & A Weinstein, 'Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute 
Resolution' (1980) 4 Land Use and Environmental Law Review 433 at 441. 
21 Preston, op cit., note 2 above, 161. 
22|n Leatch v National Parks and Wildlife Service & Shoalhaven City Ck)uncil 
(1993) 81 LGERA 270 at 282. 
The principle had its origins in Genmany in the 1970s and 
received expression in international environmental instruments 
such as the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, Principle 15. The principle has been incorporated 
in the Commonwealth Strategies on Endangered Species and 
Biological Diversity and in the 1992 Intergovernmental 
Agreement on the Environment, as well as in State legislation 
such as the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 
1991 (NSW). The statement of the principle in the following 
terms has now been cross-referenced in a number of other State 
legislative provisions: 
'Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainity should 
not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
environmental degradation."23 
The formulation in the 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on 
the Environment has in addition the following provisos: 
"In the application of the precautionary principle public and 
private decisions should be guided by: 
(i) careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or 
irreversible damage to the environment; and 
(ii) an assessment of the risk-weighed consequences of various 
options."24 
23 Section 6(2)(a) & see for example the Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Regulation 1994 (NSW), Schedule 2, para.8(a). 
24CI. 3.5.1. 
Prior to its statutory incorporation in most New Soutli Wales 
legislation by cross-referencing, the principle itself was 
considered as a general proposition in Leatch v National Parks 
and Wildlife Service and Shoalhaven City Council.^^ Stein J 
considered the basis of the principle, namely "the potential for 
serious hami to any endangered species and the adoption of a 
cautious approach in the protection of endangered species" as 
largely commonsense and clearly consistent with the scope of 
the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW).26 
The principle was applied to an application to take and kill 
endangered fauna in the context of the construction of a link 
road through North Nowra to the Pacific Highway on the south 
coast of New South Wales. Two species of endangered wildlife 
were affected, the Giant Burrowing Frog and the Yellow-bellied 
Glider. 
Stein J said in his judgement: 
"while there is no express provision requiring consideration ot 
the 'precautionary principle', consideration of the state of 
knowledge or uncertainity regarding a species, the potential for 
serious or irreversible harm to endangered fauna and the 
adoption of a cautious approach in protection of endangered 
25(1993) 81 LGERA 270. 
26|d., 282-283. 
fauna is clearly consistent with the subject matter, scope and 
purpose of the [National Parks and Wildlife] Act.'27 
It was accepted that the precautionary principle was most apt 
in the case of the Giant Burrowing Frog because it was a new 
addition to the endangered species schedule and therefore 
warranted the cautious approach suggested where there is 
scientific uncertainity. As regards the Yellow-bellied Glider it 
had been listed as either of special concern or as endangered 
since 1974. Though the licence was also refused for the Yellow-
bellied Glider, the court considered the precautionary principle 
was not the crucial factor as the lack of scientific uncertainity 
was considerably less.^^ The principle was thus a crucial factor 
in the court's view that a licence should not be granted in the 
case of one of the two endangered species.29 
The principle has not, however, been universally applied. Talbot 
J in Nicholls V Director of National Paries and Wildlife Service & 
Forestry Commission of NSW^^ said in refusing to allow an 
appeal against a licence to take or kill protected fauna in 
relation to forestry operations near Wingham in northern New 
South Wales: 
'while it might be framed appropriately for the purpose of a 
political aspiration, its implementation as a legal standard 
27|d. 
28|d.. 286. 
Segal, "The Precautionary Principle- Should it be Embraced?', paper 
presented to the NELA Conference Coolum, 8-12 May 1996. 
30(1994) 84 LGERA 397 
could have the potential to create interminable forensic 
argument. Taken literally in practice it might prove to be 
unworkable. Even the applicant concedes that scientific 
certainity is essentially impossible".^^ 
In Greenpeace Australia Limited v Redbani< Power Company Pty 
Limited & Singleton Council 32 Pearlman CJ in the NSW Land and 
Environment Court dealt with an appeal against the granting of 
development consent for a new power station. Greenpeace 
opposed the power station on the basis that it would 
unacceptably exacerbate the greenhouse effect through the 
cumulative effect of carbon dioxide emissions. The Court was 
asked to apply the precautionary principle and refuse 
development consent. The Court held that the application of the 
precautionary principle dictated that a cautious approach should 
be adopted but it did not require that the greenhouse issue 
should outweigh all other issues.̂ ^ 
At present the use of the Precautionary Principle in Australia 
appears to be essentially a public policy directive rather than an 
operational t o o l . S o , for instance, in the case of the 
preparation of Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) in New 
South Wales, the EIS is required to contain reasons justifying a 
proposed development having regard to "the principles of 
31 id., 429. 
32 (1994) 86 LGERA 143. 
33|d., 153 and see comments of T F M Naughton, Land and Environment Court 
Law and Practice (1993) LBC, Sydney, 2.663. 
34D Farrier & L Fisher, "Reconstituting Decision-Making Process and 
Structures in Light of the Precautionary Principle'(1993), paper delivered to 
UNSW Institute of Environmental Studies on The Precautionary Principle' 
20-21 September 1993. 
ecologically sustainable development", which principles include 
the precautionary principle. But the EIS does not need to show 
that the development positively satisfies ESD principles.^^ 
The precautionary principle developed to deal with the 
scientific uncertainity often associated with environmental 
controversies. 
If uncertainity exists a cautious approach is warranted. If there 
is uncertainity as to environmental outcomes from a 
development, 
this uncertainity extends to doubts as to whether these 
outcomes will be irreversible or not. The extent of current 
scientific knowledge does not provide an adequate basis for 
making such a prediction. 
The clearing of certain forest compartments and thus causing 
habit destruction may result in fauna species destruction which 
is irreversible. The precautionary principle counsels that in the 
face of such uncertainity caution should be exercised. 
It is considered that the presence of questions such as this 
dealing with scientific uncertainity mark out an environmental 
conflict from an environmental dispute. It would be reasonable 
to expect scientific and technical questions to arise in 
environmental disputes but in such a way that reasonable 
certainity would exist as to the environmental outcomes of the 
development. In the case of environmental conflicts however 
^^Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulations 1994 (NSW), Schedule 
2, para. 5&8. 
scientific uncertainity may well exist. The presence of such 
uncertainity is considered to be the first critical factor in 
distinguishing environmental disputes and environmental 
conflicts. 
Value Conflicts 
Environmental controversies are at least as much disputes about 
values as about science.^^ The value disputes can relate both to 
the divergence of values parties themselves bring to the dispute 
and to the value judgements scientists make in assessing 
ecological data. The problems associated with scientific 
judgements can be addressed to a large extent by a clear 
recognition that such judgements are seldom value-free.^^ 
The value conflicts which separate parties however may be 
more fundamental: 
•For example, a conflict will often occur on the basis of values 
about the relative rights of human beings and other species, or 
the merits of exploiting natural resources or conserving them, 
or what constitutes an acceptable quality of life for people in a 
particular community."3® 
Susskind & A Weinstein, op cit., note 20 above, 446. 
^^See for example, S Beder, "Activism versus negotiation: Strategies for the 
Environment Movement" (1991) 10 Social Alternatives 53. 
38g Tillett, Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach (1991) Sydney 
University Press, Sydney, 138. 
This is not to say tiiat these differences in underlying values 
will always surface but their existence should not be ignored. 
The divergence of values held by the parties may well influence 
the methods open to resolve the controversy. Environmentalists 
may, for instance, assert that in some circumstances 
environmental issues are simply not susceptible to compromise, 
for example, where they allege biological diversity is 
threatened or wildemess values are involved.^Q 
It is the range of values at issue that is fundamental. If it is 
considered that all environmental controversies involve value 
issues but that the values at issue range from non-fundamental 
to fundamental, it is possible to use this characteristic as a 
further discriminator between environmental disputes and 
environmental conflicts. 
So in the case of an environmental dispute where there are 
issues to do with amenity such as noise or view, a conflict over 
what the respective parties hold valuable may arise. Similarly 
in the case of an environmental conflict value conflicts over 
questions of sustainability may arise. But the two value 
conflicts are objectively speaking not of the same dimension, 
only the question of sustainability gives rise to fundamental 
value conflicts. 
This is best illustrated by retuming to our discussion of the 
two approaches to the concept of the 'environment'. These 
J Fowler, op cit., note 8 above, 126. 
approaches essentially show two differing ways of valuing the 
environment. The anthropocentric approach clearly views the 
environment in terms of its relationship to human beings and so 
conflicts arise as to the respective uses proposed for the 
'surroundings of human beings'. This may, for instance, be the 
extent to which such proposals reflect or depart from principles 
of sustainable development. But the ecocentric approach also 
values the environment in terms of its relationship with human 
beings. It is just that from this approach it is valued differently 
since it is valued in temns of its value to human beings as an 
entity in itself to be simply admired and appreciated or to be 
sympathetically developed. 
But while both approaches value the environment in tenns of its 
relationship to human beings there is a wide divergence in the 
values that attach to the environment. At one extreme, the 
environment is a resource to be used and exploited for the 
benefit of human beings, at the other extreme the environment 
is a resource to be left unexploited for the benefit of present 
and future human beings. In the middle, these extremes are 
subject to a fine balance based upon the principles of 
sustainable development. 
The extreme views mark out the fundamental value conflicts 
that are a key to the existence of environmental conflict. Some 
environmental disputes involve value conflicts but they are not 
of the same fundamental nature. For this reason the 
characteristics of value conflicts will also be one of the crucial 
distinguishing factors between environmental disputes and 
environmental conflicts. The existence of fundamental value 
conflict mark the controversy out as an environmental conflict. 
Difficulties with identifying and invoiving participants 
In an environmental dispute the parties will usually identify and 
involve themselves simply by participation in the process. So, 
for instance, the parties to a dispute involving a development 
application to operate a funeral parlour in a residential area 
may include the applicant, the local council and affected local 
residents, either individually or as a group. The geographic 
scope of the dispute is that of the local community and a 
reasonable expectation would be that any affected party would 
be easily identified and involved in the dispute resolution 
process. 
The position can be markedly different in the case of an 
environmental conflict, with the potential of a much larger 
scope of influence or effect. An example of such a conflict 
would be a proposal to grant logging licences in disputed 
wilderness areas. In such a situation there may be difficulties 
as regards numbers of participants and in balancing 
representation to ensure that all stakeholders participate in any 
resolution process. There needs to be a mechanism for 
identifying potential stakeholders such as representatives of 
communities affected socially and economically, conservation 
and development interests, government departments and other 
interested groups or individuals, such as recreational users. 
One relevant consideration is tlie need to attempt to ensure as 
far as possible participatory equity between the competing 
interests of government, conservation and development.^^ A 
further consideration is whether funding of participants 
perceived as having an equity disadvantage is necessary and 
appropriate to ensure the full involvement of such groups in the 
dispute resolution process. 
As well as these considerations, there are certain specific 
restrictions with respect to environmental conflicts subject to 
adjudication or administrative resolution that warrant 
comment. Where a conflict is to be dealt with by way of 
adjudication or administrative resolution, participation for a 
particular party will depend not only upon whether the party has 
a right or interest affected by the conflict but also whether this 
right or interest is recognised by the law as being sufficient to 
warrant participation. In areas of public law such as 
environmental law this concept of locus standi, or standing to 
sue, may restrict the participation of some otherwise affected 
parties. The requirement that affected parties must not only 
profess an interest but that this interest be recognised at law 
may present problems in involving all interested parties in the 
conflict resolution process. 
So, for instance, the interest of the Australian Conservation 
Foundation in the preservation of the environment generally and 
^̂ B Boer et al., The use of Mediation in the Resource Assessment Commission 
Process (1991) AGPS, Canberra, 52. 
41 Id., 70. 
in upholding an environmental right or principle in a case 
concerning wetlands protection was classified by the court as 
an "emotional or intellectual interest" not sufficient to warrant 
standing in IQSO.'̂ ^ 
By 1989 however, in a case conceming a licence to export 
woodchips from logging in the South East Forests in New South 
Wales, it was accepted that the ACF had a special interest in 
the subject matter of the application. While not giving 
environmental groups carte blanche as regards standing, Davies 
J said: 
"While the Australian Conservation Foundation does not have 
standing to challenge any decision which might affect the 
environment, the evidence thus establishes that the Australian 
Conservation has a special interest in relation to the South East 
Forests and certainly in those areas of the South East Forests 
that are National Estate. The Australian Conservation Foundation 
is not just a busybody in this area."̂ ^ 
Similariy Sackville J in North Coast Environment Council 
Incorporated v Minister for Resources accepted that the North 
Coast Environment Council had a special interest such as to give 
standing to sue against a grant of a licence to export 
woodchips.^^ 
^^Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v The Commonwealth (1980) 
146 CLR 493. 
^^ACF V Minister for Natural Resources (1989) 76 LGRA 200 at 205-6. 
44(1994) 55 FOR 492.. 
He followed this principle in granting standing to the Tasmanian 
Conservation Trust with respect to the judicial review of a 
similar decision to grant a licence to export woodchips.^^ 
Standing rules in the Land and Environment Court of NSW are on 
the face of it open. Section 123 of the EPAA Act speaks of "any 
person" bringing proceedings to remedy or restrain a breach of 
the Act and section 25 of the Environmental Offences and 
Penalties Act 1989 (NSW) allows (with leave of the court^®) 
"any person" to take such proceedings where the breach is likely 
to cause harm to the environment. 
However in the case of adjudicative and administrative 
proceedings, the permitting of participation through open 
standing rules raises questions over the financing of that 
participation. This is particularly so in the case of community 
groups or groups representing environmental interests. Not only 
are their own legal costs a consideration, the insecurities 
associated with costs orders and cost indemnities remain an 
ever present constraint. These concerns received recent 
emphasis as a result of the anxiety engendered by the NSW Court 
of Appeal decision in Richmond River Council v Oshlack ^^ 
recently overtumed in the High Court. The Court of Appeal had 
departed from the line of authority that held that the public 
^^ Tasmanian Conservation Trust v Minister for Resources & Gunns Limited 
(1995) [Gunns No.1] 127 ALR 580. 
^^Brown v Environment Protection Authority & Anor (1992) 75 LGRA 397. 
^^See T Bonyhady, Places Worth Keeping (1993) Allen & Unwin, Sydney.88 as 
to the pro bono representation provided to conservationists. 
^SUnreported CA 40120/94, 19 June 1996 and Oshlack v Richmond River 
Council (1998) HCA 11, 25 February 1998. 
nature of environmental proceedings was a relevant 
consideration in the exercise of judicial discretion to refuse an 
award of costs to a successful party. 
The problems discussed in the identification and involvement of 
participants to environmental disputes need to be addressed to 
ensure that any resolution reached will not subsequently be 
jeopardised by parties not being included in the process at the 
outset. 
Nature of issues may involve the pubiic interest 
One characteristic consistently attributed to environmental 
controversies is that they involve the public interest. However 
the concept of the public interest' presents a number of 
theoretical and practical difficulties itself. The primary 
difficulty Is in defining the concept of the public interest' and 
In making provision for the competing claims of various parties 
to represent such interest. The extent of this difficulty is 
apparent from Tillett's comments: 
'Two or more participants may each claim to represent public 
interest, community interest, national interest, or nature itself. 
Within a community, several groups or individuals (including 
elected officals and community groups) may each argue that 
they represent the interests, and the opinions, of the 
community.'^® 
^^G Tillett, op cit., note 38 above, 137. 
An examination of the developing jurisprudence witli respect to 
the concept of 'public interest litigation' is useful, though it has 
developed essentially to address questions relating to cost 
orders and indemnities.so 
In Rundle v Tweed Shire Council, a case concerned with a cost 
order following upon an unsuccessful appeal to restrain 
herbicide spraying, consideration was given as to what might 
properly be characterised as involving the public interest. The 
applicant's counsel (B J Preston) submitted the following 
features were relevant to categorising the litigation as 'public 
interest litigation":®! 
•(i) the fact of the Attorney-General's intervention in the 
proceedings; 
(ii) the considerable local interest in the issues raised by the 
proceedings; 
(iii) the applicant's proceeding represented the common concern 
of a number of local persons; 
(iv) the long history of the controversy concerning the second 
respondent's use of 2,4-D in its noxious plant eradication 
programmes; 
(v) the public interest served by the respondents ascertaining, 
by judicial decree, the extent of any relevant obligation under Pt 
V of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act; and 
^^The 'public interest* arises in these cases on the principle that in public 
interest litigation the usual rule about costs following the result does not apply. 
5169 LGRA 21 at 27. 
(vi) the public interest in protecting local flora and fauna.' 
Similar factors are considered when seeking to identify what 
constitutes 'public interest environmental matters' in the Legal 
Aid policies of the Legal Aid Commission of NSW when 
determining the merits of applications for legal aid.52. The 
criteria provide: 
"Legal Aid is available for public interest environment matters 
where the activity or proposed undertaking raises a matter of 
substantial public concern about the environment. In deciding 
whether there is substantial public concem, regard will be had 
to at least the following: 
* whether or not the activity, or proposed undertaking is likely 
to have a significant impact on the environment in NSW or to 
substantially affect public use, or enjoyment of that 
environment. 
* the scarcity of the particular attribute(s) of that environment. 
* the value of that environment to the community of New South 
Wales. 
* community interests that may be affected including the 
impact on the social and cultural needs of the community.' 
The Legal Aid guidelines equate 'public interest' with 
'substantial public concern' about developments likely to have 
significant effects on the environment. 
^^Legal Aid Commission of NSW. Legal Aid Policies (June 1995), 5. 
Atherton and Atherton take a different view in referring to 
market theory to answer the question: what is the 'public 
i n t e r e s t ' . M a r k e t theory attempts to quantify the relative 
values of competing interests: 
"The mechanism for this is usually cost benefit analysis and a 
proposal is deemed to be in the public interest if the benefits 
are found to outweigh the c o s t s . " 5 4 
While cost-benefit analysis has adapted methods for valuing 
'unpriced social benefits'^s (such as the recreational value of a 
beach or a national park), such that the public interest can be 
equated to development which produces the largest net public 
benefit, these methods remain an essentially artifical device 
for showing what should be in the public interest rather than 
what actually is. 
This brief overview shows that the concept of the public 
interest has proven a difficult concept to express or define. 
There is some merit in the often voiced proposition that the 
public interest is 'what interests the public'. This reflects the 
approach of the Legal Aid guidelines in equating the public 
interest with 'substantial public concern'. This is a useful 
shorthand approach to use in determining whether the existence 
of the public interest in a controversy is a discriminating factor 
53t Atherton & T Atherton, op cit., note 3 above, 15. 
54|d.. 
55see P W Abelson, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Problems 
(1979) Saxon House, New York. 
between an environmental dispute and an environmental 
conflict. 
Because a layer of government has been shown to be involved in 
virtually all environmental controversy- be it local, state or 
national- it can be assumed that a potential public interest is 
involved since government is presumed to represent the public 
interest. The question is whether the public interest has been 
aroused in a particular environmental controversy, that is to say 
'has the public become interested?' If it has not, the public 
interest can be said to be dormant; if it has, then there is an 
active public interest involved. It is considered that this 
characteristic of an activated public interest marks out an 
environmental conflict from an environmental dispute. In the 
case of an environmental dispute, a public interest factor exists 
but it has not been activated. In the case of an environmental 
conflict, it has been activated. 
The difficulty remains that it is not possible to isolate a single 
public interest, dormant or active. There are instead a range of 
public interests, subject to the participants' perceptions,®® and 
such 'publics' include "environmental objects'^^ (inanimate 
objects, wildlife) and future generations. 
The extent of this range of 'publics' led US Justice Douglas in 
Sierra Club v Morton to say: 
J Preston, op cit., note 2 above, 166. 
57l Susskind & A Weinstein, op cit, note 20 above, 457. 
"'public interest' has so many different shades of meaning as to 
be quite meaningless on the environmental front/^s 
For the purposes of this study it is not necessary to pursue this 
issue of the nature of the 'public interest' in an environmental 
dispute or an environmental conflict. All that is necessary is to 
find evidence that the public interest has been activated in a 
particular matter. If the public interest has been activated the 
matter is likely to be an environmental conflict. In the case of 
an environmental dispute, the interests that are activated are 
private ones, the public interest exists (hence the govemment 
involvement as the arbiter of planning standards) but it is not 
activated. Stereotypical environmental disputes involve 
competing private interests over amenity. 
Environmental conflicts on the other hand involve competing 
public interests, for instance between the economic benefit of a 
development and the environmental protection benefit. Such 
competing public interests lead to conflicting claims by various 
parties to represent such interests: 
"advocates of one position or another claim that they represent 
not just their own concerns but the public interest as well."®® 
There is no real solution to these conflicting claims other than 
to concede that there is no single public interest activated in an 
SQSierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727 (1972) at 745 cited in C D Stone, 
Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal rights for Natural Objects (1974), 
William Kaufmann, Los Altos, 76. 
S^L Susskind & A Weinstein, op cit., note 20 above, 455. 
environmental conflict. If this concession is made then there 
may be legitimacy in a number of parties claiming to represent 
"the interests of various p u b l i c s . S u c h competing claims will 
usually arise only in environmental conflicts, environmental 
disputes will be characterised by competing private interests, 
though such interests may be just as firmly held and 
championed. 
The activation of competing public interests is thus the third 
key discriminating factor between environmental disputes and 
environmental conflicts. 
Implementation Difficulties 
The implementation of agreements for resolution of 
environmental controversies may pose special problems. Firstly, 
previously unidentified problems may arise after a project is 
completed or well advanced which make the agreement reached 
or the decision imposed no longer acceptable to all the parties. 
Implementation difficulties may also arise because the 
proposed resolution of the conflict is frustrated by individuals 
or bodies which were not part of the resolution process. This 
can arise in two ways. Firstly interest groups not party to the 
resolution process may attempt to block its implementation if 
their interests have not been accommodated.®^ Secondly, if a 
govemment agency charged with the authority to implement a 
60|d.. 456-7. 
S^T Atherton & T Atherton, op cit., note 3 above, 15. 
decision has not been a party to tlie process, implementation of 
tlie decision at ail or in its agreed form may be dependent upon 
its endorsement.®^ 
Absence of a Prior Relationship among Parties 
Another specific characteristic of environmental controversy is 
that the parties often have no relationship prior to the conflict 
arising. The controversy itself may bring the parties together 
for the first and perhaps only time.®^ This needs to be seen in 
the context that in the majority of controversies a government 
agency or authority is one of the parties involved. This means 
that there is in fact a pre-existing relationship between the 
government authority and the other parties at least in the sense 
of elected representatives and their constituencies. 
In the case of an environmental dispute the parties are likely to 
have been in a pre-existing relationship such as neighbours or 
community members. That proximity may affect their 
willingness to participate in various dispute resolution 
processes. In the case of an environmental conflict there may 
either be no prior relationship between the parties or there may 
be an ongoing relationship of an entrenched bitter nature not 
conductive to eariy dispute resolution. 
®2T Atherton & T Atherton, op cit, note 3 above, 15. 
®3see Id., 16 and G Bingham & L V Haywood, 'Environmental Dispute 
Resolution: The First Ten Years (1986) 41 Arbitration Journal 3 at 4. 
Inter-organisational 
Environmental controversies are usually inter-organisational 
rather than interpersonal.^^ This produces potential problems 
associated with the size of the organisations and of the actual 
and ostensible authority of the executive to represent the 
interests of a broad constituency. This is particularly so in the 
case of environmental groups, which often purport to represent, 
and are perceived as representing, a far broader class of 
individuals than their own members.®^ Preston raises the issue 
as to whether advocates of such groups can legitimately be said 
to represent the public or even their own constituency.®® It is 
reasonable to anticipate that an advocate will tend to represent 
at best the interests of a few active members of the 
organisation's constituency rather than the whole constituency. 
Geographical Uncertainlties 
The complexities of ecological systems mean that it may not 
always be possible to deal with a dispute in isolation from its 
surroundings on the assumption that its effects can be 
localised. The approach of Agenda 21 to environmental 
protection reflects the interdependent nature of ecosystems by 
emphasising the need to protect both discreet and interacting 
ecosystems. 
Atherton & T Atherton, op cit., note 3 above, 16. 
®5R Stewart, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law"(1975) 88 
Harvard Law Review 1667 at 1767. 
®®R J Preston, op cit., note 2, 166. 
67UN Conference on Environment and Development, The Earth Summit {^993) 
London, Agenda 21, Ch 16, para.16.22. 
Because of this interconnectedness, development in one 
ecosystem may have repercussions for other systems, 
repercussions which may not be predictable with any degree of 
certainity. For instance, the impacts may be irreversible, 
involving habitat destruction or species extinction's, which 
effects were not immediatedly apparent nor contemplated. 
The effect of these complexities is that it is not always 
possible to set realistic geographical boundaries to a conflict. 
Susskind and Weinstein are of the opinion that: "There are no 
correct geographical boundaries for a particular environmental 
dispute".'^ Such boundaries need to be estimated as accurately 
as possible in order to determine jurisdiction and to include or 
exclude potential stakeholders.^^ But the effects and boundaries 
of environmental controversies are often difficult to estimate 
accurately in advance.^i 
Classification of environmental 
controversies72 
As discussed, the term 'environmental controversy' covers a 
wide range of controversies dealing with the competing 
interests, needs and goals relating to environmental matters. 
®®T Atherton & T Atherton, op cit., note 3 above, 14. 
S^L Susskind & A Weinstein, op cit., note 20 above, 451. 
^^T Atherton & T Atherton, op cit, note 3 above, 16. 
G Tillett, op cit., note 38 above, 137. 
^^The classification system adopted here owes much to that developed by B J 
Preston, op cit., note 2 above, and this debt is warmly acknowledged here. 
These controversies range across a continuum between disputes 
over essentially negotiable interests, needs or goals, to 
conflicts involving essentially non-negotiable interests, needs 
and goals. 
For the purpose of analysis it is necessary to have some method 
of placing an environmental controversy at some point along 
this continuum. The method selected essentially follows the 
classification system suggested by Preston: 
'Environmental disputes can be classified by the extent to which 
they exhibit certain characteristics. 
The more characteristics a particular environmental dispute 
exhibits the more readily it can be classed as a conflict. 
The fewer characteristics a particular environmental dispute 
exhibits the more readily it can be classified as a dispute.'^^ 
So, for this study, the exhibition of the majority of these 
characteristics mark a controversy as an environmental 
conflict, distinguishing it from an environmental dispute which 
exhibits at most a small number of these characteristics. 
In addition an attempt has been made to isolate a small number 
of key characteristics which are considered the essence of the 
distinction between an environmental dispute and an 
environmental conflict. Three characteristics capture the 
73|d.. 175. 
essential of conflict, that is, irreconcilable disagreement over 
values or goals. These are the characteristics designated as: 
1. Value Conflicts, 
2. Scientific Uncertainity, and 
3. Public Interest Concerns. 
An environmental controversy displaying a majority of the 
characteristics but in particular these three key characteristics 
will be placed in the environmental conflict half of the 
continuum. An environmental conflict classified in this way is 
defined as: 
•An environmental controversy dealing with competing 
interests, needs and goals over environmental issues, in 
particular the apparently non-negotiable issues of value 
conflict, scientific uncertainity and public interest concerns." 
Conversely an environmental controversy which displays only a 
monority of these characteristics and in particular does not 
display the three key characteristics will be placed towards the 
environmental dispute end of the continuum. An environmental 
dispute classified in this way is defined as: 
"An environmental controversy dealing with competing 
interests, needs and goals over environmental issues, but which 
issues deal with essentially competing amenities questions.' 
Distinguishing environmental disputes and environmental 
conflicts in this way and emphasising three of the 
characteristics may appear to exclude the importance of other 
characteristics which intuitively suggest large scale conflict. 
This is particularly so with the characteristics of 'multi-
parties' and 'multi-issues', where the magnitude and breadth of 
the controversy suggest that the public interest has been 
activated over conflicting values or questions of scientific 
uncertainity. But these two characteristics while important are 
not considered to be as effective in discriminating between 
environmental disputes and environmental conflicts. This is 
best illustrated by an example. 
Two recent large scale controversies are the Lake Cowal Gold 
Mine proposal in central New South Wales and the Bengalla Coal 
Mine proposal in the Hunter Valley. Both of these controversies 
involved multi-parties and multi-issues and precipitated a 
ministerial referral to a Commissioner of Inquiry pursuant to 
s i 19 of the EPAA Act. On the basis of these characteristics it 
would be expected that both controversies would be placed in 
the environmental conflict half of the continuum. But it will be 
contended that they lean towards different ends of the 
continuum. 
The Bengalla Coal Mine Controversy 
The Bengalla Mining Co Pty Limited lodged a development 
application with Muswellbrook Council in 1993 to establish and 
operate an open cut coal mine In the Upper Hunter Valley north 
of Sydney. The area proposed for the mine was adjacent to local 
residents and they together with community groups opposed the 
development. Particularly strong opposition came from local 
land users, Rosemount Estates Winery and the Dalama Horse 
Stud. 
A Commission of Inquiry was ordered in January 1994 and 
reported to the Minister in August of that year.^^ The report 
recommended that the Minister grant consent to the 
development subject to a number of conditions. Before 
ministerial consideration, the report was subject to an 
application to the Land and Environment Court of NSW seeking 
judicial review of the recommendations on the basis that the 
Commission of Inquiry had incorrectly assumed the relevant 
Local Environment Plan (LEP) permitted the mine. That 
application was upheld in the judgement of Waddell, AJ on 24 
January 1995 and as such the recommendation could not be 
acted upon by the Minister.̂ s As a result of this judgement, the 
^^Office of the Commissioners of Inquiry for Environment and Planning, 
Establishment and Operation, Bengalla Open Cut Coal Mine Muswellbrook 
(1995) Commission, Sydney. 
"^^Rosemount Estates Pty Limited v Cleland & Ors, Land and Environment Court 
of NSW No. 40144/94. 
Inquiry reconvened and a supplementary report of May 1995 
confirmed the original recommendation of consent.^® 
Nevertheless the government gazetted SEPP 45 on 4 August 
1995 and the Minister then granted consent to the mine on 7 
August 1995. This consent was subject to a further appeal in 
the Land and Environment Court of NSW. The basis of the appeal 
was that the process of making the SEPP was manifestly 
unreasonable as insufficient opportunity for public participation 
had been given due to the Minister's decision not to publically 
advertise the SEPP. The court granted the appeal and declared 
SEPP 45 and the development consent void. This decision was 
the subject of a successful appeal to the NSW Court of Appeal.^^ 
Before the appeal was heard the NSW Govemment had passed 
legislation specifically designed to approve the project.^^ 
This was passed in June 1996 and construction of the mine 
commenced in 1997. 
Mather, "SEPP No.45 (permissibility of mining) declared ¡nvalid'(1996) 
34(5) Law Society Journal 30. 
Minister for Urban Affairs & Planning v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd & Ors, 
NSW Court of Appeal 40127/96, 14 August 1996. 
State Environmental Planning (Permissible) Mining Act NSW (1996). 
The nature of this controversy was examined in terms of the 
characteristics discussed above. The results of this examination 
are tabulated as follows: 
Table One 
Bengalla Coal Min 
Display of the Cli 
e Project 
aracteristics of Enviror mental Controversy 
Characteristic Extent Displayed Evident 





multiple issues noise, air quality, 








issues re noise, 
effect on viticulture, 
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value conflicts Conflicts as to the 
value of the project 
in economic terms as 
opposed to ecological 
effects 
yes 




interests were at 












absence of prior 
relationship 
yes, though previous 
co-existence 
yes 






Number of characteristics clearly f ive 
evident 
Lake Cowal Gold Mine Controversy 
North Limited proposed in 1995 to develop a gold mine at Cowal 
West, West Wyalong in Central New South Wales. The proposed 
extraction area included part of the bed of Lake Cowal, a 
wetland waterbird habitat. While relevant government 
departments expressed concern about the potential ecological 
impacts, the majority of local residents supported the 
development. However both regional and national conservation 
groups opposed the development. The main environmental issues 
in dispute were the conservation of the ecological values of 
Lake Cowal and the effect of cyanide concentrations in the 
tailings discharging after ore processing. 
A Commission of Inquiry was ordered in October 1995 and 
reported in March 1996 recommending that conservation and 
environmental considerations did not preclude the Minister 
granting consent to the proposed development.^^ However in 
April 1996 the Minister did not adopt this recommendation and 
rejected the development on environmental grounds. The 
Minister was of the view that there could be no guarantee that 
"cyanide use will not damage this fragile ecosystem."so 
^^Offlce of the Commissioners of Inquiry for Environment and Planning, Lake 
Cowal Gold Project, Bland Shire-Forbes Shire (1996), The Commissioners, 
Sydney. 
Sydney Morning Herald, 12 April 1996, 7. 
Subsequent negotiations have tal<en place between North 
Limited, environmental groups and the NSW government 
involving attempts to have an amended development proposal 
approved. A compromise plan was brokered by the NSW Labor 
Council involving, inter alia, the establishment of a trust fund 
for environmental improvements, included North Limited 
purchasing the whole lake area and turning it into a nature 
reserve.®^ It now seems likely that the mine may proceed, either 
by Ministerial approval or a further Commission of Inquiry. 
Id.. 13 June 1998, 17. 
The nature of this controversy was also examined In terms of 
the characteristics of discussed above. The results of this 
examination are tabulated as follows: 
Table Two 
Lake Cowal Gold Mine Project 
Display of the Characteristics of Environmental Controversy 
Characteristic Extent Displayed Evident 





multiple Issues Effectof cyanide 
levels on flora & 





multiple parties 118 submissions yes 
scienti f ic 
uncertainity 
As to effects of 






As to ecologically 
sensitive areas v. 
local social & 
economic impacts 
yes 







industrial and groups 
yes 









absence of prior 
relationship 
no prior relationship yes 






Number of characteristics clearly 
evident 
eight 
Both of these environmental controversies are multi-party and 
multi-issue. On the face of it they would be expected to lie 
close to one another on the continuum. But in terms of the total 
number of characteristics each of these environmental 
controversies displays, there is some significant difference. 
The Lake Cowal project displayed eight clear characteristics, 
the Bengalla Mine project only displayed five. 
Confining the comparison to the three key characteristics, the 
differences are even more significant. In the Lake Cowal 
controversy, the public interest is activated; in the case of the 
Bengalla Mine project it is not activated to any significant 
degree. In the case of the Lake Cowal controversy, there is 
scientific uncertainity as to the effect of tailings leakage on 
native fauna in terms of waterbird breeding grounds. There is no 
strong evidence of such uncertainity in the case of the Bengalla 
Mine project. In both environmental controversies howver there 
are conflicting values over the uses to which the environment 
should reasonably be subject. 
This comparison provides a useful illustration that the size of a 
controversy (in terms of number of parties or issues) does not 
necessarily satisfactorily discriminate between an 
environmental dispute and an environmental conflict. Both of the 
inquiry processes provoked a very large number of submissions 
and involved a large number of direct participants, yet the 
controversies are at different halves of the continuum. The 
presence or absence of these three characteristics moves a 
controversy closer to either the environmental dispute or 
environmental conflict end of the continuum. 
Conclusion 
This discussion has provided a framework for the reporting of 
this research. Key terms have been defined. A method of 
classifying environmental controversies has been proposed 
based upon the extent to which they exhibit the characteristics 
of environmental controversies. This method of classification 
reinforces the existence of a continuum ranging between 
environmental disputes and environmental conflicts. 
This is the first preliminary task of this research. The next 
preliminary stage requires a review of the mechanisms for 
resolving environmental controversies. The third preliminary 
stage is an examination of those ADR methods currently used in 
the consensual mechanisms . 
Having completed these preliminary stages a detailed study of 
the use of consensual mechanisms to resolve environmental 
controversies can be detailed. 
CHAPTER THREE 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS 
Introduction 
In Chapter Two the distinguishing features of environmental 
controversies were examined. While not implying that those 
features indicated that such controversies were more amenable 
to resolution by either adjudicative, consensual or 
administrative means, it was suggested that environmental 
controversies displayed levels of complexity which may call for 
innovative approaches to their resolution. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine one such group of 
innovative approaches, namely Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) methods. The examination confines itself to those 
methods used significantly in environmental controversies. 
The concept of Alternative Dispute Resolution is critically 
examined to determine which methods of dispute resolution fall 
within this description. Secondly, those methods commonly used 
in environmental controversies are detailed and examined. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
This discussion considers the different ways in which the 
concept of ADR can be said to be 'alternative'. These senses 
include: 
(1) as an alternative to adjudication 
(2) as an alternative to externally imposed solutions 
(3) as an alternative or addition to existing dispute resolution 
structures 
(4) as a bundle of dispute resolution methods alternative to 
existing methods. 
The term ADR begs the question as in what sense these methods 
are said to be 'alternative'. If the term is used in the sense of an 
alternative to litigation then the term may still embrace other 
adjudicative dispute resolution methods, such as arbitration. As 
Gibey says, "arbitration has a long and successful history as an 
alternative to litigation".^ But Boulle points out it can be 
misleading to portray ADR as an alternative to litigation, simply 
because "litigation itself is such a rare method of managing 
disputes."2 
If ADR methods are seen also as consensual mechanisms of 
dispute resolution (where the solution of the dispute is not 
lM Gibney, "Alternative Dispute Resolution-Arbitration' (1994) paper 
delivered to the Australian Mining & Petroleum Law Association 18th Annual 
Conference, Perth, 10-12 August 1994, 20. 
2 l Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (1996) Butterworths, 
Sydney, 5. 
imposed upon the parties but is dependent on achieving 
agreement between them) then they cannot include arbitration, 
since it is an imposed solution. In addition the dispute 
resolution approach of negotiation cannot strictly be said to be 
an 'alternative' (other than to adjudication) it having been a 
method long in existence. 
This provides some potential problems of expression. For the 
sake of clarity, the four senses of 'altemative' can be grouped 
together and examined in two categories: 'altemative to 
adjudication and altemative to externally imposed solutions' 
and 'alternative to existing dispute resolution structures or 
methods'. 
Alternative to adjudication & to externally imposed 
solutions 
These two senses of 'alternative' have much in common. In the 
first sense they are confined to "dispute resolution procedures 
which are an altemative, not just to litigation, but also to 
arbitration",3 that is to say as alternative to adjudicative 
methods. In the second sense they are taken to mean alternative 
to imposed solutions, that is to say they are consensual 
mechanisms which have as a common feature a solution which is 
agreed between the parties rather than imposed.'̂  
3|d.. 1. 
^A Rogers, 'Alternative Dispute Resolution-Mediation' (1994) paper 
delivered to the Australian Mining & Petroleum Law Association 18th Annual 
Conference, Perth, 10-12 August 1994, 1. 
Viewed in these senses, ADR methods can be defined as: 
•Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) refers to a variety of 
methods, short of litigation, by which disputants may reach 
(their own) agreement to resolve their d i f f e r e n c e s . 
In shorthand form these methods are consensual mechanisms 
and in this research ADR methods in this sense and consensual 
mechanisms are used synonymously. 
The breadth of these methods is apparent from the scope of a 
number of other definitions in common usage. Bingham and 
Haygood define "environmental dispute resolution" as referring: 
"collectively to a variety of approaches that allow the parties 
to meet face to face to reach a mutually acceptable resolution 
of the issues in a dispute or potentially controversial situation. 
Although there are differences among the approaches, all are 
voluntary processes that involve some form of consensus 
building, joint problem solving, or negotiation."s 
This definition incorporates the extension suggested by, inter 
alia, Clark: 
5G Tillett, Resolving Conflict - a practical approach (1991) Sydney, LBC, 
146. 
^G Bingham & L V Haygood, 'Environmental Dispute Resolution: the first ten 
years' (1986) 41(4) Arbitration Journal 3 at 4 (emphasis supplied). 
"In addition to the established mechanisms, ADR also includes 
any technique which helps the parties to reach a compromise.' ^ 
Paratz uses the convenient summary term of 'managed 
negotiation processes' for these processes to encompass the 
essense of ADR procedures which "allow for parties to come to 
consensual resolutions of their disputes in an efficient and 
effective manner'.® 
Alternative to existing dispute resolution structures or 
existing methods 
To use the terms 'ADR methods' or 'consensual mechanisms' in 
the senses of 'alternative to adjudication' and 'altemative to 
imposed solutions' does not categorise their use as either 
supplementary to the institutionalised methods of adjudication 
and administrative procedures or as completely autonomous 
alternatives. So when 'alternative' is used in these first two 
senses it is possible, as some proponents prefer, to describe 
ADR as "Additional Dispute Resolution".® 
^E Clark, 'The role of non-litigious dispute resolution methods in 
environmental disputes"(1995) 2(2) The Australasian Journal of Natural Law 
and Policy 4 (emphasis supplied). 
®D Paratz "Options for environmental dispute resolution', paper presented at 
9th NELA Conference, Gold Coast, Queensland, 26-28 August 1990, 274. 
^L Street, 'Environmental Mediation and Other Means of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Environmental Matters in the Pacific Region' (!991) in R J 
Fowler (ed.) Proceedings of the International Conference on Environmental 
Law, 14-18 July 1989, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 129-135 at 134. 
To describe ADR methods excludes 'alternative in the third and 
fourth senses of 'alternative to existing dispute resolution 
structures or methods.' To do this diminishes their differences 
and this description is not used here. 
Some critics contend that ADR methods should in fact remain 
alternative to existing dispute resolution structures in the 
sense of a separate and self contained system of dispute 
resolution existing alongside the traditional adjudicative and 
administrative forms. The general consensus though has been 
that many of "the techniques are used not so much 
independently, but are incorporated into traditional judicial or 
administrative processes".""o 
For this reason 'alternative' is not used in the third strict sense 
as alternative to existing dispute resolution mechanisms or 
structures. When 'altemative' is used in this research in the 
third and fourth senses it is confined to the sense of a 
particular set of techniques for dispute resolution and not in the 
stricter sense of a separate and distinct consensual system of 
dispute resolution. 
It is suggested that using ADR methods in the sense of 
'alternative to existing dispute resolution methods' allows for a 
discussion of their use to overcome the inadequacies in 
traditional adjudicative mechanisms. For instance, ADR methods 
"•OR J Fowler, "Environmental Dispute Resolution techniques: what role in 
Australia? (1992) 9(2) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 122 at 
123. 
can be used long before the dispute has reached an impasse. The 
methods can be, and often are, used for dispute prevention in the 
sense of mediating compromise and thus avoiding escalation of 
the controversy. The question of the timing of the intervention 
is important because it allows the scope of what can 
legitimately be described as ADR to be expanded significantly. 
Seen in these terms ADR methods may extend to any situation of 
managed negotiation with the aim of preventing, circumventing 
or resolving an actual or potential controversy. So, for instance, 
participation on an advisory body setting environmental policy 
may fall within this expanded definition if the participation 
helps to manage the inherent conflict between the stakeholders 
over such policy. 
To summarise, the sense of 'alternative' which remains from 
this discussion is that ADR methods are alternative to 
adjudication and to externally imposed solutions and alternative 
or additional to existing methods of dispute resolution. 
ADR methods used in environmental 
controversies 
In addition to defining ADR methods in the senses set out above 
they can also be classified into a simple division of 'assisted' 
and 'unassisted' negotiation. Assisted negotiations are 
characterised as involving an additional person in the process 
who is not an immediate party to tlie controversy. ^̂  Mediation 
is tiie main fomn of assisted negotiation and will be used here 
to describe the process of mediation itself and as a convenient 
summary expression to describe all forms of assisted 
negotiation. The other assisted negotiation forms essentially 
involve the use of mediation in wider contexts and these include 
facilitation, neutral evaluation or case appraisal, scoping and 
mini-trials. 
Unassisted negotiation is sometimes referred to as a 'primary' 
dispute resolution process. Boulle indicates this is so, both 
because negotiation is an element in most other dispute 
resolution processes and because negotiation of itself is the 
most immediate way of dealing with a c o n t r o v e r s y . ^ 2 Unassisted 
negotiation is also a flexible process used in a wide range of 
contexts and forms but unassisted by a neutral non-party. The 
term negotiation is used here to describe all forms of 
unassisted negotiation. 
Mediation and other forms of assisted 
negotiation 
The definition of mediation 
To Wade, mediation is a "slippery concept" having multiple 
meanings essentially dependent upon the context in which it is 
Boulle, op cit.,note 2 above, 66. 
12|d. 65. 
used and the userJ^ Wade says that at a broad level mediation 
can best be described as assisted negotiation or assisted 
decision making. 
To define mediation with as much precision as possible, the 
best starting point is the classic definition of mediation of 
Folberg and Taylor: 
"The process by which participants, together with the 
assistance of a neutral third person or persons systematically 
isolate dispute issues, in order to develop options, consider 
alternatives and reach a consensual settlement that will 
accommodate their needs."^^ 
Boulle is critical of this definition, primarily because of the 
departures it makes from actual practice. He says, for instance, 
there are many instances where mediation does not 
systematically isolate issues nor consider options but rather 
involves incremental bargaining towards a compromise 
solution. 
As well as the elements contained in Folberg and Taylor's 
definition, there is the additional important element of 
voluntariness. Cormick's definition is the classic statement of 
this approach: 
H Wade, "Mediation-The Terminological Debate" (1994) 5(3) Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal August 1994 204 at 207-209. 
"•̂ J Folberg & A Taylor, Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving 
Conflict Without Litigation (1984) Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 4. 
"•̂ L Boulle, op cit., note 2 above, 5. 
"Mediation is a voluntary process in wliich those involved in a 
dispute jointly explore and reconcile their differences. The 
mediator has no authority to impose a settlement. His or her 
strength lies in the ability to assist the parties in resolving 
their own differences. The mediated dispute is settled when the 
parties themselves reach what they consider to be a workable 
solution. 
But the prerequisite of this element of voluntariness is not 
without its critics. Certainly mediation is not always voluntary 
since parties are sometimes coerced into the process. Modem 
litigation and administrative case management systems for 
instance require or compel parties to enter into the process. 
This is either by the imposition of cost sanctions or on the 
basis of fear that intransigence to participate will adversely 
affect any subsequent adjudicative or administrative decision. 
Similarly as regards participation in the process itself the 
element of voluntariness implies that mediated decisions 
reflect the preferences of the parties and not that of a 
mediator. But it is not always possible to draw a clear line 
between consensual and imposed decisions since consensuality 
can be a question of degree. There are examples of mediations 
where the process creates its own momentum and pressures to 
settle and where the mediator induces parties to settle where 
16G w Cormick, 'Mediating Environmental Controversies: Perspectives & 
First Experience" (1976) 2 Earth Law Review 215 at 215. 
they might not otherwise have done soJ^ Merely because of their 
authority, mediators may perform a quasi-adjudicative 
function^® However consensuality should be taken in the narrow 
sense that the parties have the autonomy to accept or reject 
particular outcomes and to refuse to settle. Then voluntariness 
in the sense of 'consensuality of outcomes' can be regarded as a 
defining characteristic of mediation. 
Given these considerations mediation is still no easier to define 
after several decades of application, 'since it does not provide a 
single analytical model which can be neatly described and 
distinguished from other decision-making processes'. 
Nevertheless, allowing for this difficulty Boulle provides a 
definition and this definition is preferred for the purpose of 
this study: 
'Mediation is a decision-making process in which the parties are 
assisted by a third party, the mediator; the mediator attempts 
to improve the process of decision-making and to assist the 
parties to reach an outcome to which each of them assent.'2 o 
Definitional questions were also addressed in the context of 
legislation requiring adoption of ADR methods. One common 
example of such legislative initatives is the New South Wales 
"•̂ C Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for resolving Conflict 
(1986) Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 277. 
"•öR Ingley, 'Court Sponsored Mediation: The Case Against Mandatory 
Participation' (1993) 56 Modem Law Review 441 at 443. 
L Boulle, op cit, note 2 above, 3. 
20|d. 
enabling legislation, the Courts Legislation (Mediation and 
Evaluation) Amendment Act 1994 (NSW) which came into force 
on 14 November 1994. This Act inserted new provisions headed 
'Mediation and Neutral Evaluation' into, inter alia, the Land and 
Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) (the LEG Act) being Part 5A, 
sections 61A-61L. This amending legislation indicated that its 
purpose was to: 
"enable the Court to refer matters for mediation or neutral 
evaluation if the parties to the proceedings concerned have 
agreed to that course of action.''2i. 
The amendments added by the Act provide a definition of 
mediation: 
"'Mediation' means a structured negotiation process in which the 
mediator, as a neutral and independent party, assists the parties 
to a dispute to achieve their own resolution of the dispute." 22 
This definition does not mention the essential element of 
voluntariness, but s 61D (1) (b) of the LEG Act provides for it in 
making the consent of the parties a condition precedent to the 
Gourt referring a matter to mediation. 
The other condition precedent to the Gourt referring proceedings 
for mediation or neutral evaluation is that the Gourt consider 
2lsection 61A(1) 
22section 61B(1). 
the circumstances appropriate and there is agreement by the 
parties as to who is to be the mediator or neutral e v a l u a t o r . 2 3 
Section 61E of the LEG Act reiterates the essential element of 
voluntariness by providing that attendance at and participation 
in mediation or neutral evaluation sessions are voluntary and 
that a party may withdraw from the sessions at any time. 
The process of mediation 
Once definitional problems are addressed the next aspect to 
consider is the process of mediation itself. The process of a 
particular mediation depends amongst other things upon the 
nature of the controversy and the resources of the parties. 
Boulle isolates what can be referred to as a standard mediation 
process. He denotes three sequential phases which involve the 
following stages: 
(1) preparatory matters: initiating the mediation, screening the 
dispute's suitability, determining the scope of the dispute and 
identifying relevant stakeholders; 
(2) the mediation meeting: mediator's opening, parties' 
presentations, defining and ordering the issues, negotiating, 
separate meetings, decision-making and its recording; 
(3) post-mediation: ratification, official endorsement by a 
consent authority if required and supervising i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . ^ ^ 
23section 61D(1)(a)&(c). 
24l Boulle, op cit., note 2 above, 91-112. 
These stages are relevant for a consideration of mediation both 
as a stand alone method of dispute resolution and as a 
component In other forms of assisted negotiation. 
Commentators distinguish between four models of mediation, 
namely: the settlement, facilitative, therapeutic and evaluative 
models.2^ The point should be made that a single mediation may 
display the characteristics of a number of models, for instance 
it may begin in the facilitative mode then move into an 
evaluative mode. Allowing for this it is easiest to distinguish 
the models on the basis of the main objective they seek to 
achieve. 
Settlement mediation seeks to encourage incremental 
bargaining towards a compromise between the parties' 
positional demands. Whereas facilitative mediation seeks to 
negotiate in tenns of the parties' underiying needs rather than 
In terms of their overt positional expectations. Therapeutic 
mediation is similar in that it focuses upon the underiying 
causes of the parties' problems with a view to improving their 
relationship as the basis of resolution. Evaluative mediation has 
a narrower focus in that it essentially deals with a dispute 
according to the parties' entitlements and the anticipated 
adjudicative outcomes.26 in terms of the application to 
environmental controversies, the preferred model is the 
25see Id.. 28; H Brown & A Marriott, ADR Principles and Practice (1993), 
Sweet and Maxwell, London, 115 and S Bordow & J Gibson, Evaluation of the 
Family Court Mediation Service (1994) Family Court of Australia, Research 
and Evaluation Unit, Research Report No. 12, Canberra. 
26L Boulle, op cfL, note 2 above, 29. 
facilitative one since resolution of the controversy requires an 
examination of underlying needs and interests especially in 
dealing with environmental conflicts. 
The purposes of mediation 
The last aspect to consider in this review of mediation practice 
is the various uses to which mediation is put. A number of these 
uses are evident in environmental mediation. The first use to 
which mediation is put is for the sole purpose of defining the 
issues in dispute and referring the dispute to other forms of 
dispute resolution. Some writers refer to this as scoping 
mediation but the preference here is to deal with scoping as a 
distinct form of assisted negotiation. 
The second use to which mediation is put is referred to as 
dispute settlement mediation. This is where the process is used 
in an attempt to settle the controversy between the parties 
through joint decision-making. 
Contrasted with this is the use of mediation to manage conflict 
in the sense of an ongoing series of controversies, while 
acknowledging that the conflict itself will continue. An example 
of this usage is the mediated regulation of relationships 
between the parties involved in an environmental controversy. 
Boulle identifies the use of mediation in this way to formulate 
policy, or standards and procedures in government made rules 
and regulations. This reflects the use of mediation in the United 
States where it is institutionalised in a form of mediation 
known as 'policy dialogue'. This process operates where: 
"a third party convenor assists the various (and usually 
adversarial) interests groups to formulate consensually arrived 
at legislative or regulatory recommendations which are 
forwarded to decision-makers."27 
This process has been given legislative effect in the United 
States referred to as regulatory-negotiation or "reg-neg".28 The 
use of mediation in this policy-making fashion was recognised 
as a process: 
"where parlies, who lack power to resolve a dispute by their 
agreement, reach agreement by mediation on a common position 
to put to a decision maker."29 
Conciliation 
Conciliation is another form of assisted negotiation in which 
the conciliator intervenes in various ways with the object of 
faciliating a settlement between the parties.^o There is. 
27p Adier, "Mediating Public Disputes' (1990) in R J Fowler (ed.) 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Environmental Law, 14-18 
June 1989, Sydney, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 
28d Pritzker, "Regulation by Consensus: Negotiated Rulemaking In the United 
States' (1994-95) 1 Commercial Dispute Resolution Journal 217. 
Wootten,'The Merits of Negotiation and Mediation in Resource Management 
Disputes' (1991) 15 Adelaide Law Review 33 at 41. 
30L Boulle, op ciL, note 2 above, 67. 
however, a wide divergence of views about the definition of 
conciliation and its relationship to the mediation process.^i 
One of the essential differences considered is that conciliation 
is routinely provided by public agencies and is therefore 
institutionalised and not alternative in the strict sense of 
'alternative to existing dispute resolution structures.' But as 
discussed above this sense of 'alternative' is not favoured here. 
In addition conciliation operates 'under the shadow of the law' 
and as such there are limitations on the kind of settlements 
possible. Bryson reflects this view by defining conciliation as 
"mediation within a legal framework" with the conciliator 
acting as an advocate for the law.32 
These differences reflect the origins of conciliation as a 
statute-based system of dispute resolution, particularly in the 
area of industrial relations, but there is little real difference 
between mediation and conciliation in practice. For instance. 
Street says: 
"In recent times, mediation or conciliation (the words are 
synonymous) has been increasingly accepted in Australia and in 
comparable jurisdictions as an adjunct to the adjudication of 
claims at law. Although we have a preference for the word 
mediation, we shall use in this report the word conciliation.."33 
31 Wade, op cit., note 13 above, 204. 
32d Bryson, "Mediator and Advocate: Conciliating Human Rights" (1990) 
1 Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal 136. 
33l . Street, Report on a Model of Conciliation for the NSW Workcover Scheme 
(1996) L. Street, Sydney, 8. 
Because the resolution of environmental controversies also 
operates by necessity 'under the shadow of the law' the process 
of resolution by mediation in environmental matters could 
equally be described as resolution by conciliation. But it is 
considered that no useful purpose is served by making an 
essentially artificial distinction between mediation and 
conciliation. Mediation as used here encompasses this form of 
assisted negotiation. 
Scoping 
Scoping is a normal part of a mediation process but it can also 
be used as a distinct part of other dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Its aim is to detemnine the 'scope' of the issues to 
be addressed and to identify the significance or ranking of such 
issues. 
The formal origin of the scoping process' is the United States 
National Environmental Policy Act 1969 (NEPA) regulations 
which developed in reaction to the preparation of lengthy 
environmental impact statements (EISs), criticised as costly 
and non-evaluative.34 The NEPA provided instead for the 
mandatory use of scoping to involve interested parties such as 
government agencies, proponents, affected parties and others in 
determining matters of relevance to be addressed in the EIS at 
34b Boer et al, The Use of Mediation in the Resource Assessment Commission 
Process (1991) AGPS, Canberra, 7. 
the initial stage of its preparation with a view to realistically 
limiting their scope. The matters scoped included determination 
of the significant matters in issue, allocation of responsibility 
for conducting the necessary studies, arrangements for 
conducting consultation and methods for determining 
compliance with related legislation.^^ 
More recently the suggested use of scoping has been widened to 
include an initial period of scoping preceding public inquiries. 
This was one of the recommendations made in the consultants' 
report to the Resource Assessment Commission.^^. It has also 
been recommended as the "proper role for negotiation/mediation 
in terms of environment dispute resolution" by the 
Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario.37 The general view 
is that scoping will be most effectively conducted with the 
involvement of a neutral third party. 
Scoping is a modification of mediation since its use is confined 
to an initial tool only with the resolution of the actual 
controversy left to other dispute resolution methods. The 
benefit of scoping is that it can overcome the constraints of the 
public inquiry process where the emphasis is upon sequential 
and non-interactive consultation.3® Scoping potentially permits 
for a much more interactive process. This is the use suggested 
35|d., 62. 
36|d., xlv. 
37m I Jeffery, "Accommodating negotiation in the environmental impact 
assessment and project approval processes" (1987) 4(4) Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal 244 at 250. 
38h ROSS, "Environmental Impact Assessment: How to Understand and Resolve 
the Substantive Issues in a Dispute" (1991) paper presented at EDR 
conference Sydney, 14-15 May 1991, 5. 
for the inquiry process of the Commissioners of Inquiry for 
Planning and Environment in NSW.^Q 
Scoping can also be used to settle the process for dealing with 
smaller individual impact assessments and planning reviews at 
a local level, rather than leaving the scope of such reviews to 
the staff of local authorities.^o 
One important difference between scoping and mediation is that 
the scoping process does not necessarily require 
confidentiality, a usual prerequisite of ADR processes. The 
significance of this distinction is an important issue in this 
research. 
Facilitation 
Facilitation overlaps considerably with mediation. The main 
point of difference is that facilitation has the capacity to be 
more flexible and open-ended than mediation in terms of its 
procedures and potential uses.-̂ ^ The definition of facilitation 
reflects this difference: 
390ffice of the Commissioners of Inquiry for Environment and Planning, 
Annual Report 1994-95 (1995) Office of the Commissioners, Sydney, 5. 
^^R Sandford, 'The Merits of Negotiation and Mediation in Resource 
Management Disputes''(1991) paper presented to Environmental Dispute 
Resolution Conference, Sydney, 14-15 May 1991, 9. 
L Bouile, op cit., note 2 above, 74. 
•Facilitation Is the bringing together of disputing parties with a 
view to clarifying Issues, reducing adversity, establishing 
facts, confining issues and creative problem-solving." 
The wider scope of facilitation is evident from the range of 
matters facilitators assist the parties with, Including 
Information gathering, fact finding, round table conferencing, 
public meetings and consultancy referrals. Facilitation is said 
to be particularly useful In dealing with problems involving 
multiple issues and multiple parties, characteristics typical of 
some environmental controversies. Facilitation most 
appropriately constitutes a preliminary step before the dispute 
resolution process Itself commences. 
Similar to scoping, facilitation is not a process that necessarily 
demands confidentiality. 
Neutral Evaluation / Case Appraisal 
The terms 'neutral evaluation' and 'case appraisal' are used 
synonymously for the process in which a controversy is referred 
to an independent third party who provides a view on Its merits. 
The Courts Legislation (Mediation and Evaluation) Amendment 
Act 1994 (NSW) which Introduced mediation and neutral 
evaluation into the procedures of six court systems in New 
South Wales provides a definition of neutral evaluation which 
reflects its differences from mediation: 
'Neutral evaluation means a process of evaluation of a dispute 
in which the evaluator seeks to identify and reduce issues of 
fact and law that are in dispute. The evaluator's role includes 
assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of each party's 
case and offering an opinion as to the likely outcome of the 
proceedings. 
The equivalent Queensland legislation, which introduced ADR 
processes at the discretion of the court into the Queensland 
court system, uses the synonymous term 'case appraisal'. The 
definition however indicates that case appraisal has 
similarities with adjudicative mechanisms. Case appraisal is a: 
"process under the Rules under which a case appraiser 
provisionally decides a dispute.'^^ 
As Clark^3a points out this is really a variation of arbitration, 
except that the parties are free to decide in advance whether 
the determination will be binding. Given this saving clause the 
differences between the New South Wales and Queensland 
provisions are in fact slight. In NSW, the evaluator's role 
includes offering an opinion on a likely outcome whereas the 
Queensland appraiser makes a provisional determination. The 
use of this ADR option is usually in a controversy requiring a 
decision on a specific technical or scientific issue which can be 
detemiined by a neutral expert, either in an advisory or binding 
^^Court Legislation (Mediation and Evaluation) Amendment Act 1994 (NSW), 
Sch 1. 
^^Courts Legislation Amendment Act 1995 (Old), section 6 (emphasis added). 
43a E Clark, op cit., note 7 above, 7. 
capacity. Usually it is non-binding and is intended to "constitute 
the voice of experience wliich will influence the parties in 
negotiating".44 
The difference in roles between the evaluator / expert and a 
mediator is that: 
"unlike a mediator, an expert is expected to provide an answer 
to a particular matter submitted by the parties and it is 
generally expected that an expert will reach a decision upon the 
basis of her or his personal opinion or expertise rather than on 
the parties' submissions or on law."^^ 
In this sense the expert is using his or her expertise and 
influence to potentially affect the outcome of a controversy. 
Mini-Trial 
'Mini-trial' is a dispute resolution process which combines 
aspects of case presentation with mediation. It involves firstly 
a 'best case' presentation by both parties, usually to a neutral 
third party. The second stage is then intended to evolve into a 
consideration of settlement options with the third party 
assisting in such process. 
^^L Boulle, op cit, note 2 above, 72. 
Astor & C Chinkin, Dispute Resolution In Australia (1992) Butterworths, 
Sydney, 114. 
A mini-trial in this sense is not really a trial at all in the 
traditional sense but rather a structured presentation utilising 
a trial-like setting. Its use is mostly confined to disputes 
involving large corporations, with consequent limited use to 
date in environmental controversies.^® 
Forms of Unassisted Negotiation 
Negotiation 
Definition 
Negotiation refers to unassisted or direct negotiation between 
the parties to a controversy. There is no third party neutral' 
present. Negotiation is a traditional approach to dispute 
resolution but the principled or 'win-win' approach to 
negotiation which is said to characterise ADR methods has 
produced "an enormous change in the way we think about 
negotiation.•47 
The core elements of negotiation irrespective of the approach 
taken have been isolated as: 
(a) a verbal interactive process 
(b) involving two or more parties 
Clark, op cit., note 7 above, 29. 
47H Wootten, op cit., note 30 above, 42. 
(c) who are seeking to reach agreement 
(d) over a problem or conflict of interest between them 
(e) in which they seek as far as possible to preserve their 
interests, but to adjust their views and positions in the joint 
effort to achieve an agreement 
All models of negotiation display these core elements but are 
substantially different in the approaches they take. The three 
models examined here are positional bargaining, problem-
solving negotiation and interest-based bargaining. 
Models of negotiation 
Positional Bargaining 
In positional bargaining the parties adopt extreme opening 
positions, and thereafter make incremental concessions bringing 
them closer together until they reach agreement. This is the 
most commonly used approach to negotiation because it is form 
most often familar to litigants and their advisers.^s 
The advantages of this approach essentially flow from its 
familarity and its relative ease of application, but it has a 
number of shortcomings. One serious shortcoming is that it may 
overlook some of the parties' needs or interests which have not 
Anstey, Negotiating Conflict (1991) Juta & Co., Kenwyn, South Africa, 
9 1 - 9 2 . 
49c Mendel-Meadow, "Lawyer Negotiations: Theories and Realities-What We 
Learn From Mediation" (1993) Modem Law Review May 1993, 361 at 361. 
been clearly articulated in the claim and and thereby reduce the 
negotiation to a single issue.^^ A number of difficulties may 
flow if the negotiations become reduced to a single issue. Where 
the other potential issues in dispute are ignored it may 
sometimes be difficult to close the final gap between the 
parties since there is nothing left to bargain. The negotiations 
may break down without a settlement. Similarly where the 
controversy involves parties in a continuing business or other 
relationship the tactics often employed in positional bargaining 
may sour the relationship and adversely affect any future 
negotiations. 
Problem-solving Negotiation 
Approaches such as problem-solving negotiation attempt to 
promote techniques in negotiation which go beyond mere 
compromise. One of the salient features of such negotiation 
which Boulle recognises is the preparedness to probe beneath 
the positional claims of the parties to uncover "their real needs 
and interests".5i By placing on the negotiation table all such 
matters, the scope for effective negotiations is said to be 
therefore enhanced. 
Boulle, op cit, note 2 above, 48. 
51 Id.. 49. 
Interest-based Negotiation 
One of the most influential of the recent problem-solving 
approaches to negotiation is that of interest-based negotiation. 
The main example of this approach is the principled negotiation 
model associated with the Harvard Negotiation Project, 
generally accessible through the writings of Fisher and Ury.52 
Fisher and Ury's model is the basis for most descriptions of the 
interest- based negotiation process. The model relies upon four 
underlying principles summarised as: 
(1) Separate the feelings of the people from the substance of 
the problem; 
(2) Focus on interests, not positions; 
(3) Invent options for mutual gain; 
(4) Insist on objective criteria.5 3 
The first of these defining features emphasises the need to 
develop a working relationship between the parties based upon 
mutual acceptance and reliability without conceding on the 
substantive issues. The emphasis in such negotiations is upon 
separating the personal and emotional aspects of the 
controversy and focussing upon the substantive problem. 
Secondly, parties in negotiations are encouraged not to focus 
upon their positions but upon the needs and interests which 
52r Fisher and W Ury, Getting to Yes (1981) 2nd ed., Business Books Limited, 
London. 
53|d. 11-12. 
underlie those positions. The reason for this emphasis is that 
the underlying interest may be easier to negotiate and achieve 
in a number of ways different from that represented by the 
initial position. 
Fisher and Ury's model encourages inventive and innovative 
solutions to the problem at hand. The atmosphere encouraged by 
once novel techniques such as brainstorming allows the 
development of settlement options which may not otherwise be 
considered nor recognised by the parties. 
The fourth feature of the model emphasises the need for 
objective criteria about what outcomes are realistically 
possible or preferable. Insistence on objective criteria can 
avoid stalemates and breakdowns in negotiations. A difference 
of opinion as to options can be resolved by reference to an 
agreed standard and thus not become a protracted area of 
dispute. 
Boulle's view is that despite the apparent simplicity of these 
principles, "they are deeply profound".®^ They help to achieve the 
desired outcome of an agreement that meets the interests of the 
parties. Fisher and Ury describe such an outcome as a "wise 
agreement": 
"An agreement that meets the legitimate interests of each side 
to the extent possible, resolves conflicting interests fairly, is 
durable, and takes community interests into a c c o u n t . 
Boulle, op cit., note 2 above, 51 
55|d., 4. 
A model having these features remains the basis for the conduct 
of interest-based negotiations. But the model has been subject 
to criticism as an inadequate description of the process, 
particularly with reference to multi-issue and multi-issue 
negot ia t ions. i t remains to be seen whether the model can 
make adequate allowance for situations involving conflicting 
values, public interest concerns or scientific uncertainity which 
we have suggested distinguish environmental conflicts. 
In these cases either interest-based negotiation is 
inappropriate and should be avoided or different criteria will 
need to be applied. Some critics argue that if negotiations do 
take place the parties return to the "ultimate hard bargaining" 
strategies.57 The process is then characterised by strategies 
"pushing for a compromise outcome" which essentially equate to 
positional bargaining.^s 
It is important to remember for this reason there can be no 
certainity that the style of negotiation being employed in ADR 
processes reflects the Fisher and Ury ideal. The parties may 
equally be negotiating positionally as from an interest-based 
position and the negotiations will need to take account of the 
inherent differences. 
56see B Wolski, "The role and the limitations of Fisher and Ury's model of 
interest-based negotiation in mediation" (1994) Australian Dispute Resolution 
Journal, August 1994, 210. 
J White, "The Pros and Cons of 'Getting to Yes' & Comments by R Fisher" 
(1984) 34 Journal of Legal Education 115 at 116. 
58b Wolski, op cit, note 56 above, 218. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a framework for 
discussing the use of ADR methods in the resolution of 
environmental controversies. 'ADR methods' and 'consensual 
mechanisms' are used synonymously to describe those dispute 
resolution methods 'alternative to adjudication, to externally 
imposed solutions and to existing dispute resolution methods'. 
'Mediation' is used as a shorthand description for all forms of 
assisted negotiation. 'Negotiation' is similarly used as a 
shorthand description for those ADR methods where the parties 
seek to reach a consensual resolution without the assistance of 
a neutral third party. 
Using this nomenclature the research explores the use of these 
methods in resolving environmental controversies along the 
length of the continuum between environmental disputes and 
environmental conflicts. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have detailed the characteristics of 
environmental controversies and the ADR methods which may be 
utilised to resolve them. This chapter reviews the current 
United States literature on the use made of ADR methods in the 
resolution of environmental controversies and the extent of that 
usage. 
In reviewing an effective 25 year history of the development 
and use of ADR methods to resolve environmental controversies 
a number of topics arise for discussion. This review seeks to 
address these recurrent topics. 
In two classic articles in the 1970s Fuller discussed the limits 
and forms of two dispute resolution mechanisms, referring to 
mediation (or consensus mechanisms generally)^ and 
a d j u d i c a t i o n . 2 . He was concerned with controversies in general 
rather than environmental controversies specifically. His 
discussion of the limits of these two dispute resolution 
mechanisms involved a consideration of the characteristics of 
"•L Fuller, 'Mediation-Its Forms and Functions' (1971) 44 Southern 
California Law 325. 
^L Fullerp 'The Forms and Limits of Adjudication' (1978) 92 Harvard Law 
Review 353. 
each mechanism and its capacity to resolve certain types of 
controversies. 
Another aspect of Fuller's discussion was the form of the 
dispute resolution mechanism, that is the way to organise 
adjudication or mediation in order to be most effective. His 
discussion is the first clear expression of the notion that 
different kinds of controversies may be better resolved by 
different dispute resolution mechanisms. This is particularly 
important in the light of our earlier argument that the kind of 
environmental controversies requiring resolution range along a 
continuum between planning disputes and environmental 
conflicts. 
Fuller provides the theoretical background for the discussion 
suggesting that mediation (or ADR methods generally) 
constitute a separate and distinct system of dispute resolution. 
He draws a clear distinction between mediation and 
adjudication as separate dispute resolution mechanisms. This is 
important because the growth of ADR methods is often seen as a 
reaction to the inadequacies of adjudication. 
For the sake of clarity our discussion reviews the United States 
experience with ADR methods in three separate stages: 
implementation & experimentation, consolidation and current 
practice. 
stage One: Implementation & Experimentation 
Reaction against adjudication 
It is customary to think of adjudication as 'a means of settling 
disputes or controversies." But more fundamentally adjudication 
can be viewed as a fomn of social ordering, "as a way In which 
the relations of men to one another are governed or regulated.'^ 
Seen In this light, adjudication can be compared with other 
forms of social ordering those involving for instance, 
negotiation or those requiring a managerial or political solution. 
Fuller considers the essential distinguishing characteristics of 
adjudication. Firstly, adjudication Is a device that gives formal 
expression to the influence of reasoned argument. Secondly, the 
disputant must make a 'claim of right' based upon some legal 
principle.^ 
The judge or arbitrator can certainly step out of this strict role 
of adjudicator and assume another role and therefore not be 
subject to these constraints. But this does not negate the fact 
that there are some forms of controversy which are inherently 
unsuited to adjudication. Fuller categorises these as 
'polycentric disputes', controversies involving both a 
multiplicity of parties and an issue which is not sharply 
defined, in Fuller's words, where there is 'a somewhat fluid 
3|d., 357. 
4 Id. 366. 
State of affairs".^ His view is tliat if such controversies are not 
suited to resolution by means of adjudication, other mechanisms 
such as negotiation or "administrative direction" may be more 
suitable. 
Fuller still places adjudication in the role of the primary 
mechanism of dispute resolution saying that these other 
mechanisms may be more suitable for certain types of 
controversies. 
Other writers are sharper in their criticism of the inadequacies 
of adjudicative mechanisms. One common criticism was that the 
inefficiency of adjudicative bodies was due to a 'litigation 
explosion' with which the court system had simply been unable 
to cope. This rise in court use was seen as a legacy of the 1960s 
when many legal newcomers (consumers etc.) started utilising 
the court system. But on reviewing the empirical research, 
Parmentier concludes that "this diagnosis is severely 
questioned and [should be] ultimately discarded."® His view was 
that the reaction against the adjudicative system was not 
primarily due to its perceived inefficiencies stemming from 
overioad. 
In the case of environmental controversies the perceived 
inefficiency of the court system is seen more as an inability to 
deal with the growth of environmental legislation and the added 
5|d.. 397. 
Parmentier, "Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United States: No roses 
without thorns" (1991) in S Nagal & M Mills(ed.) Systematic Analysis in 
Dispute Resolution, Quorum Books, New York, 223-241 at 227. 
interpretative role this places on courts and other tribunals. But 
as Wald points out the role of adjudication in environmental 
controversies is limited. The primary responsibility to 
formulate and apply 'pertinent legal rules' is granted to 
executive officals and independent agencies^ The court's role is 
in the exercise of review over such decisions. 
If the perception of 'a legal and regulatory malaise' which was 
said to have characterised the view of the American legal 
system by the late 1970s was not primarily due to the inability 
of the courts to deal with a quantitative leap in 'court dockets', 
what was the source of the perception?® It seems in part to be 
due to a realisation of the inherent restrictions of adjudication 
in handling controversies. Fletcher identifies the major 
restriction: 
'Our courts are reactive bodies - like spiders, we judges wait 
and watch to see what controversies may fly into our webs...our 
obligation is to resolve the dispute presented and on as narrow 
grounds as possible."^ 
These restrictions are particularly pertinent in the case of 
environmental controversies where the ramifications of a 
decision may well extend beyond the specific controversy or 
parties involved. But the inherent restrictions of adjudication 
M Wald, "Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: a new role for the 
courts?'(1985) 10 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 1. 
8|d., 3. 
^B B Fletcher, 'The Judicial Approach to Environmental Litigation'(1990) in 
R J Fowler (ed.) Proceedings of the Intemationai Conference on Environmental 
Law, 14-18 July 1989, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 60. 
do not allow courts to fill the role of reconciling essentially 
competing political interests. This is a role for: 
"the agency to which congress has delegated policymaking 
responsibilities...rely[ing] upon the incumbent administration's 
view of wise policy to inform its judgments. 
On this view the reaction against adjudication is more in 
response to its perceived ineffectiveness in resolving complex 
public interest controversies than any perception of its 
inefficiency in dealing with a hugely increased levels of 
litigation. This realisation prompted a number of early writers 
to speculate as to whether ADR methods could effectively fill 
this void. A closer examination of the features of the small 
scale societies in which mediation in particular was said to be 
most effective (such as their social cohesion, the fact that the 
mediator was often a highly ranked member of the community 
representing the common values of the group and exerting 
pressure on the parties) convinced some critics that adequate 
regard needed to be made for the substantial differences 
between these societies and the United States.^^ 
I0(js Supreme Court's view expressed in Chevron, USA v Natural Resources 
Defence Council - US 104 SCt 2778 (1984) quoted in Wald, op cit., note 8 
above, 6. 
11 Parmentier, op cit., note 6 above, 227. 
ADR as a separate and distinct dispute resolution 
mechanism 
Fuller says that 'under a system of state-made law, the 
standard Instrument of dispute settlement should be 
adjudication and not mediation'J^ Within this context he then 
explores the features of mediation. The essential quality of 
mediation which distinguishes it from adjudication is: 
•its capacity to reorient the parties towards each other, not by 
imposing rules on them, but by helping them achieve a new and 
shared perception of their relationship.'^ ̂  
This distinguishing quality allows mediation to be a more 
appropriate dispute resolution mechanism in some 
circumstances. In Fuller's view the adjudicative process is only 
one way of bringing human relations into a workable and 
productive order. The difficulty is In detennining what is the 
'proper domain of mediation".^ ̂  
Fuller proposes two tests to determine this, the first of which 
indicates when mediation should not be used and the second 
indicates when it cannot be used. The first test is applied by 
asking 'Is the underiying relationship best organised by 
'impersonal act-oriented rules', that is, rules properiy flowing 
Fuller, op cit, note 1 above, 328. 
I3|d., 325. 
330. 
from an external authority? If it is, mediation is unsuitable as 
it may undermine the protection afforded by that authority. 
The second test is applied by asking 'Is the problem presented 
amenable to solution through mediation processes?' To Fuller 
there are two intrinsic limitations to mediation. He considers 
that it cannot generally be employed when more than two 
parties are involved. Additionally, it presupposes an 
intermeshing of interests of an intensity to make the parties 
willing to collaborate. Fuller calls this "a felt sense of 
interdependence" exerting pressure to reach agreement.^^ if this 
sense of interdependence is missing mediation cannot work. 
But this is not to say whether mediation is or should be a 
separate and distinct dispute resolution mechanism. Cormick's 
view is that it is not. He sees the mediation process as 
complementary to existing social structures, not separate.^^ In 
this way ADR processes exist within the framework of existing 
administrative, regulatory and judicial processes. On this view 
the processes and methods of mediation and negotiation do not 
require a separate mechanism to operate effectively. This view 
receives support from critics who assert that "informal 
institutions" such as mediation, should be planned as additive 
supplements to, and not as substitutes, for the existing legal 
15|d.. 
16g w Cormlck, 'Mediating Environmental Controversies: Perspectives and 
First Experience"(1976) 2 Earth Law Journal 215 at 223. 
s y s t e m J 7 j h e consensus appears to be that ADR methods will 
work best within these existing mechanisms J® 
Should ADR be the preferred dispute resolution 
mechanism? 
The view that ADR methods constituted another form of social 
ordering was seen by some as debasing the functions of 
adjudication by comparison. Certainly Fuller's view was that 
adjudication should be the standard instrument of dispute 
resolution and that controversies requiring the imposition of 
external rules were not suitable for mediation. But to see 
mediation on an equal footing with adjudication was regarded as 
a trivalisation of the remedial dimensions of adjudication and a 
reduction of its functions to one of resolving private disputes 
only.i^ To see adjudication in this light does not make allowance 
for the public purpose of adjudication. This purpose is to 
articulate and interpret the rights, principles and rules that 
help to protect individuals and groups in society.^^ 
Fiss' view is that if adjudication is seen only as a process of 
resolving controversies then the settlement that comes from 
mediation or negotiation achieves exactly the same purpose as 
Abel, "The Contradiction of Informal Justice" in R. Abel (ed.) The Politics 
of Informal Justice, Vol. 1 (1982), Academic Press, New York, at 273. 
l^A Painter, 'The future of environmental dispute resolution"(1988) 28 
Natural Resources Journal No.1 Winter, 145 at 167. 
I^O Fiss, 'Against Settlement'(1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1080 at 1085. 
20c Ellison, Dispute Resolution and Democratic Theory"(1991) in Nagel & 
Mills, op cit., note 6 above, 243-268 at 248. 
judgment. But he considers this is not so because it ignores the 
broader purpose of adjudication, a purpose which mediation does 
not have. To Fiss this is: 
"not to maximise the ends of private parties; nor simply 
to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values 
embodied in authorative texts such as the Constitution and 
statutes."21 
If ADR is the preferred dispute resolution mechanism, the duty 
embodied in this purpose may not be discharged when the 
parties settle, for the parties will be free to settle while 
leaving justice u n d o n e . 2 2 
Similar criticisms are made based upon the inherent 
characteristics of ADR methods themselves. Abel traces the 
development of "informal legal institutions" from the growth of 
neighbourhood justice centres in the 1970s to an expanded role 
in dealing with larger social issues. His criticisms are that 
these informal legal institutions deal with the controversy by 
depicting it as only a failure of communication: once lines of 
communication are reopened the controversy will resolve itself. 
Further the controversy is neutralised by individualising 
complaints and inhibiting the perception of common 
g r i e v a n c e s . 2 3 The effect of these two factors is that the 
disputants are actively encouraged to settle their separate 
2 I 0 Fiss, op cit., note 20 above. 1085. 
22|d. 
23R Abel, op cit., note 17 above, 284-289. 
disputes as either party is robbed of any "strong normative 
basis for his p o s l t i o n . " 2 4 
To make ADR the preferred dispute resolution mechanism 
nullifies important protections afforded by not only the 
adjudicative mechanism but also by the administrative 
mechanism. The legal system allows class and collective 
actions that can result in precedent setting. The political arena 
is the better place to handle controversies about societal 
problems, such as environmental safety standards where 
matters of public Interest are best dealt with transparently.2 s 
This is not to say that both the legal and political systems are 
without limitations. But the point Abel and others are making is 
that at least the potential for abuses In these mechanisms can 
be limited by requiring the safeguards of due process and as 
such they should remain the preferred dispute resolution 
mechanisms.26 
These criticisms have considerable relevance in the case of 
environmental controversies. For instance, the series of judicial 
decisions that played a part in developing the protective role of 
the precautionary principle would never have occurred If these 
disputes had been mediated.^^ 
24|d., 293. 
25s Parmentier, op cit., note 6 above, 236. 
26r Abel, op cit, note 17 above, 307. 
27see for instance in the NSW jurisdiction: Leatch v National Parks and 
Wildlife Services & Anor. (1993) 81 LGERA 270 and Greenpeace Australia 
Limited V Redbank Power Station & Anon (1994) 86 LGERA 143 (see eartier 
discussion on pp. 40-42 above). 
Should environmental controversies be mediated? 
The argument about whether environmental controversies should 
be dealt with by mediation or other forms of ADR methods 
follows essentially the same pattern as did the argument over 
the use of these methods to resolve controversies generally. 
Firstly, there is a perception that traditional methods have 
failed. The federal agencies given a major role through 
environmental protection legislation to resolve environmental 
controversies administratively are seen to be unable to cope 
adequately with that role. The effectiveness of the 'command 
and control' model of government regulation as a useful 
approach to environmental protection was being tested.^s There 
was also doubt that the role of the Federal Courts in exercising 
judicial review of agency decisions provided an effective 
safeguard. The courts were seen to exclude many interested 
parties, to leave unaddressed larger issues involved in the 
environmental controversy and to leave unresolved the 
underlying conflict.2 9 
Susskind and Weinstein reported a general mood of 
dissatisfaction with both administrative and adjudicative 
means of dispute resolution such that: 
Susskind & A Weinstein, "Towards a theory of environmental dispute 
resolution"(1980)4 Land Use and Environmental Law Review 433 at 440. 
29|d., 441. 
'many environmental conflicts exceed the decision-making 
capacity of our existing institutions and will require new 
institutional arrangements for r e s o l u t i o n . " ^ o 
They suggest that ADR methods may be the answer, but other 
commentators remain unconvinced. Amy, while conceding a role 
for mediation in controversies of a type similar to those 
referred to as environmental disputes in this study, raises 
questions about the suitability of mediation for environmental 
conf l ic ts .He poses a number of important questions which 
will be applied to the environmental conflict case study 
examined in this research: 
Is the mediation process politically biased in favour of the 
interests of developers? 
Can the public interest be protected in mediation agreements?^^ 
He says that questions such as these are 'politically charged'. 
By politics, he means 'the issues of power, equality and 
democracy that are necessarily involved in any policymaking 
process.'33 
Amy then sets out to examine mediation from the politics of 
environmental mediation and sees a number of disturbing 
aspects. He sees an imbalance of power between different 
3 0 | d . , 4 4 3 . 
Amy, The Politics of Environmental Mediation (1987) Columbia 
University Press, New York, 6. 
32d Amy,"The Politics of Environmental Mediation'(1983), 7 Ecology 
Law Quarterly 1 at 2. 
33|d. 
stakeholders with an unequal access to the mediation table by 
interested parties in that only powerful stakeholder groups are 
parties to the process. In addition he sees an imbalance of 
expertise amongst the parties involved, in that some interests 
are better resourced than others. The politics of the process 
itself are characterised by an illusion of voluntariness, meaning 
that there are subtle pressures on the parties to participate and 
to produce an outcome. Amy argues that there is also the 
illusion of power in the participants. He says public and private 
stakeholders use mediation to give the illusion of significant 
and widespread participation, while retaining essential policy-
making power. There is also a coercive element rising from the 
process to achieve a 'reasonable compromise' where in some 
environmental conflicts, for instance a compromise may involve 
an unwanted and unsuitable development continuing in a 
modified form.^^ 
Amy says that when mediation is seen from this perspective its 
inherent unsuitability as a mechanism to resolve 'public policy 
conflicts' is apparent. The same criticisms could not be equally 
made of the resolution of environmental conflicts by 
administrative mechanisms. His comments that consensual or 
administrative mechanisms rest on a false understanding of 
what politics is applies to both contexts: 
"Politics is not simply about communication, it is also about 
power struggles. It is not only about common interests, but 
34|d., 6-15. 
about conflicting interests as well. And it not only involves 
horse-trading, but competition between conflicting values and 
different moral visions.'^s 
Amy's argument is that there is a need amongst participants, 
particularily less powerful ones to face this political realism. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that environmental 
controversies in the nature of environmental conflicts are 
better resolved administratively. If they are to be dealt with by 
ADR methods there should at least be a clearer understanding 
that the mediation itself is a political process. 
This is a view essentially endorsed by other commentators. 
Macdonnell is concemed with whether ADR methods are best 
suited to resolving environmental controversies involving 
'natural resource conflicts.Macdonnell's view is that these 
conflicts involve questions of values, for example the quality of 
air, water and land are such a fundamental part of human 
existence that their use is a matter of special concern. These 
value-centred conflicts are especially difficult to resolve and 
as such are best addressed through the political process, that 
is, through administrative means.37 While conceding that Amy's 
criticisms of environmental politics apply equally to 
administrative mechanisms as to mediation, administrative 
mechanisms are at least transparently political and not 
mistakenly portrayed as consensual. 
^^ D Amy , op cit., note 31 above, 228. 
J MacDonnell, 'Natural Resources dispute resolution: an overview" (1988) 
28 Natural Resources 5 at 7. 
37|d., 8. 
This is not to idealise the administrative mechanisms 
unnecessarily. Meyers in discussing a dispute over logging old-
growth forests in the Pacific North West of the United States 
and its impact on protected species paints a different picture of 
the administrative process. He says the administrative 
mechanism involves "political posturing in Congress, foot 
dragging by the executive branch..(which) will not resolve public 
resource conflicts."3® 
The theme that there are particular critical concerns about the 
use of ADR methods to resolve environmental controversies is 
picked up by Ellison in his review of the use of policy dialogues 
and negotiation in the Federal Government agencies' rulemaking 
p r o c e s s . T h e rulemaking process is the manner in which US 
government agencies create rules, a process usually 
characterised by public participation in the drafting stage. So, 
for example, the process was used to set penalties for vehicle 
manufacturers failing to meet Clean Air Act standards. Ellison 
is critical of this "negotiation-based approach to policy 
formation." He repeats Amy's criticism that environmentalists 
rarely examine ADR as a political phenomenon nor consider 
whether the "flight from politics" in the formal sense is 
justified or appropriate.'̂ o Ellison's argument is that the 
A Meyers, "Old-growth forests, the Owl and Yew: Environmental Ethics 
versus Traditional Dispute Resolution"(1991) 18 Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review 623 at 667. 
Ellison, "Dispute Resolution and Democratic Theory"(1991) in S Nagal & 
M Mills(ed.) Systematic Analysis in Dispute Resolution, Quorum Books, New 
York, 243-268. 
40|d. 246. 
administrative mechanism is the preferred mechanism for 
dealing with environmental conflicts involving the setting of 
public policy. Nor is adjudication an appropriate public policy 
tool. Its strength lies in the resolution of controversies where 
there is a need to 'articulate and interpret the rights, 
principles, and rules that help to protect individuals and 
groups.'^^ The role of consensual mechanisms on tiie other hand 
is ancillary to each of these processes. 
Ellison's view is that this process of formulating and 
implementing public policy is the province of politics. Politics 
is a process of resolving distributional disputes requiring 
consensus and incremental adjustments between parties. The 
political process performs this function well by administrative 
means, and in some cases the administration will override 
resolutions reached elsewhere.^^ Environmental conflicts 
invariably involve such distributional issues. To attempt to 
substitute ADR methods for this process in Ellison's view 
'generally serves bureaucratic purposes and only rarely the 
needs of d e m o c r a c y . j ^ e problem with this rationale is that 
the concept of 'stakeholder as constituency is flawed as it 
potentially excludes less organised or less powerful groups 
which nonetheless are effected by the outcome. To equate the 
public interest with the interests of those participating is 
^Md. 248. 
^2see. for example. State Environmental Planning Policy No. 47 Moore Park 
Showground, the effect of which excluded public participation in the 
development of particular land. 
43c Ellison, op ciL, note 39 aba^e, 250. 
flawed. In this sense the administrative mechanism may not in 
fact 'resolve' the conflict in the sense used here. 
The other concern expressed by critics is with the manner in 
which negotiated settlements are conducted. For Ellison this is 
likely to occur in temporary fora protected from the pressures 
of dealing directly with constituencies and so regulating 
controversies "to these private spaces in public life."'̂ '̂  ADR 
methods are seen as privatising what should be a public policy 
controversy by limiting the participants, the issues and the 
audience. The controversy then becomes inappropriately 
depoliticised. When the matter involves an environmental 
controversy it should be dealt with by the administrative 
mechanism, involving publically elected officials or their 
delegates. For Ellison, negotiated approaches tend to weaken the 
authority and public interest committment of such officials, 
making them 'bargain like any other stakeholder " often at the 
expense of previously articulated public values.^^ 
The growth of ADR methods in environmental 
controversies 
The first recorded example of the use of ADR methods to resolve 
an environmental controversy was in 1973. Two mediators, G W 
Cormick and J E McCarthy from the Mediation Centre in 
Washington, were appointed to attempt to resolve a long running 
44 Id. 253. 
45|d., 261. 
controversy over a proposed flood control dam on the 
Snoqualmie River in Seattle, Washington. In fact the controversy 
had gone unresolved for over 14 years.^^ After defining the 
parties and selecting representatives, the mediators held a 
number of mediation sessions. From these sessions the parties 
made joint recommendations to government, essentially 
proposing a smaller dam at a less intrusive location. The local 
Governor announced endorsement of the recommendations and a 
committee was formed to implement the agreed plan. The 
mediation had achieved a consensus, though In fact the smaller 
dam was never built. A number of the recommendations were 
implemented but, more importantly, the mediation showed that 
ADR methods could work in environmental controversies.'^^ 
By 1986 the use of ADR methods in environmental controversies 
had a sufficient "cumulative track record' for the US 
Conservation Foundation to commission a study as to this 
effectiveness.'^® The study was only concemed with those 
controversies where the ADR method used involved a mediator. 
The findings of this study were summarised in a paper by 
Bingham and Haywood, both directors of the Foundation. The 
abstract to the paper encapsulates the findings: 
"Between 1974 and 1984 mediation was used to resolve more 
than 160 environmental disputes. Agreements were reached in 
W Cormick, op cit, note 16 above, 220. 
47c Stukenborg, "The Proper Role of ADR in Environmental Conflict"(1994) 
19 Dayton Law Review 1305 at 1312. 
48 G Bingham, Resolving Environmental Disputes: a decade of experience 
(1986) Conservation Foundation, Washington. 
78 percent of the 133 cases where that was the parties' 
objective. 
On the face of it this seems an astonishing record of success. 
The report said that up to the mid-1970s "the number of 
mediated disputes...could be counted on the fingers of one 
hand.'̂ ^^ By the end of 1979, 36 disputes had been mediated and 
by mid-1984 a further 126 from a total 162 cases; impressive 
but proportionally speaking, not a dramatic increase.^^ It is 
useful to place these figures in the wider context of 
environmental controversies in the United States.52 
Further, in 30 of the 162 cases documented by Bingham, the 
parties' objective was only to 'improve communications' rather 
than to 'reach an agreement'. Taking this qualification into 
account, resolution of approximately 130 controversies in a 10 
year period does not equate to a substantial share of the 
controversies over environmental issues in the United States. 
Bingham and Haywood's study does however give some insight 
into the types of controversies which were subject to mediation 
as the ADR movement gained momentum. Each category of 
dispute was divided into two types: 'site-specific or policy 
^^G Bingham & L V Haywood, "Environmental Dispute Resolution: The first ten 
year'(1986) 41 Arbitration Journal 3 at 3. 
^ ^ Rellly, in the Forward to G Bingham, op cit, note 48 above, ix. 
S^G Bingham & L V Haywood, op cit, note 49 above, 6. 
In the period from the 1984 amendments to the Resource, Conservation and 
Recovery Act (US) (providing for citizen suits) to 1988, 1200 citizen actions 
alone were commenced in environmental matters in US Federal and State courts, 
see L Jorgenson & J J Kimmel, Environmental Citizen Suits: Confronting the 
Corporation (1988) Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, 19. 
level disputes'. Site-specific disputes Involved a dispute over a 
particular project or plan while policy-level disputes involved 
questions of local, state or national environmental policy. Six 
broad categories were identified: 
Land Use:: 70 site-specific & 16 policy-level disputes, 
Natural Resource Management 29 site-specific & 4 policy-level, 
Water Resources:: 16 site-specific & 1 policy-level. 
Energy: 10 site-specific & 4 policy-level. 
Air Quality:: 6 site-specific & 7 policy-level. 
Toxics:: 5 site-specific & 11 policy-level. 
The findings indicated there was little difference in the 
settlement rate between site-specific and policy-level 
disputes. The parties were successful in reaching agreement in 
79% of site-specific cases and in 76% of policy dialogues. There 
were significant differences in the implementation rate of the 
two types of disputes. In site-specific disputes the agreements 
reached were fully implemented in 80% of the cases, while in 
policy-level disputes agreements were fully implemented in 
only 41% of cases.^s The reason for this difference appears to be 
that while with site-specific disputes the organisations 
(usually public agencies) with authority to implement decisions 
were directly involved, in the case of policy-level disputes, 
when those with the authority to implement the 
recommendations were not at the table (for whatever reason) 
the terms of the agreement were either modified or rejected.^^ 
^^G Bingham & L V Haywood, op cit., note 49 above, 9. 
54|d.. 12. 
There is a clear message from these results that In the case of 
environmental conflicts all parties involved, in particular the 
relevant organ of government, should be party to the 
negotiations from the outset. There is no benefit in 'resolving' a 
dispute when the resolution is subsequently rejected by 
government. 
Subsequent reviews of the use of ADR methods in the United 
States for environmental controversies show an increasing and 
established pattern. A 1989 study found 458 ADR programs 
operating in 45 States dealing with environmental matters. The 
trend has been for environmental mediation to become 
Instututionalised. A National Institute for Dispute Resolution 
was formed in 1989 to create state-level and state-sponsored 
mediation offices to address environmental controversies, with 
four offices opening in that and following years.^^ 
Stage Two: Consolidation 
At the consolidation stage the use of ADR methods in 
environmental controversies was firmly established and the 
discussion turned to what the proper use of these methods 
should be. By this stage the view that the surge in the use of 
ADR methods was due to the Inefficiency of the court system 
had been largely dispelled in the literature and critics now saw 
Adier, "Mediating Public Disputes" in R J Fowler (ed.) Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Environmental Law, 14-18 June 1989, Sydney, 
University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 103-112 at 105. 
it more as a question of the courts' ineffectiveness in 
addressing tlie real issues in dispute in environmental 
controversies. Many litigated controversies dealt only with 
procedural compliance rather than substantative issues as to 
whether the development should proceed.^e 
ADR was now presented as a more effective mechanism for 
environmental dispute resolution rather than the only one. The 
view that ADR methods were the best mechanism had not been 
unanimously embraced and the implementation of these methods 
was not widespread. Though there was growing acceptance of 
their use to resolve planning disputes, there was significantly 
less support for using ADR methods to resolve environmental 
conflicts. The view continued to be strongly held that while 
adjudication was inappropriate for environmental conflicts, so 
too were negotiation-based approaches. The use of the 
administrative mechanisms inherent in the political process 
were still seen as the preferred method for resolving value-
laden conflicts. As the use of ADR methods moved out of its 
initial experimental stage deeper issues arose as to the nature 
of their role. These issues are considered in detail here. 
^^G W Cormick, op cit., note 16 above, 96. 
Identification of environmental controversies suitable 
for mediation 
The first of these issues was to determine an appropriate 
method of identifying those environmental controversies which 
were suitable for resolution using ADR methods. By the early 
1980s, the use of ADR methods had sufficient currency for a 
number of mediators practising in the area to propose a means 
for evaluating the suitability of ADR for environmental 
controversies. These commentators do not make a distinction 
between planning disputes and environmental conflicts, nor do 
they have regard to the concept of a continuum between them. 
However from the examples they examine it is apparent that 
they are dealing with both halves of the continuum but with a 
strong emphasis on environmental conflicts. One experienced 
mediator estimated that "about 10% of environmental disputes 
are good candidates for ADR.'57 Comnick, both a practising 
mediator and a theorist in the area, defined four criteria 
necessary for a successful mediation: 
(1) a stalemate or the recognition that stalemate is 
inevitable, 
(2) voluntary participation, 
(3) some room for flexibility, and 
(4) a means of implementing agreements.̂ Q 
57A R Talbot, Settling Things: Six Case Studies in Environmental Mediation 
(1983) The Conservation Foundation, Washington, 91. 
S^Quoted Id., 99. 
This first criterion tends to bring us back to one of Fuller's 
intrinsic limitations of mediation, that it presupposes an 
intermeshing of interests in achieving an outcome.59 It is a 
criterion also repeated by Wald when she lists as one of her 
preconditions, a situation "where the parties' precise objectives 
cannot be reached without negotiat ion.Patton identifies a 
similar precondition as 'uncertainty', where no one party can 
hope to dictate the outcome with any certainty.^^ It is this 
recognition that the controversy has reached an impasse that is 
regarded as crucial. It affects the attitudes a party brings to 
the negotiations. Cormick does not expressly state this in his 
list of suitability criteria but several other commentators 
consider it warrants clear expression. Patton says the parties 
must want to "consider settlement'®^ and Bingham says it is 
necessary that all parties "desire settlement".^^ It is important 
to remember that this recognition is not altruistic, it flows 
from a realisation that a stalemate has been reached which 
makes the parties want to negotiate. The parties recognise the 
relative power of the other participants, if only in a 'spoiling' 
role.64 
This shared recognition that an impasse has been reached which 
then makes the parties willing to collaborate should not be 
S^L Fuller op cit., note 1 above, 330. 
60p vv Wald, op cit., note 7 above, 7. 
K Patton, "Settling Environmental Disputes: the Experience with and the 
Future of Environmental Mediation"(1984) 14 Environmental Law 547 at 
549. 
62|d., 653. 
Bingham, op cit., note 48 above, 10-11. 
P Grad, "Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Law"(1989) 14 
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 157 at 166. 
equated with mandating the process. This is Cormick's second 
criterion, the requirement for voiuntariness. His view reflects 
the prevailing view that the essential character of ADR 
processes is that they are not coercive but consensual. There is 
one qualification to this as regards the necessary elements for 
successful negotiated rulemaking. Harter says there may be a 
compulsion to make a decision 'lest some other agency 
undertakes to do so.'^^ He emphasises that there may be 
pressure to settle but he does not equate this to compulsion. 
There is also the implication that all parties can participate 
free from the constraints imposed by imbalances of power and 
resources which is subject to debate.®® 
The third criterion is the existence of some element of 
flexibility in the participants so that there is scope for 
compromise. Bingham noted this as a crucial criterion in her 
review of mediated settlements. She identified the need for an 
ability and an authority to settle on the part of all parties in the 
successful mediations reviewed.®^ This precondition may well 
exclude value-laden environmental conflicts. If such conflicts 
are to be negotiated there needs either to be a measure of 
agreement on fundamental values or an agreement to exclude 
from the negotiations, value-laden issues.®® In the absence of 
these preliminary agreements it is suggested negotiation-based 
solutions would not be effective in such conflicts. 
®5p Harter, "Negotiating Regulations; A Cure for Malaise" (1982) 71 
Georgetown Law Journal t at 51. 
®®P W Wald, op cit., note 7 above, 7. 
Bingham, op cit, note 48 above, 11. 
®®F P Grad, op cit, note 64 above, 166. 
As to the fourth criterion the need for a means of ¡mplementing 
agreements reached is a recognition that the mediation process 
may offer no compulsion external to the parties to enforce a 
consensus outcome. This is recognised as a difficulty by Harter 
who lists as one of his necessary elements "a commitment to 
implement the agreement reached".®^ His comments were in the 
context of negotiated rulemaking where the parties know an 
external agency can impose a different solution if the parties do 
not adhere to their consensus. Another way of achieving the 
implementation of an agreement is to ensure that parties 
representing all views on an issue are joined as participants and 
that their representatives have the authority to enforce and 
implement any agreement reached. ^^ 
There are other subsidiary issues to do with the effectiveness 
of the ADR process (such as cleariy defined issues and 
manageable numbers of participants) but these four simple 
criteria have gained considerable currency as a means of 
identifying controversies suitable for ADR methods and they are 
returned to in this research.^i 
Harter, op cit., note 65 above, 51. 
70A R Talbot, op cit., note 57 above, 99. 
71c Stukenborg, op cit, note 47 above, 1333. 
Problems of Participation 
The second of the issues which arise in this consolidation stage 
concern a number of recurrent problems to do with participation 
which have appeared in the United States experience of 
"environmental mediation." These problems are examined 
separately here. 
Inequality of bargaining power 
The first problem identified is the need to deal with the 
inequality of power in the mediation process between the 
participants. Amy had perceived a tendency in mediation to 
"institutionalise maldistributons of power."^2 But Adier says 
this inequality of power can be managed if it is recognised that 
there are other types of power than economic power and that 
these other types of power can effectively be used by "citizen 
groups" to balance the equation. in this regard there is the 
power of public opinion which can be marshalled against 
unpopular development projects or the power of delay inherent 
in protracted litigation, particularly if the citizen groups are 
protected against cost orders if unsuccessful. 
The first step in dealing with this problem is a recognition that 
the negotiation or mediation process is by its essence a process 
of power exchange, and therefore no different from the political 
process involved in the administrative mechanism. The parties 
72D Amy , op cit., note 32 above, 6. 
73p Adier, op cit., note 55 above. 111 
to the controversy must have some relative ability to exercise 
sanctions over one another for the mediation process to have a 
chance of success, just as they must have in the administrative 
mechanism7^ 
Absence of decision malcing power 
The second problem is also a question of power. There is a 
necessity to deal with the absence of decision-making power in 
the participants. This arises in two situations. The parties must 
first have the authority of their constituency to accept a 
solution. This presents difficulties for peak environmental 
groups such as the Nature Conservation Council (NCC) 
endeavouring to agree to resolutions binding upon its 
constituent bodies. This extends to government parlies, so a 
government agency involved in the process must have the 
authority to agree to any compromise solution reached over a 
controversial development. 
A separate aspect of the problem is that the participants must 
also have authority over the process and the outcome. Cormick 
makes the point that mediation is not a planning or information 
process but a decision-making process. If the consensus reached 
has no certainty or likelihood of implementation then the 
parties have been involved in no more than "some sterile 
participation or informational exerc ise . '^s To achieve this will 
W Cormick, op cit., note 16 above, 216. 
75|d., 219. 
require a commitment by decision-making authorities to 
implement tlie outcome readied, otherwise the process is futile. 
Inequality of resources 
The third recurrent problem of participation was the need to 
deal with inequality of resources between the parties. Parties 
with limited resources may consider these are better used in a 
forum likely to attract maximum public attention, such as 
adjudicative fora or in public protest^® 
The existence of unequal resources may preclude the use of 
negotiation-based methods. If ADR methods are to be used, 
mechanisms need to be developed to provide the means to 
generate the scientific and technical information crucial to 
balanced negotiation. In its absence, this 'lack of resource 
power" may preclude the use of ADR methods.77 
ADR Mechanisms: independent or Ancillary? 
The third issue at this consolidation stage is whether ADR 
methods should operate as a separate and distinct mechanism or 
as a process ancillary to other mechanisms. The main focus of 
this debate has been whether the mediation services should be 
court-annexed or totally outside the judicial system. 
Bingham, op cit, note 48 above, 159. 
77|d., 160. 
To have the use of ADR methods in environmental controversies 
as a court referred mechanism overcomes some of the concerns 
expressed by Fiss and others. They were concerned that only 
adjudicative mechanisms are capable of upholding normative 
values. Wald says that a sympathetic judicial overview would 
allow for the refusal of settlements not 'in the public 
interest'.78 Her view is that: 
"the amputation of meaningful judicial review from settlements 
or negotiated regulations in the environmental field would make 
these ADR techniques far less attractive to some of the parties 
as instruments of justice."7 9 
If settlements are to embody the nearest approximation of the 
ideals of justice to which Fiss refers, this would allow the 
adjudicative mechanism to operate to ensure that mediated 
settlements contain just outcomes. 
Bingham supports this view when she says that court-related 
mediation services are preferrable as they overcome the 
hazards of second class justice and lack of external control.^^ In 
Bingham's view there is also the likelihood that making 
mediation services court-annexed would increase the range of 
services offered by the courts and thereby increase 
accessibility to the judicial system. 
78p vv Wald, op cit., note 7 above, 25. 
79|d., 33. 
Bingham, op cit., note 48 above, 151 
Conversely, making ADR methods court related may produce a 
loss of informality and may take from the parties the resolution 
of their own controversies, both positive attributes of ADR 
methods. Bingham suggests that the accessibility and 
independence questions could be resolved by the 
institutionalisation of mediation services on a State-wide 
government funded basis in the form of environmental mediation 
c e n t r e s . T h e y would be institutionalised but not controlled. 
The United States experience has shown however that if ADR 
processes are institutionalised outside the adjudicative system, 
the strength of public opposition presently prevent 'any 
widespread acceptance" of their use in the resolution of 
environmental controversies.®^ 
ADR Mechanisms: Voluntary or Mandated? 
The final issue in the consolidation stage is whether mediation 
should be a mandated or a voluntary option. Voluntariness is 
suggested as an essential component of mediation, in the sense 
of contrasting it with the mandatory or coercive character of 
litigation at least as far as the decision-making is concerned.®^ 
®l|d., 154. 
®2C Stukenborg, op cit, note 47 above, 1338. 
®®P Adier, •Resolving Public Policy Conflicts through Mediation: The Water 
Round Table'CIOSO) 1 Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal 69 at 78. 
stage Three: Current Practice 
The issues that arose in the consolidation stage had been more 
or less addressed by the mid-1980s with an established trend to 
institutionalise the use of mediation to resolve environmental 
controversies. This saw the formation of the National Institute 
for Dispute Resolution (NIDR), a Washington based non-profit 
organisation, which sought to create State-level and State-
sponsored mediation offices to address public disputes 
including environmental controversies. It began with four State 
offices in 1989.®9 AdIer reports that the Program for ADR 
(PADR) fomned in Hawaii conducted 39 Mediated Policy 
Roundtables in the period 1985-89 achieving agreement or 
partial agreement in 29 of these matters.^o 
The types of matters reported as being mediated are large scale 
disputes, including environmental conflicts. The matters AdIer 
gives as examples reflects this trend. So, for instance, he 
describes disputes about toxic waste disposal (Virginia), urban 
redevelopment (Minnesota), housing and historic preservation 
(Ohio) and industrial redevelopment (Indiana).®^ 
Two specific applications of the use of mediation-based 
methods show the manner in which these methods were being 
used. The first relates to a long running controversy between 
fishing and oil industries off the coast of California following 
AdIer, op cit., note 55 above, 107. 
90|d., 110. 
91 Id., 106. 
oil discoveries there in the 1980s. In 1983 a proposal to grant 
fresh exploration and production permits to the oil interests 
was vigorously opposed by the fishermen. Mediators from the 
Mediation Institute, Seattle, Washington were engaged to seek 
to resolve the controversy. After lengthy mediation sessions 
which resolved the immediate issues in dispute the parties 
agreed to establish permanent committees to address continuing 
issues and potential new areas of controversy. The ageements 
reached were formalised and incorporated into the exploration 
permits issued by the relevant government agency.®^ 
The second example is the implementation of a memorandum 
issued by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) in 1987 
"Guidelines of the Use of ADR Techniques in Enforcement 
Actions". The intention of these guidelines was to encourage the 
use of mediation to agree upon the penalty to be imposed on a 
violator in the case of illegal land contamination.®^ The use of 
mediation was designed to overcome the lengthy delays in the 
clean up of toxic waste sites due to protracted litigation. The 
intention was to use mediation to agree on consensus decrees 
for pollution clean up obligations under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabiiity Act 1988 
(referred to as CERCLA or Superfund) and thereby overcome the 
lengthy delays In enforcement being experienced.®^ As Peterson 
points out the use of mediation was also slow to be 
implemented and in 1989 the EPA began an ADR Pilot Project to 
W Cormlck & A Knaster, "Mediation and Scientific lssues'(1986) 28(10) 
Environment, December 1986, 33 at 34-37. 
Q^Grad, op cit., note 64 above, 175. 
expedite its use. By 1992 tlie results of this pilot project 
showed that ADR methods could assist in the effective 
resolution of a large number and variety of Superfund cases.^^ 
Similar government interventions in the form of legislative 
enactments have encouraged the use of ADR methods to resolve 
environmental controversies. The Administrative Dispute 
Resoiution Act 1990 expressly authorised and encouraged the 
use of ADR techniques by requiring federal agencies to consider 
the use of ADR methods before commencing litigation.^s 
There was also the encouragement given to the use of ADR 
methods in the rulemaking process by the Negotiated Ruiemai<ing 
Act 1990. The Act established a framework for the conduct of 
negotiated rulemaking by Federal agencies and 'encouraged the 
use of such procedures when it would enhance conventional 
rulemaking procedures'.^^ The purpose of the legislation was to 
allow agencies to settle controversies 'by tailoring the 
requirements of a regulation to a particular dispute while still 
enforcing the policies behind the regulation'.But the process 
was criticised as having little flexibility and for producing 
regulations which often challenged adjudicatively.®® 
95L Peterson, "The Promise of Mediated Settlements of Environmental 
Disputes: The Experience of EPA Region V" (1992) 17 Ck)lumbia Journal of 
Environmental Law 327 at 379. 
96c Stukenborg, op cit., note 47, 1329. 
97Quoted Id., 1330. 
98|d.. 
99d M Prltzker & D S Dalton, Negotiated Rulemaking Handbook (1995) 
US Government Printing Office, Washington, 2. 
The processes were modified to address these problems. The 
incentive for interest groups to agree was that the agency 
retained the authority to write its own rule if the parties could 
not agree on one.̂ oo The process had three pertinent criteria. 
There were limits of 20-25 participants as stakeholders, the 
rules for negotiation were selected so as to preclude any 
requirement for compromise on fundamental principles and the 
agency imposed a deadline to impart urgency into the 
deliberations. The use of negotiation in these contexts was 
credited with overcoming some of the impediments to producing 
regulations in the areas of national emission standards and 
performance standards which have not been subject to 
challenge.^02 
The institutionalising of the use of ADR methods has ensured 
their continuing refinement and development in the United 
States and provided potentially valuable lessons for the 
Australian context. 
Conclusion 
This discussion has examined a number of questions which have 
come to prominence in the growth and development of ADR 
methods in environmental controversies in the United States. It 
is anticipated that the same questions would need to be 
iooid., 5. 
101 Id.. 6. 
102|d., 7. 
addressed in the Australian context and so this discussion may 
provide assistance. 
It is firstly apparent that a number of recurrent themes arise 
when the suitability of ADR methods to resolve environmental 
controversies is considered. Similar themes are expected to 
arise in the Australian context. Most importantly for our 
purposes, some critics suggest that there are a number of 
factors that will always constrain the wider use of ADR 
methods, particularly in the case of environmental conflicts. 
The conclusion is that ADR methods will therefore always have 
a limited role. 
These factors are: 
1. There will always need to be a requirement for voluntariness. 
Any steps to mandate the use of ADR methods are a 
contradiction in terms. 
2. There will always be a need to consider the politics of 
environmental dispute resolution, in particular the inequalities 
of power and the illusion of decision making power and these 
inequalities may dictate that the use of ADR is unsuitable in 
many environmental controversies. 
For ADR methods to be effective, it is critical to consider these 
two factors. These factors will always act as a permanent 
constraint on the wider use of ADR methods in environmental 
controversies. Whether this prediction has proven the case in 
Australia is explored in the next chapter and in the empirical 
research to follow. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT 
Introduction 
The Australian response to the high praise and promise of ADR 
methods in the environmental area in the United States can be 
traced to a period beginning in the late 1980s. There are a 
number of reasons for this slower development stemming from 
the unique character of environmental dispute resolution in 
Australia. 
Appraisal of the Promise of ADR IVIethods 
A number of commentators have examined the potential use of 
ADR methods in environmental matters in Australia. Wootten 
approached the issue from the familiar perspective that the 
usual means for resolving environmental controversies in 
Australia were administrative and adjudicative means.^ 
Preston adopted much the same approach labelling these 
mechanisms as "resolution by managerial direction" (a term 
incorporating both executive and administrative decision-
1H Wootten,•Environmental Dispute Resolution"(1993) 75 ^de/a/de Law 
Review 33 at 35. 
making) and "resolution by adjudicative decision"^ These two 
mechanisms are labelled here simply as administrative and 
adjudicative resolution. 
While essentially accepting that ADR methods do have a role, 
there remained uncertainity in the eyes of these commentators 
as to what this role should be. Should it operate as an ancilliary 
part of the administrative or adjudicative systems or as a 
separate and distinct consensual mechanism? 
In addressing this issues a number of questions have arisen. 
1. What are the precise differences in the Australian 
context which affect the use of ADR methods? 
A number of differences in the Australian context were 
identified. 
Firstly, as regards the administrative mechanisms for dispute 
resolution, environmental controversies have in the past tended 
to be dealt with outside any regulatory or adjudicative forum 
which could be seen as equivalent to the fonnalised Rulemaking 
Procedures adopted in the United States. This has meant there is 
not a widely accepted form of public participation in Australia 
into which ADR methods might fit. In its place Fowler identifies 
"a distinctive approach to the resolution of environmental 
2B J Preston, "Limits of Environmental Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms"(1995) 13 Australian Bar Review 148 at 149-151 
disputes in Australia" in the fonn of "extra legal strategies".^ 
These strategies, which had their earliest expression in the 
green bans of the 1970s, involve the use of devices such as 
large scale public protests, intensive lobbying and media 
coverage to attempt to influence environmental decision making 
outside any formalised public participation framework. Fowler's 
point is that this confrontationalist approach indicates a 
dissatisfaction with traditional administrative mechanisms 
similar in some respects to the dissatisfaction in the United 
States with judicial mechanisms. 
Secondly, as regards adjudicative mechanisms. Fowler argues 
that courts in Australia are far less accessible to 
environmental litigants than in the United States, due largely to 
constraints on standing and costs. But conversely, in Australia, 
there are alternative adjudicative fora available in the form of 
specialist tribunals and courts to hear merit appeals. These 
differences have meant that many of the criticisms voiced in 
the United States about delay and inadequate fora are not as 
pertinent to the Australian context, either because limited 
court access has meant fewer delays or because the specialist 
fora cater more adequately and effectively for environmental 
matters.-* 
^R J Fowler, "Environmental Dispute Resolution-What Role In 
Austrana?'(1992) Environmental and Planning Law Journal April 1992 
,122 at 128. 
4|d., 127. 
2. What are the potential restrictions on the roie of 
ADR methods in environmental matters? 
The main ¡mplementatlon difficulty envisaged in adopting ADR 
methods is a reluctance by government to relinquish a perceived 
electoral mandate to adopt and Implement their own policies. 
This would particularly constrain the use of ADR methods as an 
adjunct to existing administrative mechanisms in resolving 
environmental controversies. Further, the use of ADR methods 
would arguably require a shift away from a confrontationalist 
approach by all parties to the "reasoned argument' and 'detailed 
objective appraisal' said to be characteristic of consensual 
means.5 
In the case of adjudicative mechanisms, the concern most often 
expressed is that the development of ADR methods in existing 
adjudicative fora would detract from a pressing need to reform 
and modify these mechanisms themselves, particularly as 
regards the limitations imposed on environmental action by 
legislative and practical cost-related restrictions.® 
Wootten emphasises that environmental law in Australia is 
essentially a product of the parliamentary system rather than 
the common law. As such it exhibits the characteristics of this 
system, that is an emphasis upon 'statutorily authorised 
executive decision making'.^ The effect of this is that some 
5|d. 129. 
6|d. 
^H Wootten, op cit.,note 1 above, 34. 
environmental controversies are resolved primarily in the 
political system rather than in the courts. Those who seek 
particular environmental outcomes are thus forced to become 
involved in politics and to adopt political methods in order to 
achieve their environmental objectives.® 
Accordingly when we look at ADR in Australia we are not only 
looking at it only as an alternative to litigation but more so as 
an alternative to the current forms of administrative resolution. 
Since environmental controversies are dealt with at various 
tiers of government (legislative, executive, administrative or 
local) the issue at stake may be resolvable not by an 
interpretation of the existing law (that is, adjudicatively), nor 
through the agreement of the parties (that is, consensually) but 
by the creation of a new law or the alteration or reintepretation 
administratively of an existing one (that is, administratively).® 
This is not to dismiss the potential use of ADR methods within 
either the adjudicative or administrative systems. As Wootten 
points out the political practice of "making issues justiciable 
that were once merely political" ensures that both the courts 
and tribunals and the administrative system do have a 
substantial role in the resolution of environmental 




Any potential role for ADR methods thus depends upon whether 
the controversy is litigation-related or politically-related. In 
the case of litigation-related controversies, the role of ADR is 
favourably exemplified by the mediation service offered by the 
Land and Environment Court of NSW in 'settling* controversies, 
even though it deals with 'only a few percentage of matters 
coming before the Court"J ^ 
In the case of politically-related controversies, the role of ADR 
methods is not 'settlement' or 'resolution' as defined here, 
because the final decision still remains an administrative or 
executive one. However, there is scope for ADR to be used to 
formulate options and recommendations to government and as a 
vehicle to facilitate participation. Mediation in this sense 
embraces "processes where parties who lack power to resolve a 
dispute by their agreement, reach agreement by mediation on a 
common position to put to a decision-maker'.'^^ 
Wootten gives a number of examples of mediation used in this 
way. He examines the mediation of the Colondale Ranges 
controversy in South East Queensland in July 1990. The political 
context to this issue was important. The Queensland Labor 
Government in the lead up to an election in 1989 promised to 
extend two existing national parks in the Conondale Ranges 
north-west of Brisbane, which would effect logging in the 
region. After its election, the government formed the Colondale 
Range Consultative Committee comprising representatives of all 
Id., 47. 
l^ld., 41, (emphasis supplied). 
affected stakeholder groups to provide a plan for implementing 
this decisionJ3 The Community Justice Program provided 
mediation services to the Committee. After mediation sessions 
extending over a six month period, a joint recommendation for 
extending the park and limiting the areas which could be logged 
was put to the Queensland Govemment. In June 1992 the 
government endorsed and implemented the joint proposals.^^ 
Wootten offers this process as an example of the effective use 
of ADR methods in an environmental controversy. When the 
necessary concurrence exists, ADR methods may come to the 
fore as a means of achieving a consensual recommendation to 
deliver to govemment which can then be endorsed 
administratively. 
Preston injects a cautionary note in his appraisal of the 
potential role of ADR methods in Australia. In a 1989 review he 
considers that, particularly in the case of environmental 
conflicts, there are three essential preconditions for the use of 
mediation. These preconditions are parity of power, a real 
likelihood of compromise and a conflict within manageable 
p r o p o r t i o n s . I n the case of environmental conflict, a parity of 
power in terms of economic or legal leverage or political 
influence is not always present. In Preston's view, if this parity 
is absent mediation is not suitable. 
"•̂ T Bonyhady, Places Worth Keeping (1993) Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 23. 
"•̂ H Wootten, op cit., note 1 above, 72. 
15b J Preston, Environmental Litigation (1989) LBC, Sydney, 392. 
Preston considers that compromise is rarely possible once 
matters of principle which question the very development itself 
intrude. This is the point made in Chapter Two in relation to 
fundamental value conflicts. If value conflicts exist a 
consensual resolution may not be possible. This is consistent 
with the view that the political process which has "already done 
the balancing act between conflicting interests' is the more 
appropriate mechanism for resolution.^ 6 
The precondition of a conflict within manageable proportions 
essentially concerns the need to have a workable process. A 
mediation involving 40 or 50 interests is likely to be too 
unworkable and unweildy to "develop the give-and-take upon 
which success depends." Preston emphasises that even if such a 
process reaches a 'settlement' or 'resolution' there may not be 
the committment amongst such a large number of participants 
to carry it into effect, nor the political will of the consent 
authority to approve the committment r e a c h e d . ^ ^ But as 
discussed in Chapter Two, the size of controversies in terms of 
the number of parties is not necessarily indicative of the 
existence of an environmental conflict. 
Preston considers that these characteristics of environmental 
conflicts make them unsuitable for resolution by ADR methods. 
He concludes that "most of these characteristics, if present in a 
particular environmental dispute, cause difficulties for 
16|d., 398. 
401. 
consensual resolution methods".^® He considers that 
adjudicative means remain more "appropriate" for resolving 
environmental conflicts and that the focus should remain on 
these existing mechanisms. The emphasis should be upon 
reforming the Inefficiencies of the adjudicative fora Instead of 
"encouraging parties to resolve environmental disputes by 
ADR". 19 He reiterates the view that Inefficiencies, such as 
restrictive procedural rules, the emphasis on adversarial 
presentation of evidence and limitations on standing, are of 
more pressing concern that the unwarranted attention given to 
less effective ADR methods. 
3. Can ADR methods address the inadequacies in the 
existing systems of environmentai dispute resoiution? 
As well as emphasising the Inadequacies In the adjudicative 
fora, concerns were also voiced about adequacies of existing 
administrative fora. This was particularly so In the case of 
environmental conflicts. Involving conflicting community 
lnterests.2o Such conflicts were seen as common but the 
existing means. Including "political system solutions" were 
considered inadequate, giving as they did disproportionate 
weight to pressure groups, to provide an Inadequate voice for 
other views and to produce diluted compromise solutions.^^ It 
18|d.. 173. 
19|d., 174. 
20m Klug, "Public Interest Dispute Resolution: A Role for Lawyers?"(1991) 
2(3) LEADR Brief May 1991, 1. 
21 Id., 2. 
was considered that the use of the 'negotiated consensus 
building model' might address these inadequacies by bringing 
together representatives of all stakeholder groups. 
This was a view adopted at the time of the establishment of the 
Resource Assessment Commission (RAC) in 1989 to deal with 
major resource use controversies. The RAC commissioned a 
report on the use of mediation as an effective part of its inquiry 
process. In the view of one of its commissioners, the report 
suggested a significant role for mediation in just those t e r m s . 2 2 
In a similar way, ADR methods were proposed as a possible 
solution to the perceived inadequacies of the adjudicative 
system. While it was conceded that in excess of 90% of matters 
litigated were in fact "settled" this type of settlement was 
considered to be "a crude and ill defined system" which 
committed environmental controversies to "the culture and 
techniques of adversary litigation" resulting in the protraction 
of a dispute.23 Paratz considered that the use of some form of 
"managed negotiation" might also address these inadequacies. 
The expectation that these methods could be effectively 
implemented was given encouragement by "the significant 
references to the use of ADR processes" in the Fitzgerald Report 
22g McCoII. "Environmental Dispute Reso!ution"(1993) 12th NELA 
Conference, Canberra, 5-6 July 1993 Conference Papers,^, 
23d Paratz, "Options for Environmental Dispute Resolution"(1990) 9th NELA 
Conference, Gold Coast, 26-28 August 1990, Conference Papers 273. 
on the mining of Fraser Island released in 1991.2^ in this 
atmosphere Paratz predicted that it was "highly likely..that we 
shall shortly witness experimentation as to the use of these 
processes in environmental disputes in AustraliaV^s 
4. What concerns were raised about the use of ADR 
methods in these systems? 
In spite of this enthusiasm, concerns were raised. One strong 
line of criticism concerned the use of ADR methods to resolve 
environmental conflicts. These criticisms echo some of Amy's 
criticism that ADR inevitably requires compromise and such 
compromise is not acceptable in those environmental 
controversies involving broad moral and philosophical 
differences, namely environmental conflicts.27 Rogers takes the 
criticism further by asserting that ADR methods "as a process" 
are also an unsuitable mechanism from the perspective of 
environmental groups. She argues this in the context of 
questioning the efficacy of existing administrative methods, 
such as public inquiries. Such inquiries tend to 'diffuse a sense 
of crisis and create false confidence in a process" but they at 
least have the effect of enhancing and sustaining public 
consciousness.28 However ADR processes because of their 
24|d., 280 and see G W Fitzgerald, Commission of Inquiry into Conservation, 
Management and Use of Fraser Island and the Great Sandy Region (1991) The 
Commission, Brisbane. 
25|d., 282. 
26D Amy, The Politics of Environmental Mediation (1987) Columbia 
University Press, New York. 
Rogers, 'A Dark Green Perspective on Environmental Dispute 
Resolution'O 994) 7 Commercial Dispute Resolution Journal 111 at 114. 
28|d. 
confidential nature may rob environmental groups of the public 
forum and media coverage essential to their main long term goal 
of achieving "an effective shift in public c o n s c i o u s n e s s . " 2 9 She 
suggests the focus on compromise implicit in ADR methods will 
in fact tend to depoliticise and diminish the conflict. 
This criticism has been a major constraint on the extended use 
of ADR methods, especially in environmental conflicts in 
Australia. The insistence that ADR processes, especially 
mediation, be confidential takes the resolution of such 
controversies outside the public forum. If the process is 
confidential, only the stakeholders can be apprised of the 
results of the decision making process. This has two 
disadvantages in the eyes of environmentalists. Firstly, there is 
the concern that controversies are being resolved in the 'private 
spaces' of administrative decision making. This produces a lack 
of transparency which tends to arose suspicion about any 
compromise solution reached. Secondly, because the process is 
confidential it is not possible to bring the deliberations into the 
glare of public attention. As such it is not possible to subject 
the controversy to the kind of political pressure arising from 
perceived public opinion. This is a considerable disadvantage, 
because public opinion is often seen as a powerful weapon in the 
armory of environmentalists. 
For these reasons, while so ever the insistence on 
confidentiality remains, it seems likely that the suspicions 
29|d., 115. 
environmentalists have over the use of ADR methods to resolve 
environmental conflicts will remain strong. 
Rogers also voices the concern that environmentalists may be at 
a disadvantage in any mediation or negotiation process due to 
power inequities. Since environmental controversies inevitably 
involve relationships with some level of government, Rogers is 
concerned that the power imbalances inherent in these 
relationships can transform mediation. The effect is then to 
"replicate(s) the power relationships entrenched in bureaucratic 
and administrative organs of the State'^o. 
Similar criticisms are made about whether ADR methods provide 
a better method of resolving environmental controversies than 
"direct action." Rogers equates direct action with Fowler's 
'extra-legal techniques', involving public protest or 
'environmental theatre'. She rejects the suggestion that ADR 
methods could replace direct action with "a more dignified form 
of participation". For Rogers, direct action has the potential to 
generate publicity and a sense of urgency sufficient at times to 
produce a political resolution of the controversy. But this 
criticism does not allow for the fact that direct action may 
merely exacerbate or precipitate a controversy. The view 
remains in many circles that "in the long term, activism may 
achieve more for the environmental movement than any other 
strategy". 
118, see too J A Scutt, "The Privatisation of Justice: Power 
Differentials, Inequality & the Palliative of Counselling & Mediation" (1988) 
11 Womens Study International Forum 503. 
31 Id., 122. 
Salmon speaking from the perspective of the Australian 
Conservation Foundation supports this view and regards some 
forms of ADR methods as conflict suppression rather than 
r e s o l u t i o n . J Q ^QQ mediation as a means of quelling 'mindless 
conflicts' is in the eyes of the ACF 'nothing so much as a side 
track from the main game.'^a Salmon however allows some 
scope for ADR methods in making the point that the best way to 
avoid conflict lies with proper policy development strategies. 
She gives the example of the Canadian Green Plan developed in 
1990 as an action plan to achieve environmentally sustainable 
development. This Plan was the product of an extensive 'multi-
stakeholder consultative process.'^^ She sees a potentially 
positive role for mediation in a similar process of policy 
development in Australia but is not convinced that the potential 
is sufficient "to direct our energy from some of the (current) 
p r o c e s s e s " . T h i s potential use of ADR methods in a public 
participation role is discussed In detail in the second case 
studies in this research in Chapter 9. 
James Johnson, Director of the Environmental Defenders Office 
(NSW), echoes this cautious tone. He is concemed with the use 
of ADR methods to resolve environmental controversies over 
issues that affect 'the general public', that is to say 
32s Salmon, "Working Towards the Same Agenda? Processes Which Reflect 
Community Concerns and Industry Needs' (1991) MR Conference 





environmental conflicts as defined here.̂ ® He concedes that the 
traditional processes of litigation or political intervention 
provide inadequate fora to examine the broad questions of 
development as they impact upon the environment.^^ But he 
remains wary of the use of ADR methods for this purpose, 
repeating Preston's trio of reasons not to use ADR: 'principles, 
politics and precedent'.^® 
Examining these three reasons in turn, Johnson makes the point 
that where 'principles' are involved compromise is seen as 
inappropriate. Where philosophical beliefs or legal rights 
clearly encourage parties to demand proper environmental 
assessment or protection, compromise is not seen as an 
appropriate response. 
Similarly where 'precedent' is involved in the sense of the need 
to develop and protect such principles, ADR methods may not be 
appropriate because a successfully mediated environmental 
controversy still does not provide an effective precedent which 
may help "to redefine the boundaries of environmental 
protection".39 
With respect to the issue of 'politics' Johnson voices the most 
concern. He is concerned with both the politics of the ADR 
process itself and with the wider administrative mechanism. As 
J Johnson, "Applying Mediation Techniques to Environmental Issues' 
(1991) 28 Impact, September 1991, 5. 
37|d., 7. 
38b J Preston, op cit., note 15 above, 15. 
39j Johnson, op cit, note 36 above, 7. 
regards the process itself he says that participation may be 
perceived as an indication of weal<ness by other parties. He 
gives an example of a response received from the NSW 
Government when negotiations were conducted directly between 
the EDO office and a mining company over a bat habitat in 
limestone caves at Kempsey, northern New South Wales. Johnson 
says that on becoming aware of meaningful negotiations, the 
government altered its pro-conservation position claiming "it 
would seem you are no longer committed to pursuing this matter 
through the courts."^o Johnson conceded there is also the risk of 
environmental groups losing respect and credibility in their own 
organisations through showing a preparedness to consider 
compromise. In this wider political sense, environmentalists 
may not wish to avoid conflict, seeing it instead as a 
mechanism of change and a vehicle to effect a shift in public 
values. 
Nevertheless Johnson is not entirely dismissive of ADR methods. 
He also sees their potential role as being in the policy setting 
process. He suggests ADR in the form of a mediation policy 
round table would be effective if used before any major 
environmental legislation was introduced. Similarly the use of 
mediation at the planning and policy stage may help to defray 
potential areas of dispute rather than leaving these to be 
escalated on a site by site basis^^ It is the use of ADR methods 
in this context which is the focus of the second case study 
discussed in Chapter 9 of this research. 
40|d. 
41 Id., 8. 
Models for Implementation of ADR Methods 
Scholarly attention was also directed to devising appropriate 
models for the implementation of ADR methods in environmental 
controversies. In a series of papers in 1988-91 Sandford, also 
identifying the forms of environmental dispute resolution as 
administrative and adjudicative, considered that these were 
essentially inadequate to address environmental issues. She 
suggested a model to redesign these mechanisms to incorporate 
mediation as an integral part of the existing mechanisms.'*2 Her 
approach is termed the integration model. 
The Integration Model 
In examining the existing appeals systems in Tasmania, 
Sandford looked at a number of examples. In the adjudicative 
system, she considered Courts of Petty Sessions where 
objections raised to the granting of acquaculture permits for 
the establishment of marine farms were reviewed. In this 
existing system once formal objections had been lodged the 
dispute proceeded to a hearing without formal negotiation 
procedures. Sandford considered there was a role for mediation 
in the pre-objection stage as a dispute prevention measure, or 
Sandford, 'Environmental Dispute Resolution: Alternatives for Appeals 
Systems" (1990) 7 Environmental and Planning Law Journal May 1990, 19 
at 24. 
at the stage of objections to mediate a solution before a hearing 
commenced.43 
In the administrative system, she considered the Environment 
Protection Appeal Board which heard objections and appeals 
under the Environment Protection Act 1973 (Tas). Sandford saw 
a role for mediation in these appeals either prior to objections 
being lodged or before a hearing took place. Sandford 
foreshadowed the potential of ADR methods in these processes 
as "an integral part of the environmental decision-making 
process". 
In 1990 Sandford was involved in one specific application of this 
integration model involving the use of unassisted negotiation. This 
was the Salamanca Agreement Process which evolved from "the 
rubble of the 1988 Helsham Inquiry" into forestry management in 
T a s m a n i a . T h e Process was a result of the Tasmanian 
Parliamentary Accord between Labor and the Green Independents 
which delivered government to Labor in 1989.^5 The Agreement 
bound all stakeholders to negotiate for a period of twelve months 
to develop a strategy for forest management. Round Table 
negotiation took place between February and September 1990 but 
broke down when all parties could not agree upon a joint 
recommendation. A non-unanimous (which significantly did not 
include the Combined Environment Groups) recommendation for a 
43|d., 26. 
Sandford, "The Merits of Negotiation and Mediation in Resource 
Management Disputes" (1991) Environmental Dispute Resolution Conference 
Sydney 14-15 May 1991 Conference Papers, IIR Conferences Sydney, 4. 
45t Bonyhady, op cit., note 13 above, 23. 
final strategy was put to the Tasmanian Cabinet. But as the 
Accord began to unravel, due in part to this breakdown, the 
strategy was not implemented. The Salamanca Process failed to a 
large measure because it was so closely tied to this 
Parliamentary Accord. 
Though the Salamanca Process was not successful, Sandford 
drew a number of lessons from its failure which she provided 
for in her "integration model." She emphasised the need to 
prevent or minimise dispute escalation at the outset of any 
dispute resolution process. She suggested this be done by 
encouraging broad public participation in the form of regional 
advisory groups to parallel the stakeholder negotiations and 
provide a vehicle to constructively voice community concerns.^^ 
Secondly she saw a need for mediation to assist in the initial 
stages of the negotiation process to develop an agreed scope and 
procedure for the negotiations to follow.-^^ 
Sandford's model was based on the use of ADR methods as an 
integral part of the whole environmental decision making 
process as distinct from being used solely as an adjunct to the 
dispute resolution part of the process. Used in this way she 
considered ADR methods had the potential for dispute prevention 
or minimisation as well as dispute resolution. 
This integration model was one strongly endorsed in the report 
to the RAG on the use of ADR methods in its Inquiry Process. 
Sandford, op cit., note 44 above, 7. 
47r Sandford, op cit., note 48 above, 8. 
This report looked at a wide range of approaches and models for 
the use of non-adversarial methods as an effective means of 
public participation.48 
The models reviewed included the Harvard MIT model the US 
Environment Protection Authority's Regulatory Negotiation 
Project, the Canadian Round Tables, the Salamanca Agreement 
Process itself and the Pitjantjatjara model used for negotiating 
clearances over Aboriginal sacred sites in the Northern 
Territory and South Australia prior to mine exploration.so 
Following this review the report suggested implementation of 
ADR methods into the inquiry process. The consultants saw a 
role at the commencement of each new inquiry for the use of 
mediation to determine the scope of the main issues, the 
required research and the likely participants. Additionally they 
saw clear benefits in integrating mediation into the inquiry 
process itself as part of a public participation strategy.^i 
Boer et al saw a role for ADR methods but not as a dispute 
resolution strategy since this was beyond the RAC's 
jurisdiction. Instead they saw their use as a means of dealing 
with process issues, such as the scope and procedure of 
inquiries. To this extent they endorsed Sandford's model since 
they gave ADR methods a role integral to the whole 
48b Boer et a!., The Use of Mediation in the Resource Assessment Commission 
Process (1991) AGPS, Canberra, ix. 
49See R Fisher & W Ury, Getting to Yes (1981) London, Hutchinson. 
50B Boer et al, op cit., note 48 above, 24-42. 
51 Id., 60 -64 . 
environmental decision making process. Much of the perceived 
effectiveness of ADR methods in this context was considered to 
be that the usual strict confidentiality was not required. This 
aspect warrants further exploration and is examined in detail in 
the second case study carried out for this research. 
The emphasis in Sandford's model on ADR methods as an early 
intervention tool is considered the best strategy for 
controversies concerned with Environmentally Sustainable 
Development (ESD) questions.52 Christie emphasises that 
implementation of ESD principles may not be achieved through 
one resource management option only, but that a range of 
options along a continuum may each achieve the goal to differing 
degrees. So, for example the Fitzgerald Report on logging on 
Fraser Island provided four options, all consistent with ESD 
principles.53 Christie said that adjudicative processes consider 
whether a particular proposed usage is "environmentally 
acceptable' and will not seek alternative uses which may prove 
more suitable. ADR processes on the other hand can fully 
evaluate each option on the continuum and reach an informed 
view as to which is preferrable in ESD terms.^^ The use of ADR 
methods can thus be an essential first step in the decision 
making process where questions of ESD are in focus.^s 
52e Christie, "ESD and Environmental Dispute Resolution" (1993) 4(4) 




The Adjunct Model 
The other model of the use of ADR methods in environmental 
dispute resolution emphasises their use as a distinct part of the 
dispute resolution mechanism, rather than as an integral 
component of the broad environmental decision making process. 
Weir in considering the recommendations of Fitzgerald's Report 
suggested that the use of ADR methods in administrative and 
adjudicative mechanisms should be as an essentially adjunctive 
o n e . H e supports a single adjudicative forum to decide all 
development and environmental matters with the use of ADR at 
pre-hearing conferences being "firmly established within the 
court system".Addit ionally, if a controversy is to be dealt 
with administratively by way of an inquiry then ADR should be 
involved to "encourage public participation (and) to allow a 
broad range of views to be considered".58 
This adjunct role for ADR methods was one implemented in the 
Environment Resource and Development Court, South Australia 
established in January 1994 by the Environment Resources and 
Development Court Act 1993 (SA). This role was supported by 
one of its founding judges who considered that the most 
appropriate environmental dispute resolution mechanism was 
adjudicative with ADR methods operating in a supportive role.^^ 
56m J Weir, "Alternative Dispute Resolution in Queensland Environmental 




59c L Trenorden, "Judging the Jurisdictions: Where Should Environmental 
Disputes be Resolved?" (1994) 4 Australian Environmnetal Law News 
December 1994, 46 at 52. 
This is also the role of mediation in the Land and Environment 
Court of NSWs Mediation Scheme. 
Choice of Model 
The model for ADR methods as an adjunct to other dispute 
resolution mechanisms is a more limited role than that 
expounded by Sandford. Her model gives ADR methods essentially 
a 'beginning-to-end' role in the environmental decision making 
process. In this sense ADR has a dispute prevention role or as 
Roberts describes it "a dispute management role."®® The breadth 
of this role extends to conflict anticipation, equivalent in some 
respects to the role performed by "regulation negotation" in the 
United States and also to the scoping of issues requiring 
resolution prior to administrative processes. The model allows 
the development of a role in other stages of "the regulatory 
lifecycle".®^ It is this integration model that may "convince 
environmentalists that mediation does have a role" in 
environmental dispute resolution.®2 This research examines the 
extent to which either roles has been implemented. 
60j Roberts, "Environmental Mediation: dispute Resolution or Dispute 
Management?" (1993) Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal May 1993, 
150. 
61 Id., 156. 
62|d., 158. 
Review of Practice 
In looking for evidence of the use of ADR methods in 
environmental controversies in Australia the difficulty which 
confronts the researcher is on the one hand the sparcity of 
empirical infomnation, and on the other anecdotal evidence 
which suggests significant implementation. Clark points out 
this area remains "under-theorised, under-researched and little 
e v a l u a t e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s he can say "the reality is that there 
has been a significant growth in Australia in the use of various 
ADR techniques.'®^ 
The evidence of such growth is less than persuasive. While 
recognising that environmental controversies are most often 
encountered at the local government level, Clark is only able to 
say that Sandford's model of integration is being re-emphasised 
and that local government will "increasingly be conflict 
managers" to prevent controversies before they begin.®® But 
there is little cogent evidence of this promise coming to 
fruition. 
Clark refers to the court-annexed Mediation Service offered by 
the Land and Environment Court of NSW. But he says "more often, 
®3E Clark, "The Role of Non-litigious Dispute Resolution Methods in 
Environmental Disputes' (1995) 2(2) Australasian Journal of Natural 
Resources Law 1 at 42. 
43. 
®5see R Sandford, "The Politics of Agreement Local Governments as Innovators 
in Environmental Management Conflicts"(1995) Published Proceedings of 'On 
Common Ground: National Symposium and Skills Workshop' National Local 
Government Environmental Resource Network, 30-31 March 1995, 3. 
66E Clark, op cit., note 63 above, 6. 
mediation is entered into privately without supervision by a 
c o u r t . B u t there is no evidence provided for this assertion. 
With respect to institutionalised mediation there are examples 
of the Community Justice Programs both in New South Wales and 
Queensland and the Conflict Resolution Service in the ACT. But 
there is no clear evidence that these institutions are properly 
equipped to facilitate environmental mediations due to the 
technical and specialised nature of these controversies.®® 
Clark notes that one of the contextual differences in the 
Australian situation affecting implementation of ADR methods 
is the lack of legislation expressly authorising ADR, such as the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act 1990 (USC) in the United States. The 
only example Clark provides of administrative agency use of 
ADR is the Department of Urban Services including conditions of 
mandatory negotiation in new building industry standard forms 
of contract.®^ Similarly there are no legislative initatives in the 
environmental area similar to the Farm Debt Mediation Act 1994 
(NSW;and the Native Title Act 1996 (Cth) mandating mediation 
before enforcement action. There are only examples of 
legislation where its use is encouraged, for example the Land 
and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) and the Planning, 
Environment and Development Assessment Act 1995 (Qld). 
®7|d., 12. 
®8See J O'Dea "Mediation and Local Government" (1994) 11(3) 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal June 1994 ,211, note 27. 
®9E Clark, op cit., note 63 above, 20. 
O'Dea looks at planning disputes and suggests that mediation at 
local government level is being used to some degreejo The 
potential for such usage exists both at what O'Dea terms Stage 
One, essentially equivalent to Sandford's integration model, and 
at Stage Two, the adjunct dispute resolution role, when the 
matter is before the Court for review. He sees Stage One as a 
pre-emptive action by local councils instigating mediation 
before the approval process begins. But the potential at Stage 
One is currently not being realised, and its development in many 
councils is largely an ad hoc affair.^i 
O'Dea's Stage Two mediations are a reality in the fomi of the 
Mediation Service offered by the Land and Environment Court of 
NSW. But its usage among local councils, which are parties to 
virtually all such merit appeals is not overwhelming. In 1992 
figures obtained by O'Dea show only 25% of local councils 
involved in matters before the court chose to use mediation, 
which related to about 8 % of all merit a p p e a l s . 7 2 O'Dea 
considers mediation is used in only a few cases either because 
of a fear of it as an unfamilar concept or a mistrust or bias 
against mediation in councillors or council solicitors.73 
O'Dea suggests that early intervention usage would be 
encouraged by the establishment of an independent 
environmental service. This idea was considered in a pilot 
project co-ordinated by the Australian Dispute Resolution 




Centre (ACDC) and funded by the Commonwealth Government in 
1996.74 In this pilot project six large multi-party controversies 
were subject to attempted resolution by mediation or 
facilitation. The controversies involved diverse developments, 
such as the relocation of an iron foundary to a rural residential 
area, a subdivision, a concrete crushing plant, a retail 
development, the extension of working hours on a development 
site and the proposed construction of a school haWJ^ 
Following the pilot mediations ACDC developed a model dispute 
resolution program which it provided to all councils in NSW.^e 
This model essentially duplicated Sandford's integration model. 
The expectation was that "the dissemination of outcomes will 
encourage councils to adopt consensual rather than adversarial 
approaches to development issues" and implementation of these 
procedures is continuing.77 
Spiegel also considered the scope for the use of ADR methods in 
an integration role.^s She saw they had a use at the stage of 
early intervention to ensure that the application was ready for 
submission in a form both economically and environmentally 
feasible.79 Secondly, she saw ADR methods as useful for the 
74Australian Commercial Dispute Centre, Dispute Resolution in Local 
Government Planning-Strengthing Local Economic Capacity (1996) ACDC Ltd., 
Sydney. 
75|d., 18. See Chapter Seven following for a detailed review of these 
controversies. 
76id. , 43 -57 . 
77Australian Commercial Dispute Resolution Centre, Press Release (undated, 
c . 1 9 9 5 ) , 1 . 
78E Spiegel, "Mediation in the Court" (1992) Paper delivered to NELA (NSW) 
Conference, Sydney, 2. 
79|d. 
creation of policies and programs in the controversial areas of 
pollution control and resource management, for instance in the 
setting of urban consolidation policy. She was however unaware 
of any implementation in these areas.®o 
The example and success of the Mediation Scheme in the Land 
and Environment Court of NSW which is examined in detail in 
Chapter Eight has encouraged similar developments in using 
mediation in an adjunct role in other States, in particular in 
Victoria. An investigation into the use of mediation in the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Victoria) for planning 
disputes recommended a trial of the mediation conference 
concept.®^ This institutionalisation was motivated in part by 
the cost savings based upon the NSW example.®^ Concerns were 
raised at the time as to whether AAT members would conduct 
such mediations themselves and the effect this might have on 
their independence and the safeguards which could be 
implemented to ensure the public interest was addressed.®® 
This Victorian review considered whether mediation would be 
more conducive to resolving minor controversies between 
neighbours "on a fairly even footing" but where there were "few 
cost savings" or controversies over multiple issues which 
involved the prospect of extended hearing time saved.®^ While 
®0E Spelgel, Personal comments, 17 April 1996. 
Management Committee for the Mediation in Planning Project, Mediation in 
Planning Disputes, Final Report (1994) Department of Planning & 
Development (Victoria), Melbourne. 
®2v Davies, "Mediation and Planning Appeals: Jumping on the Bandwagon?" 
(1994) 2 Australian Environmental Law News 1995 65 at 68. 
®3|d., 72-73. 
®4|d., 80. 
the pilot project itself concentrated upon essentially smaller 
disputes the arguments for extending mediations to larger 
more complex controversies were cogent. It was argued that 
these controversies could benefit from scoping to refine the 
issues and independent expert appraisal to advise on 
particularly contentious technical issues, such as traffic flow 
or effluent disposal even if full resolution could not be 
achieved. Following a review of the report the President of the 
AAT advised in June 1995 that mediations would be offered once 
a planning appeal had been lodged.^^ 
Other examples have also come from Victoria. In 1991 Fisher 
successfully mediated a controversy involving the expansion of 
the facilities for a tourist resort which included both amenity 
questions and environmental questions dealing with threats to 
local wildlife habitats. This appears to be an example of the 
successful resolution of a controversy in the environmental 
conflict half of the continuum.s^ 
Another example was the resolution of an environmental 
controversy concerning an application to amend a planning 
scheme to allow for larger rural subdivision in the Shire of 
Hastings, south of Melbourne. This controversy in the view of 
the two mediators was "at heart a value conflict" involving a 
large number of parties but was instead successfully mediated 
^^Management Committee, op cit., note 82 above, 5-9. 
86|d., 82. 
87T Fisher, "Mediating a Planning Permit Dispute" (1992) 71(1056) 
Australian Municipal Journal, January/February 1992, 4 at 5. 
by not directly confronting this conflict and concentrating upon 
the negotiable amenity issues.®® 
There is also evidence of the use of ADR methods in the 
resolution of other environmental conflicts. In addition to the 
use of mediation to resolve the controversy over the Conondale 
Ranges in south-east Queensland discussed by Wootten and 
others earlier®^, Boulle cites other successful examples of the 
use of "policy making mediation" to negotiate environmental 
standards practice.^o 
Other examples of the use of mediation to resolve environmental 
conflicts include the management of a waste disposal site ^̂  
and conflicts over tourism in World Heritage sites.92 in addition 
there are suggestions that ADR methods may have provided 
resolution of some conflicts that were dealt with 
adjudicatively. Naughton provides two examples where 
adjudicative decisions to refuse proposals for new quarry sites 
might have been more effectively dealt with by negotiated 
solutions which allowed for some compromise.^^ 
®®B Turner & R Saunders, "Mediating a Planning Scheme Amendment: A Case 
Study in the Co-mediation of a Multi-party Planning Dispute" (1995) 6(4) 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal, November 1995, 284 at 295. 
®9H Wootten, op cit.note 1 above, 72 & T Bonyhady, op cit., note 13 above, 23. 
Boulle, Mediation: Principle, Process, Practice (1996) Butterworths, 
Sydney, 217. 
91K Train & M Klug, "Managing a Waste Disposal Conflict" (1992) 3(2) 
LEADR Brief February 1992, 9. 
& T Atherton, "Mediating Disputes over Tourism in Sensitive Areas, Part 
11" (1994) Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal, May 1994, 134. 
93T Naughton, "Court Related Alternative Dispute Resolution in NSW " (1995) 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal, December 1995, 373 at 386. 
The use of ADR methods have also been suggested as a more 
effective mechanism for community participation in 
environmental decision making. Much was made of the promise 
of community participation in the formulation and 
implementation of public policy in the 1980s. This was 
particularly so in the case of environmental policy. But the 
promise often failed to materialise when the consultation 
tended to be little more than community education.^^ It was 
considered that ADR methods might provide a more meaningful 
vehicle for participation given that "a participatory style Is 
more likely to build awareness, perhaps consensus'-^® This use 
of ADR methods in this role is examined more closely in the 
second case study. 
Conclusion 
This review has demonstrated that there is some support for 
the promise of ADR methods as a useful environmental 
dispute resolution mechanism. Two models have been 
suggested for the implementation of ADR methods in this 
area. The first is the integration model where ADR methods 
are used as an integral part of the whole environmental 
decision making process. This model assigns to ADR methods 
a dispute management or conflict resolution role. The second 
model gives ADR methods a reduced role as an adjunct to 
Alviano, 'Environmental Conflict and the Failure of Connmunity 
Participation" (1995) Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal 33 at 34. 
Robinson, "Public Participation In Environmental Decision-Making" 
(1993) Environmental and Planning Law Journal October 1993, 320 at 329. 
existing administrative or adjudicative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Tiiis model places ADR methods in a dispute 
settlement role. 
This discussion of the Australian experience confirms a 
number of the concerns voiced in the United States literature 
as to the suitability of ADR methods in the resolution of 
environmental controversies. In particular the critics 
reiterate the concern over the political nature of 
environmental dispute resolution. These critics contend that 
the use of ADR methods fails to take adequate regard of the 
political nature of the process itself or the absence of 
decision making power in the stakeholders. 
In addition the Australian experience has shown the 
importance of two further issues placing constraints on the 
wider use of ADR methods. The first issue discussed is the 
negative effects of the insistence upon the confidentiality of 
the process. 
The issue of confidentiality is a recurrent theme in ADR 
practice in environmental matters. A persistent view is that 
the need for confidentiality conflicts with other important 
issues, such as the need for transparency of decision making. 
Whilesoever confidentiality remains a crucial requirement of 
ADR it will continue to act as a significant constraint on the 
expanded use of these methods in environmental 
controversies, especially in environmental conflicts. 
The second issue is the perceived need to protect the public 
interest. This is seen as a crucial factor in the resolution of 
environmental controversies. Since the public interest is 
potentially present in all environmental controversies (either 
dormant or activated), this poses another significant 
constraint on the use of these methods. The literature to date 
suggests that controversies involving an activated public 
interest will always tend to be unsuitable for consensual 
resolution. 
Given this review, the next step is to devise a research 
method to examine the implementation of ADR methods and 




The aim of this research is to investigate the use made in 
Australia of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods for 
the resolution of environmental controversies. The scope of such 
investigation needs to be confined in some manageable way. It is 
neither feasible nor possible to investigate all jurisdictions and 
contexts. 
Chapter Two provided a method of classifying environmental 
controversies by the extent to which they exhibited a number of 
characteristics. Three of these characteristics were highlighted 
as being key determinants of the nature of the environmental 
controversy: value conflicts, questions of scientific 
uncertainity and public interest concerns. Those controversies 
which exhibited these three key characteristics were 
considered more ikely to sit towards the environmental conflict 
half of the continuum. Conversely, controversies which did not 
exhibit these three key characteristics were more likely to fall 
in the environmental dispute half of the continuum. The 
classification method was not presented as being a definitive 
method of categorisation. Rather environmental controversies 
were said to be graduated along a continuum between the two 
extremes depending upon the full or partial exhibition or non-
exhibition of all the characteristics considered. This 
investigation aims to examine the use of ADR methods in 
resolving environmental controversies towards opposite ends of 
the continuum. 
In addition, the discussion in Chapter Five provided one other 
ancilliary matter which warranted investigation. This review 
identifies two models of the use of ADR methods: 
-an integration model, and 
-an adjunctive model 
As a secondary objective, the research will consider the 
prominent of each of these models in the introduction of ADR 
methods in the solution of environmental controversies in 
Australia. 
Using these preliminary bases a series of hypotheses or 
research questions can be set. It is then necessary to select 
appropriate and manageable methods to test the questions 
raised. 
The first function of this chapter is to clearly identify the 
research questions set. The second function is to detail the 
methods selected to test these questions and to justify the 
selection. The chapter also describes in outline the design of the 
research instruments used to carry out specific parts of the 
research. 
Research Questions 
Drawing from the literature review a number of expectations 
arise about tine effectiveness of ADR methods in resolving 
environmental controversies. These expectations arise in 
particular from the nature of the response in Australia to the 
United States experience with ADR methods. In the United 
States there appears (in spite of some strongly voiced 
misgivings) to be an expectation that ADR methods can be 
effective in resolving controversies towards the environmental 
conflict end of the continuum. Indeed a great deal of the United 
States literature seems to equate "environmental disputes' (as 
they are referred to there) with environmental conflicts as 
described in this research, with little regard to the 
environmental dispute half of the continuum. 
But this expectation is not reflected in the Australian 
experience. In Australia, the expectation appears to be that ADR 
methods can work well for environmental disputes but will 
rarely be effective in environmental conflicts. This expectation 
is said to be because of the differences in the nature of the 
environmental protection regime between the two countries. The 
assumption is made that because environmental conflicts in 
Australia are in the main dealt with administratively, ADR 
methods will prove to be unsuitable. 
The hypothesis that arises as a result of these assumptions is: 
*ADR methods will be effective in solving controversies 
towards the dispute end of the continuum but not controversies 
towards the conflict end. 
Research Method 
In order to test this hypothesis it is first necessary to review 
the fora in which environmental controversies are resolved in 
Australia to gauge the extent to which ADR methods are 
employed. This results in a very broad area of inquiry from 
which emerge three questions: 
(1) Where are environmental controversies resolved in 
Australia? 
(2) Do ADR methods play a significant part in the resolution of 
environmental disputes in Australia? 
(3) Do ADR methods play a significant part in the resolution of 
environmental conflicts in Australia? 
The focus of these broad questions needs to be refined to a more 
manageable scope for the purposes of this study. To make the 
research project manageable the focus has been reduce to the 
following questions: 
(1) In what fora are environmental controversies 
resolved In New South Wales? 
(2) How successful are ADR methods In the solution of 
controversies towards the dispute end of the 
continuum? 
(3) How successful are ADR methods In the solution of 
controversies towards the conflict end of the 
continuum? 
Selection of Method 
It has proven extremely difficult to select suitable methods to 
test the second and third of these research questions. ADR 
methods by their nature are altemative to traditional means. As 
a result there is no institutionalised recording system for the 
number and nature of controversies dealt with nor the results 
obtained, as there is for instance In the case of matters dealt 
with by adjudication. 
In addition, an essential characteristic of most ADR methods is 
confidentiality. This feature has added to the difficulties of the 
research in obtaining examples of controversies dealt with and 
results obtained. These access problems were compounded when 
controversies dealt with in a non-court annexed system were 
examined. 
A further difficulty arose from the lack of transparency evident 
in controversies resolved by administrative means. These 
restrictions made it difficult to determine the extent of the use 
of ADR methods in this context. 
The methods selected attempt to address these problems. Two 
specific case studies were conducted. The case studies selected 
are not necessarily typical of the use of ADR methods and indeed 
may be atypical. The case studies are not presented as 
representative of such use but merely illustrative. 
Allowing for these restrictions the following methods were 
selected to address the research questions set: 
Question 1 
In what fora are environmental controversies resolved 
in NSW? 
A review was undertaken of all known public and private fora 
dealing with environmental controversies in NSW. This review is 
reported in Chapter Seven and provides a context from which the 
case studies were selected. The case studies were specifically 
chosen to illustrate the use of ADR methods in dealing with 
what are hypothesised to be environmental disputes on the one 
hand, and what are hypothesised to be environmental conflicts, 
on the other. In addition, the case studies are chosen to 
illustrate the use of these methods as part of what are 
hypothesised to be adjunct and integration models. 
Question 2 
How successful are ADR methods in the solution of 
controversies towards the dispute end of the 
continuum? 
Empirical research was undertaken in the form of a case study 
of the Mediation Scheme in the Land and Environment Court of 
NSW. All matters mediated in the period May 1991-December 
1995 were examined. For the period May 1991-December 1994 
the results of previous research was reviewed. The records of 
court files of all matters mediated in the period January to 
December 1995 were personally examined and substantially 
more data was extracted from such files than had been the case 
with the earlier research. 
The first stage of the case study was to examine the 
characteristics of the cases mediated in the Land and 
Environment Court to seek to confirm the hypothesis that they 
could be classified as environmental disputes. The second stage 
of the case study was to assess the effectiveness of mediation 
as used in the Scheme. 
This case study was chosen in the expectation that it would 
provide an example of ADR methods used in the forni of an 
adjunct model. 
Question 3 
How successful are ADR methods in the solution of 
controversies towards the conflict end of the 
continuum? 
Empirical research was undertaken In the form of a case study 
of the Interim Assessment Process (lAP) negotiations conducted 
by the NSW Resource and Conservation Assessment Council 
(RACAC) in its preparation of an interim assessment strategy 
for forests in NSW in 1996. In particular all Non-Govemment 
Organisation (NGO) participants in the process were 
interviewed. 
The first stage of the case study was to examine the 
characteristics of the forestry controversy to test the 
hypothesis that it could be classified as an environmental 
conflict. The second stage of the case study was to assess the 
effectiveness of negotiation in the Interim Assessment Process. 
This case study would chosen in the expectation that it would 
provide an example of ADR methods used in the form of an 
integration model. 
Design of Research Instruments 
In addition to selecting appropriate methods to test each of the 
research questions posed, it was necessary to design suitable 
research instruments to carry out this testing using illustrative 
case studies. The following designs were developed. 
Case Study review of the Mediation Scheme in the Land 
and Environment Court of NSW. 
The Mediation Scheme offered by the Court has been in operation 
since May 1991. Access to quantitative data previously compiled 
by other researchers was available for a substantial part of this 
period. Additionally direct access was obtained to the Court's 
files for mediated matters for a further 12 month period of the 
Scheme's operation to update the information available to 
December 1995. This direct access allowed the collection of 
much more comprehensive information than previously obtained. 
In summary, the Scheme was examined using the following data: 
(a) Data from the Young Lawyers' survey^ conducted by 
questionaires administered to participants in the 42 mediations 
conducted in the period May-December 1991. 
(b) Data from Tow & Stubbs' court file analysis^ for the 140 
mediations conducted in the two year period 1992-94. 
1J Muller, "Report on Young Lawyers' Survey- 'Mediation in the Land and 
Environment Court'" (1992) 3/3 A 4 LEADR Brief 8. 
^D Tow & M Stubbs, "The effectiveness of ADR Techniques in the Resolution of 
Planning Disputes" (1995) forthcoming, University of Western Sydney. 
(c) Data from a review of court files for the 73 mediations 
conducted in the period January-December 1995. 
The data reviewed was examined to test the hypothesis that the 
environmental controversies mediated could be classified as 
environmental disputes and to detennine the effectiveness of 
such mediations. 
Case Study review of the Interim Assessment Process 
conducted by the Resource and Assessment Council of 
NSW. 
The use made of negotiation in the Interim Assessment Process 
(lAP) conducted by the Resource and Conservation Assessment 
Council (RACAC) during April 1996 was examined in detail. 
RACAC was formed with the overall function of assisting the 
relevant Minister in the exercise of his administrative dispute 
resolution function to resolve issues concerned with the 
formulation and implementation of a comprehensive forestry 
policy in New South Wales. 
The stated aim of the lAP was to identify those forests which 
would be set aside for inclusion in a resen/e system on an 
interim basis. The aim of the negotiations was to allow 
stakeholders to participate in the selection of those parts of 
State Forests which would be deferred from logging to fully or 
partially meet the reservation targets derived from the 
Commonwealth-State agreed conservation criteria.^ 
The objective of the negotiation process was to produce options 
providing varying levels of satisfaction of conservation and 
resource targets.^ In the course of negotiations these were 
reduced to four conservation / wood supply scenarios for each 
of ten regions in eastern NSW. 
The lAP negotiations were a series of face-to-face negotiations 
conducted between the major stakeholders in the forest 
controversy. Representatives of the following stakeholders 
were included: 
Commonwealth Government 
State Forests of NSW 
National Parks and Wildlife Service 
*NSW Forest Products Association 
*Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 
Aboriginal Communities 
^Conservation Groups represented by the Nature Conservation 
Council® 
The review was conducted by way of a series of interviews with 
the three NGO participants (mari<ed * above) conducted in 1996-
97. These interviews focussed upon the parties' perception of 
3RACAC, Draft Interim Forestry Assessment Report {^99e) RACAC, Sydney, 
3. 
4|d., 18. 
^RACAC News, Issue No.3 May 1996, 1. 
whether the negotiation process constituted an effective 
method to resolve or manage environmental conflict over the 
forestry issue. 
The Process was reviewed to test the hypothesis whether the 
forestry controversy could be classified as an environmental 
conflict and to determine the effectiveness of the negotiation 
process. 
Conclusion 
The methods selected are intended to provide a means of testing 
the hypotheses. It was anticipated that the two case studies 
would examine fora dealing with controversies located towards 
the opposite ends of the continuum. The first hypothesis was 
that the ADR methods used in the Land and Environment Court 
would be effective. The second hypothesis was that the ADR 
methods used in the Interim Assessment Process would not be 
effective. The extent to which these hypotheses were confirmed 
is the subject of Chapter 10. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
REVIEW OF FORA FOR RESOLVING 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERSIES IN 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the fora used to resolve 
environmental controversies in New South Wales to 
determine whether ADR methods are used and whether this 
use is on an integration or adjunct basis. The fora 
reviewed seek to cover bodies resolving environmental 
controversies both adjudicatively and administratively. 
In the case of administrative fora, the decision-maker is 
vested with authority, usually by statute, to apply the 
relevant criteria and to exercise the authority in 
accordance with administrative law principles.^ If such 
decision is subject to review on its merits to a court or 
tribunal the review is nonetheless an exercise of 
administrative function. So a merit appeal remains a re-
exercise of an administrative or executive power and in 
this way is fundamentally different from the judicial 
1M A Eisenberg, "Participation, Responsiveness and the Consultative 
Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller"(1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 410 at 
425. 
function of a court in reviewing a decision.2 The 
administrative fora to be examined would thus include 
administrative or executive bodies, quasi-independent 
advisory bodies and courts or tribunals when dealing with 
merit appeals. 
Adjudicative mechanisms usually involve a judicial or 
quasi-judicial body making a judgement in relation to a 
controversy or issue before that b o d y T h e decision made 
is binding upon the parties to it and in the case of judicial 
decisions establishes a precedent which may be binding 
upon others. An example of a controversy resolved by way 
of an adjudicative mechanism is the judicial review of the 
decisions of government ministers or officals.^ The 
grounds of such a review must involve alleged errors of 
law in the manner in which the minister or official has 
exercised his or her powers. 
Within these two broad categories the fora to be reviewed 
can be listed as follows: 
(1) Administrative or Executive Bodies 
(2) The Land and Environment Court of NSW 
(3) Commissioners of Inquiry for Environment & Planning 
(4) The Australian Commercial Dispute Centre (ACDC). 
^B J Preston, 'Limits of Environmental Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms''(1995) 13 Australian Bar Reviewl48 at 149. 
3|d.. 150. 
^See for example Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc. v Minister for 
Environment & Ors. (1997) 142 ALR 632. 
Fora Reviewed 
Administrative or Executive Bodies: 
Locai Councils, State Government l\/linisters and 
Off ic ia is 
These individuals or bodies have executive or 
administrative authority to resolve environmental 
controversies. The decision made by ministers or 
government officals or other consent authorities such as 
local councils may be to grant or refuse various consents 
or approvals Additionally they issue or withhold licences 
or permissions to carry out various activities which have 
an environmental impact. 
Clearly the principal dispute resolution mechanism used 
by these bodies is administrative. In addition, there is 
some evidence of the use of consensual mechanisms. In the 
case of local councils, for instance, this may purely be on 
an ad hoc basis. North Sydney Council, for example, had 
formulated a specific policy to recommend mediation of 
environmental controversies by way of an integration 
model.5 Similarly, the pilot project conducted by the ACDC 
included as one of its recommendations the establishment 
of a mediation based process for resolving environmental 
O'Dea, "Mediation and Local Government"(1994) 11(3) Environmental 
and Planning Law Journal June 1994, 211 at 218 
controversies at an early stage as a standard part of the 
Councils' approval processes.® 
At state government level, consensual mechanisms have 
been considered and adopted as an adjunct to the 
administrative mechanism. A notable example is the use 
made of negotiation in the Interim Assessment Process 
conducted by the NSW Resource and Conservation 
Assessment Council previously referred to. The Council 
was established to assist the NSW Government in its 
decision making process to resolve the environmental 
controversy over the use of State Forests for logging. As 
outlined in Chapter 6, this is the focus of a case study 
reported in Chapter 9. 
The decisions made by these bodies are subject to judicial 
review by a court or tribunal such as the Land and 
Environment Court of NSW. In addition some decisions are 
subject to a re-exercise of the administrative or 
executive power by way of an appeal on the merits, for 
instance by the Court exercising its administrative power. 
Such reviews have been the subject of considerable 
controversy.^ 
^Australian Commercial Disputes Centre, Dispute Resolution in Local 
Government Planning-Strenging Local Economic Capacity" (1996) AC DC, 
Sydney, 3. 
7 Appeals are available undeer s.20 for the court to exercise judicial 
review power; under s.17 for merit appeals by applicants and under s.87 & 
98 for third party appeals with respect to designated development. 
Land and Environment Court of NSW 
The Land and Environment Court of NSW (the Court) has 
power to resolve environmental controversies within its 
jurisdiction; in doing so it exercises judicial and 
administrative power and thus acts as both an 
adjudicative and administrative mechanism. 
The Court was established under the provisions of the Land 
and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) and commenced 
operations on 1 September 1980. The Court was described 
at the time of its enactment as a "somewhat Innovative 
experiment in dispute resolution mechanisms" combining 
as it does both the exercise of judicial and administrative 
power".8 
The Court was an innovative fomm in the manner in which 
it had jurisdiction to exercise both these powers. 
Importantly, the tribunal was not subject to the doctrine 
(applicable to federal tribunals) separating the exercise of 
these powers. It could exercise administrative functions, 
as it does in merit appeals under 
classes 1, 2 and 3 of its jurisdiction (ss17-19), heard by 
judges or assessors. In addition, its judges could hear and 
determine class 4 civil enforcement proceedings, class 5 
summary criminal prosecutions and judicial reviews 
8D P Landa, NSW Parliament, Legislative Assembly Debates (1979), 21 
November 1979, 3350. 
generally. This combination was viewed positively in the 
eariy years of the Court: 
"the new court exercises a more comprehensive 
jurisdiction in relation to planning and environmental 
matters than has hitherto been vested in any one appellate 
body.'Q 
Class 1 generally relates to development appeals. Such 
appeals include applications against a consent authority's 
refusal of a development application or against the 
conditions imposed on a consent. This Class also includes 
appeals under the Environmental Planning and Assessment 
Act 1979 (NSW) by third parties in relation to "designated 
developments". These are matters which, by the nature of 
their operations, are likely to have a significant impact on 
the environment. 
Class 2 relates to building applications and orders issued 
by Councils for demolition and the like. Class 3 is the 
miscellaneous jurisdiction including cases relating to 
compensation, valuation and land tenure matters including 
claims under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW). 
^Cripps J, "The Jurisdiction of the Land and Environment Court under the 
EPA Act 1979 & LGA 1919"(1982) as quoted in T F M Naughton, Land and 
Environment Court Practice (1997) LBC, Sydney, para. 1310. 
10M Connell, "Mediation in the Land and Environment Court of NSW", paper 
presented at University of Technology, Sydney 31 March 1995, 2. 
Class 4 relates to the civil enforcement of environmental 
laws. Such proceedings may be brought by consent 
authorities to restrain environmentally harmful acts or to 
enforce compliance with conditions of consent. This Class 
also allows a third party to seek judicial review of a 
decision by a relevant authority, such as a council or 
government Minister, to grant consent to a particular 
development. Such right is available primarily pursuant to 
s123 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 
1979 (NSW) but also under ancilliary Acts. However the 
majority of such third party appeals are made by 
commercial competitors rather than environmental 
objectors. 
Class 5 is the summary criminal enforcement of 
environmental laws and Class 6 is appeals against 
Magistrate's decisions in Local Courts in relation to 
environmental offences. 
As well as these adjudicative and administrative 
mechanisms, the Court has introduced the use of consensual 
mechanisms in the form of mediation and conciliation in an 
adjunctive role. The Court commenced a Mediation Scheme 
initially as a pilot project in May 1991. As a result of the 
success of this pilot project, mediation was confirmed as 
part of the Court's procedure in December 1991. As outlined 
Land & Environment Court of NSW, "Third Party Appeals in Class 4, 
Primarily Secton 123 Environmental Planning & Assessment Act", LEC 
Research Paper, December 1995. 
in Chapter 6 the Mediation Scheme is the focus of the case 
study reported in Chapter 8. 
Commissioners of inquiry for Environment and 
Pianning 
The Commissioners of Inquiry as constituted under section 
119 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 
1979 (NSW) have power to inquire, inter alia, into 
environmental aspects of any proposed development the 
subject of a development application. The matters 
referred to the Commissioners are in the main matters "of 
State or regional significance, and generate considerable 
public debate"J 2 The Commissioners deal with both 
"designated developments" (principally different forms of 
heavy industry specified in Schedule 3 of the 
R e g u l a t i o n s ^ ^ ) and other forms of significant development. 
This has the effect of widening the scope for public 
participation in the inquiry process. But at the same time 
it removes the appeal rights available to "any person" 
under s87 and s98 of the Act with respect to designated 
developments. 
The Commissioners' Inquiry does not lead to the resolution 
of the controversy as the final decision remains with the 
l^Office of the Commissioners of inquiry for Environment and Pianning, 
Annual Report 1993-94, Sydney, 3. 
The category has now been broadened beyond this to include certain non-
industrial activities. 
l^See section 101(9) as to the manner in which the Minister can exercise 
'call-in' powers. 
government. The function it provides is clearly an 
administrative one. 
The fact that the inquiry process is non-determining has 
led to criticism of the process as "an expensive charade so 
as to give the appearance of fulfilling the public 
involvement objectives of the Act" and "an expensive 
means of enabling participants to 'let off steam".^ s 
There is evidence of the Commissioners adopting ADR 
methods "alongside the traditional inquiry procedures". 
The particular methods said to have been used or 
encouraged are round table specialist conferences, 
directed negotiation and informal discussion between the 
parties. The use of these methods remain at present 
limited. As Wootten points out: 
"They (inquiry processes generally) must be recognised as 
an important part of the context in which environmental 
mediation would operate in Australia, and may to some 
extent be seen as reducing the need for ¡t."̂ ® 
The established nature of the Inquiry process, particularly 
in respect of public interest matters, shapes the way in 
Taylor, "Public Scrutiny of Planning Decisions tiirough the Legal 
System" (1989) 6 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 156 at 158. 
^Office of the Connmissioners of Inquiry for Environment and Planning, 
Annual Report 1994-95, Sydney, 4. 
17|d., 5. 
18h Wootten, "Environmental Dispute Resolution" (1993) 15 Adelaide Law 
Review 33 at 40. 
which environmental conflict, in particular, is resolved in 
New South Wales. The process has operated since 1980 and 
in that time conducted approximately 300 Inquiries, often 
dealing with contentious matters. Recent notable 
contentious examples are the Bengalla Coal Mine and the 
Lake Cowal Gold projects discussed and compared in 
Chapter 2. 
Australian Commercial Disputes Centre (ACDC) 
The ACDC was established with the support of the New 
South Wales Supreme Court and Government in 1986. Its 
purpose is "to assist all commercial disputants to resolve 
their disputes outside the court system".^ 9 This purpose 
has been expanded from strictly commercial disputes to a 
wider range of disputes, including public interest and 
environmental controversies. The ACDC has been involved 
in a number of environmental controversies.2o 
The ACDC cannot be strictly seen as a forum for resolving 
environmental controversies because that is not its main 
function, environmental controversies only coming before 
it on an ad hoc basis. Nonetheless its charter encourages 
the use of consensual mechanisms to resolve 
environmental controversies. 
l^M Ahrens & G Witcombe, Australian Dispute Resolution Handbook 
(1992) ACDC Limited, Sydney, 9. 
20wootlen, op cit., note 18 above, 72-3. 
To extend its role in this area the ACDC undertook ¡n 1995 
a pilot project under the Federal Government's 
"Strengthening Local Economic Capacity" (SLEC) funding 
scheme. The aim of the pilot project was to select a 
number of environmental controversies, subject these to 
facilitation or mediation and utilise the results as case 
studies to promote the benefit of ADR methods.21 
A draft report was released in October 1996 detailing the 
five mediations conducted. The four controversies 
resolved are as follows: 
1. Great Lakes Council, December 1995. 
The controversy involved a Development Control Plan (DCP) 
for a 29 lot subdivision at Forster. 21 objections had been 
received and 3 public exhibitions held over 15 years. 
A facilitation was held after the application for 
subdivision was lodged. Mediation occupied approximately 
8 hours with prior separate meetings of opposing parties. 
The 100 people who attended the public meeting were 
reduced to 6 representatives and 6 observers. 
There were issues of privacy, traffic and noise. 
The facilitation addressed the meaning and scope of the 
DCP and the implications of this were examined by the 
stakeholders. It was accepted the subdivision could 
proceed under existing planning law. An agreement as to 
Australian Commercial Disputes Centre, Press Release, 1995, 1 
acceptable conditions was reached and the controversy 
settled. 
The subdivision was subsequently approved by the council 
subject to conditions which addressed the issues raised. 
2. Leichhardt Municipal Council, May 1996. 
The controversy involved an application by a developer for 
the development of a landmark site for use as a 
supermarket, shops and restaurants. There were 20 
objectors. 
The issues were traffic, parking, the scale of the 
development and heritage issues. 
A facilitation was held and opposing viewpoints were 
heard. Smaller meetings were held between the developer 
and particular objectors before a mediation session was 
conducted. Following the mediation agreement was 
reached to allow the development to proceed. Settlement 
was reached as all parties accepted the alternative to be 
protracted litigation and expense for the council and local 
community. 
The development was approved at the next council 
meeting. 
3. City of Sydney Council, May 1996. 
The controversy involved an application to extend 
construction hours to 24 hours, 7 days per week on a large 
construction site at East Circular Quay. The application 
attracted an objectors' letter campaign and involved a 
conflict between the council's 'Living city' concept and the 
need for developers to meet deadlines. A large number of 
residents and resident action groups were involved. 
A facilitation was held and the objectors indicated they 
were prepared to negotiate and that they accepted that the 
project had to proceed. At issue were questions of noise 
and the risk of setting a precedent of lengthy construction 
hours. An agreement was reached on extended working 
hours subject to a number of agreed conditions. 
A recommendation put to a meeting of the Central Sydney 
Planning Committee was approved. 
4. Ashfield Municipal Council, July 1996. 
The controversy involved a government department plan to 
build a school hall on an existing school site to 
accommodate 600 primary school children 
The local community was suspicious of the hall's potential 
functions and the effect it may have in terms of loss of 
green space, traffic and noise. 
A facilitation was held and a list of suggested conditions 
for development were distributed. This narrowed the 
issues but it was considered too late in the process to 
substantially amend the plans and the development was 
modified only marginally and subsequently approved. 
Following the success of the pilot project, a 
recommendation was made that Councils proceed to 
implement a dispute resolution program using ADR 
methods as part of the standard Development 
Application/Building Application process. It was 
suggested that the use of ADR methods at this early stage 
would work to prevent further escalation of the 
controversy often engendered by methods such as public 
meetings.22 
The extent of Use of ADR methods in the 
For a Reviewed 
It was reported in a recent seminar into the use of ADR 
methods that to date these methods had 'not embraced 
wholeheartedly'.23 The focus of the seminar was 
essentially on the mediation of those controversies which 
would be classified as environmental disputes in this 
study. A number of explanations were proffered. 
Justice Lloyd of the Land and Environment Court of NSW on 
reviewing the high success rate of the Court's Mediation 
Scheme, asked rhetorically in relation to mediations, "Why 
are there so few of them?'. He said he suspected one of 
the reasons was a reluctance on the part of Local Councils 
22|d.. 3. 
23NSW Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, Proceedings of the 
Interactive Seminar on 'Dispute Management in Local Government' (1998) 
PAC Report No. 24/51, Sydney, April 1998, 7. 
to authorise their legal representatives or General 
Manager or Mayor to settle or compromise proceedings.^^ 
The limiting effect of this lack of authority was raised by 
a number of speakers who saw it as a major constraint to 
the fuller use of ADR methods. Others saw the reasons 
more in procedural terms, citing either the introduction of 
ADR methods too late in the dispute resolution process or 
a lack of knowledge in govemment circles about the 
availability and effectiveness of these methods.^s 
It was reported to the seminar that a recent survey of 
Councils in the Sydney/Newcastle area showed "60% were 
starting to use mediation", though more than half of these 
had only been involved in 1-3 mediations to date.26 
Additionally, about 40% of these Councils were using their 
own staff trained in mediation, rather than using the 
preferred method of independent accredited mediators. 
Other reasons offered touch upon some of the issues 
raised already in this study. Some Councils were reported 
as being concemed that the confidentiality aspects of 
mediation were inimical to the proper processes of 
dispute resolution for an elected body. This same concern 
was expressed in different terms by delegates of other 
Councils who said that mediation, with its required 
delegation of authority to compromise, involved an 
24|d., 14. 
25|d., 40-44. 
26|d., 60. The survey was carried out by Carieen Devine, Sydney City 
Council. 
abrogation of their political responsibility.27 These 
concerns centred upon whether "the public good or the 
public interest" is being adequately taken into account by 
the negotiating parties when any compromise solution is 
reached. 
Suggestions made to enhance the use of ADR methods, 
particularly the use of the Court's Mediation Scheme, 
included the viability of making participation mandatory. 
Favourable comparisons were made in this regard with the 
mediations conducted under the Farm Debt Mediation Act 
1994 (NSW) which "has been a very successful mandatory 
mediation offer".28 
Selection of Fora for Further Study 
From this review, fora were selected as the source for 
case study analysis of the use of ADR methods to resolve 
controversies. The case studies were selected in 
anticipation that they would be towards the ends of the 
continuum between environmental disputes and 
environmental conflicts. 
The fora selected were: 
(a) For environmental dispute issues- the use of mediation 
in the Land and Environment Court of NSW 
27|d., 66. 
28|d., 83. 
(b) For environmental conflict issues- the use of 
negotiation in the Resource and Conservation Assessment 
Council's Interim Assessment Process. 
Conclusion 
This review has canvassed the fora in which 
environmental controversies are resolved in New South 
Wales. The review has provided an oven^iew of the use of 
ADR methods in such fora. It is now intended to examine 
the case studies selected from these fora in order to 
determine how effectively ADR methods are used in their 
dispute resolution procedures. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
MEDIATION IN THE LAND AND ENVIRONMENT 
COURT OF NSW - A CASE STUDY 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the use of ADR methods in 
the resolution of environmental disputes. This aim is addressed 
by examining the use of mediation in the Land and Environment 
Court of New South Wales (The Court). The types of 
controversies dealt with will be examined to determine if they 
fall in the dispute half of the continuum of environmental 
controversies. Having made a determination as to the nature of 
the matters mediated, an investigation will be made as to the 
effectiveness of such use. 
Land and Environment Court of NSW 
Mediation Scheme 
An Adjunct Model 
As outlined in Chapter 7, the Court has specific jurisdiction 
which is divided into Classes. Controversies coming before the 
Court are dealt with in various ways depending upon the Class 
into which they fall. The role of mediation is as an option at 
defined stages in this process and so it operates in an 
adjunctive mode rather than in an integrative one 
The Court In exercising its jurisdiction to detenmine merit 
appeals pursuant to section 20(1 )(e) and section 71 of the Land 
and Environment Court Act 1979 NSW ( LEG Act) is exercising an 
administrative or executive power as distinct from a judicial 
power. Thus an appeal on the merits in Class 1-3 proceedings 
under the Act involves resolution by an administrative rather 
than by an adjudicative mechanism. In such proceedings, ADR 
methods are operating as an adjunct to administrative dispute 
resolution. In this form mediation is being used to resolve the 
controversy to finality, subject only to a supervisory overview 
by the administrative or executive body. 
In comparison, when the Court conducts civil enforcement 
proceedings or judicial reviews in Class 4 matters pursuant to 
section 20 of the LEC Act it is exercising an adjudicative 
function. The first aspect of this jurisdiction is the dvil 
enforcement of rights, obligations or duties imposed by a 
planning or environmental law as defined in section 20(3) of the 
Act. Additionally, the Court has jurisdiction *to review, or 
command, the exercise of a function conferred or imposed by a 
planning or environmental law' under section 20(2) of the Act. 
When mediation is used in Class 4 matters this involves the use 
of consensual methods as an adjunct to the exercise of an 
adjudicative function. 
Mediation has had only a very small role to play in Class 4 
matters. Mediation was conducted in only a small number 
of Class 4 matters ( approximately 20 matters) up to 
March 1995J In the revised Land and Environment Court 
Rules 1996, mediation was specifically extended to all 
Class 4 matters. 
Mediation in the form of an adjunct to an adjudicative 
function is more akin to the classic role proposed for 
mediation in the United States literature. However, in this 
light it is well to recall the comments of the then Chief 
Judge about the rationale behind a large proportion of 
Class 4 matters: 
"Many people who object to developments on merit grounds 
have recourse to actions under s123 to change proposals 
on legal grounds. Such challenges sometimes have about 
them an air of unreality, with ail parties pretending that 
they are concerned with legal niceties rather than the 
merits."2 
With these comments in mind it may well be that a number 
of Class 4 mediations are merit reviews "in disguise" and 
are really no different in kind to the Class 1-3 mediations. 
If this is so, then for all practical purposes the use of 
mediation in the Court is as an adjunct to its purely 
administrative dispute resolution function. 
1M Connell, "Mediation in the Land and Environment Court of NSW"(!995) 
Paper presented at the University of Technology, Sydney, 31 March 1995, 
2. 
2McClelland J's comments of 20 September 1983, quoted in A Fogg, "Third 
Party Objections and Appeals in Development Control Decisions under Town 
Planning Legislation"(1983) 2 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 4 
at 11. 
Development of the Mediation Scheme 
On 1 May 1991 the Court first introduced a mediation 
scheme in Class 1 and 2 proceedings. The history of the 
introduction of a mediation scheme into the Court is 
instructive. 
One catalyst for the scheme's introduction was the report 
by the Public Accounts Committee of the Parliament of 
New South Wales following its "Inquiry into Legal Services 
Provided to Local Govemment in New South Wales'.^ This 
inquiry commenced in September 1990 and the Smiles 
Report (as it became known) was issued in May 1991. One 
finding of the Report, anticipated from the outset, was to 
suggest that Councils were deliberately refraining from 
determining politically contentious development 
applications. The failure to determine such applications 
within a specified period then triggered appeal 
mechanisms to the Court under section 96 and section 97 
of the EPAA Act as "deemed refusals" and Councils were 
spared the need to make a politically unpopular decision on 
the original substantive merit application.^ The Report 
noted the consequences of this approach in terms of the 
costs of legal services: 
^Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, Report on Legal Services 
Provided to Local Govemment in NSW (The Smiles Report) NSW 
Parliament, Sydney , May 1991. 
^T F M Naughton, "Court-Related Altemative Dispute Resolution in New 
South Wales'(1995) Environmental and Planning Law Journal, December 
1995,377. 
"The Land and Environment Court is clogged with cases 
that are appeals from council decisions that may well 
have been settled in a more speedy fashion and without the 
tens of thousands of dollars of legal costs incurred if only 
an alternative dispute resolution process was available."^ 
As the then Registrar of the Court said, "the inquiry 
consolidated the debate"®, and in April 1991, shortly 
before the release of The Smiles Report, the Court issued 
a Mediation Practice Direction to commence on 1 May 
1991. In its report, the Committee acknowledged this 
development: 
"The committee notes with enthusiasm the Court's 
initiatives put into place during the course of this 
inquiry".^ 
It is interesting to note that in the initial phase it was 
envisaged that outside mediators from the Australian 
Commercial Disputes Centre would be appointed by the 
parties to conduct the mediations.^. But this proposal was 
not followed and the scheme became, and remains, a 
court-annexed one. 
^The Smiles Report, note 3 above, ix. 
Connell, "Mediation in the Land and Environment Court''(1994) 
unpublished paper, 10 May 1994, 1. 
^The Smiles Report, note 3 above, 95, par 5.102. 
8M Connell, op cit., note 6 above, 1. 
The Practice Direction commenced on 1 May 1991 and 
provided for voluntary court-annexed mediation using the 
Registrar or Deputy-Registrar of the Court as mediators in 
Class 1-3 matters. This Practice Direction further 
provided that if objectors were involved it was 
anticipated they should attend "so that the views of all 
interested parties may be taken into account in any 
mediated settlement.'^ 
The Rules provided that "at callover the Registrar will 
where appropriate refer proceedings to mediation or 
conciliation in accordance with the Practice Notes. 
It was under these joint provisions that court-annexed 
mediations were commenced in the Court, initally as a 
pilot program (from May-December 1991) and thereafter 
as a routine option offered between callover and hearing 
of a matter. The 1991 Practice Direction was replaced by 
Clause 12 of Practice Direction 1993 which came into 
force on 1 November 1993. Clause 12 headed 'Mediation' 
differed from the 1991 Practice Direction in that it more 
strongly emphasised the voluntary nature of the mediation. 
It said in part: 
L̂and and Environment Court of NSW, Practice Direction, April 1991 
lOpivision 6A Rule 2. 
•It is a fundamental tenet of mediation that it is 
voluntary, therefore each party will be required to 
indicate that it wishes a dispute to be mediated.'^i 
The Practice Direction 1993 made the following further 
provisions: 
(i) The option of a mediation session with the Registrar or 
Deputy-Registrar was available in Class 1-3 proceedings, 
(ii) It was expected that mediation could be requested any 
time up to the first callover, 
(iii) Mediation would usually be conducted at the Court, 
(iv) Objectors could attend, 
(v) It was anticipated that persons appointed to act on 
behalf of any party would have the ability to resolve the 
dispute, 
(vi) Legal representation was not seen as necessary but 
would be allowed by leave, 
(vii) At least one week before the mediation, the parties 
were required to serve on the other a statement of 
position and issues no more than 2-3 pages long, 
(viii) On filing an Initiating application in the Court a 
statement setting out the option of mediation could be 
handed to the lodging party who was required to serve a 
copy of the statement on the other side 
(ix) In Class 3 (compensation matters) it was anticipated 
that parties would seek mediation after the exchange of 
Inland and Environment Court of NSW, Practice Direction, October 1991, 
cl. 12. 
expert reports and that parties' valuers and other experts 
would be present at the mediation. 
(x) Where agreement had been reached at mediation, effect 
to the agreement would involve one of the parties giving 
consent or both agreeing to be bound by the temns of 
settlement, necessary consent orders being placed before 
the Court for consideration. 
A year later the Court was one a number of tribunals 
effected by the Courts Legislation (Mediation and 
Evaluation) Amendment Act 1994 (NSW) which came into 
force on 14 November 1994. This Act inserted new 
provisions headed 'Mediation and Neutral Evaluation' into, 
inter alia, the LEG Act being Part 5A, sections 61A-61L. 
This amending legislation indicated that its purpose was 
to: 
"enable the Court to refer matters for mediation or neutral 
evaluation if the parties to the proceedings concerned 
have agreed to that course of action."i2. 
These provision were seen as "effectively formalising the 
court-annexed mediation conducted in this Court since 
1991."13 
The definition of mediation provided for in the amending 
legislation does not mention the essential element of 
voluntariness, but section 61D(1)(b) makes the consent of 
12section 61A(1) 
Inland and Environment Court of NSW, Annual Review 1994, 8. 
the parties a condition precedent of the Court referring a 
matter to mediation. Section 61E reiterates the essential 
element of voluntariness by providing that attendance at 
and participation in mediation or neutral evaluation 
sessions are voluntary and that a party may withdraw 
from the sessions at any time. 
The amending legislation extended the scope of the ADR 
methods available to the Court by adding that of Neutral 
Evaluation, defining it as: 
"a process of evaluation of a dispute in which the 
evaluator seeks to identify and reduce the issues of fact 
and law in dispute.'i'^ 
The other conditions precedent to the Court referring 
proceedings for mediation or neutral evaluation are that 
the Court considers the circumstances appropriate and 
there is agreement by the parties as to who is to be the 
mediator or neutral evaluator. ̂ ^ This person may or may 
not be a person whose name appears on a list compiled by 
the Chief Judge of the Court under section 61H. In line 
with the pre-existing mediation scheme in the Court the 
first two names on the list are the Court's Registrar and 
Deputy-Registrar. In order to be entered upon the list 




(1) completion of a recognised mediation training course 
including the satisfaction of any evaluation component of 
that course; and 
(2) completion of a minimum of 10 mediations as either 
sole or co-mediator, with ongoing mediation experience 
preferably in local government, planning, building, 
community and environmental matters J® 
Section 61G gives to the Court a supervisory role by 
providing that the Court may make orders to give effect to 
"any agreement or arrangement arising out of a mediation 
session." The range of outcomes from a mediation session 
include: non-resolution, agreement to discontinue the 
dispute by withdrawing the application and agreement to 
resolve the dispute in terms of consent orders. It is 
through the ratification of such consent orders that the 
Court can exercise its supervisory role. It is possible that 
an agreement reached by the parties to the mediation 
while acceptable to them may not be in the broader public 
interest, for instance because it is environmentally 
unacceptable. The ratification requirement ensures that 
the Court's primary role in the exercise of its 
administrative function is not constrained and that it can 
exercise an oversight in the public Interest. 
"•^Letter from President of the Environmental & Planning Law Association 
(NSW) Inc. 33 NSW Law Society Journal 6 (July 1995) at 14. 
Implementation of the Scheme 
In the early days of the mediation scheme a number of 
"designated development" matters were identified as being 
successfully mediated and approved by the Court.^^ These 
were principally different forms of heavy industry 
specified in Schedule 3 of the Regulations to the EPAAct 
involving controversies which might well be classified as 
environmental conflicts in this research. Examples of 
mediation of substantial designated development matters 
were evident in the Court's Pilot Mediation Program. The 
Chief Judge indicated: 
"Mediation has been successful in reducing time and costs. 
This is particularly evident in some very large multi-party 
designated development cases. For example, successful 
mediations have included a goldmine at Parkes, a mine at 
Tumut and an extractive industry at Cecil Park."i8 
The goldmine referred to was the Adovale Mine dispute 
over the impact of mining on grazing and farmland, 
mediated in mid 1991. It was referred to in the NSW State 
Parliament as "probably the most successful mediation to 
date".i9 
I^E Spiegel, "i\/Iediation in the Courr(1992) Paper delivered to the NELA 
(NSW Division) Biennial Conference, June 1992, 4. 
Pearlman CJ, Letter to A U Forum (1993) 67 Australian Law Journal 
at 941. 
l^NSW Parliament, Legislative Assembly Debates (1991) 11 December 
1991, 6480-1. 
It was anticipated that controversies such as these, 
involving as they do a number of parties and a number of 
issues such as noise, vibration, dust, traffic, water 
quality, site rehabilitation and visual amenity would be 
particularly amenable to mediation.20 Such controversies 
might also exhibit the key characteristics of value 
conflicts, scientific uncertainity questions and public 
interest concerns. But this expectation was not borne out 
by the subsequent history of the Scheme. 
Further minor modifications to the practice of mediation 
in the Court occurred with the repeal of the Practice 
Direction 1993 and Division 6A Rule 2 of the Land and 
Environment Court Rules 1980. These provisions were 
repealed with the introduction of the new Land and 
Environment Court Rules 1996 (Part 18-Mediation). These 
rules were effective from 29 January 1996 and 
essentially repeat the provisions of Practice Direction 
1993, providing that mediation is available in Class 1-4 of 
the Court's jurisdiction and that "parties may apply to the 
Court for referral to mediation of a matter arising in 
proceedings."21 This is subject, however, to the provisos 
in the legislation as to voluntariness (section 61G) and the 
Court's supervisory role (section 61G). 
20tFM Naughton, op cit., note 4 above, 386. 
21 Part 18 Rule 2. 
Review of the Effectiveness of the 
iVIediation Scheme 
From the summary of the legal framework and practice of 
the Mediation Scheme, it can be seen that the Court has 
had a system of mediation in Class 1, 2 and 3 proceedings 
(and to a lesser extent Class 4 proceedings) operating 
since May 1991. As at June 1996, the mediation scheme at 
the Court had been in operation for a period of five years. 
In that time, 311 mediations have been conducted.22 Data 
is available from the Court for the first four and a half 
years of that period, during which time 285 mediations 
were conducted. 
Two prior studies of this data are available: 
(1) Survey by the Young Lawyers' Section of the Law 
Society of NSW of mediations conducted in the period 1 
May to 31 December 1991.23 
(2) Review of matters referred to mediation in the period 
January 1992 to December 1994.24 
In addition a review of the Court files for matters 
referred to mediation in the period 1 January to 31 
22D Rolllnson, Deputy-Registrar, personal communication, 20 June 1996. 
23j Muller, "Report on Young Lawyers' Survey-'Mediation in the Land and 
Environment Court'"(1992) 3/3 & 4 LEADR Briefs. 
24D TOW & M Stubbs, "The Effectiveness of ADR Techniques in the 
Resolution of Planning Disputes" (1995) forthcoming. University of 
Western Sydney. 
December 1995 was undertaken for the purposes of this 
study. From a review of this data it is anticipated that the 
operation of the scheme will be found to be an example of 
the use of ADR methods to resolve environmental disputes. 
Environmental disputes are concerned with environmental 
issues dealing with competing amenities between human 
beings. An environmental dispute has been defined as: 
"An environmental controversy dealing with competing 
interests, needs and goals over environmental issues, but 
which issues deal with competing amenities questions." 
A method is needed to determine whether the 
controversies referred to the Court's mediation scheme 
can properly be classified as environmental disputes. For 
this purpose, it was proposed to use the review of the 
characteristics of the the 73 mediations conducted in the 
period 1 January-31 December 1995. This period was 
chosen because the Court files for these matters were 
examined by the author and all information available as to 
the nature of the controversies was extracted. In the 
earlier research this issue had not been looked at in any 
detail. However, it is important to note that the data 
available on the files was for most purposes insufficient 
and inadequate. 
The results for the three period reviewed will firstly be 
presented. 
Review of Mediations 
Mediations conducted 1 May -31 December 
1991 
The Young Lawyers' study was conducted as a review of 
the first seven months of the scheme's operation, during 
which time the scheme operated as a pilot project. The 
purpose of the survey was to monitor the effectiveness of 
mediation in the Court.25 The survey method was by way of 
distribution of written surveys to parties to mediations in 
the period IVIay-December 1991. The response rate was 
said to be approximately 50%.26 
The survey did not reach all parties. "About 50 surveys 
were distributed by the Court to parties to a mediation" 
and 26 responses were r e t u r n e d , 2 7 whereas a total of 42 
mediations were actually conducted in this p e r i o d . ^ s 
The surveys were distributed by sending them to the 
parties' legal representatives for completion or, if the 
parties were unrepresented by sending them direct to the 
parties. The survey results do not disclose the proportion 
of responses received from parties or legal 
representatives, although it is possible from the 
25j Muller, op cit., note 23 above, 8 
26|d. 
27Young Lawyers' - Environmental Law Group, Report on Survey 
"Mediation in the Land & Environment Court' paper presented 30-31 May 
1992, 2. 
28d Roilinson, note 22 above. 
responses to deduce that approximately 75% of the 
responses were from lawyers. 
The survey consisted of 12 questions, some with several 
parts. Responses were by way of simple Yes/No answers 
with an opportunity for additional open-ended comments. 
The report drew a number of conclusions from particular 
responses which have gained wide currency in the 
literature concerning the effectiveness of the Court's 
scheme. The most important of the conclusions the report 
drew were that: 
(1) A substantial majority of the participants considered 
the mediation successful, and 
(2) A high level of 'user satisfaction' was evident. 
For the purpose of examining the validity of these 
conclusions only a select number of questions and answers 
are considered pertinent.29 These are examined in detail as 
follows. 
Responses upon which a conclusion of 'success' 
were based. 
In response to a question which asked: "Do you consider the 
outcome of your mediation as successful? (Whether or not 
^^For a full list of the questions and responses see Appendix A. 
it proceeded to a hearing)", 19 out of 26 respondents or 
73% said Yes. 
In response to a question which asked: "Which of the 
following factors do you consider added to the success?", 
9 of the 19 or 47% indicated "total resolution/settlement 
of the dispute" and 3 of the 19 or 16% indicated "partial 
resolution of the dispute". 
The report drew a number of conclusions from these 
particular responses. It said "of greatest interest is that 
73% of all responses considered the outcome of their 
mediation to be successfu l .This was in turn compared 
favourably with success rates achieved overseas.^! But 
the survey had provided respondents with no objective 
measure of what 'success' was, leaving it to the 
subjective judgement of the respondent. There are a 
number of problems with this method and this conclusion. 
Firstly, the 'success' was not equivalent to resolution or 
settlement of the dispute, in the sense of a closure to the 
legal proceedings. There was no basis on which to say that 
73% of matters referred to mediation were resolved or 
settled. This is clear from the responses to the second 
question referred to which suggest that a "total 
resolution/settlement of the dispute" occurred in less 
^^Muller, op cit., note 23 above, 8. 
Young Lawyers', op dt., note 27 above, 14. 
than a majority (47%) and a "partial resolution" in a 
further 16%. 
The nature of these responses provide an insufficient 
basis on which it is valid to compare the "73% successful" 
rate with other studies which are measuring 'success 
rates', in terms of resolution or settlement of disputes. 
This has, however, been the use routinely made of the 
survey results. 32 
Responses upon which a conclusion of 'user 
satisfaction' were based. 
From the responses to a question which asked in part: "If 
you are a lawyer did you experience any difficulties 
convincing your client to participate in the mediation?, it 
was apparent that only 6/26 or 23% of respondents were 
unrepresented and therefore completing the survey 
themselves. 
It follows that more than three-quarters of the surveys 
were completed by legal representatives. As such there is 
no basis on which it is valid to draw the conclusion that 
the parties participating in the mediations were satisified 
32see for example, E Spiegel, op cit, note 17 above, 8; H Wootten, 
'Environmental Dispute Resolution"(1993) 15 Adelaide Law Review 33 at 
58; P Stein, 'Mediation in the Land and Environment Court' (1992) paper 
presented to Local Government and Planning Law Review, College of Law, 
Sydney, 21 November 1992, at 4 and M Connell, 'Mediation in the Land and 
Environment Court' (1994) paper presented to Allen, Allen & Hensley, 
Solicitors, Sydney, 10 May 1994 at 8. 
with the process. The results can only support a 
conclusion that the legal representatives were satisified, 
not the parties. However the data has consistently been 
cited as a measure of 'user satisfaction'.^^ 
The conclusion that this review draws is that the data 
does not support the two main published findings, namely 
that the scheme was achieving a 73% 'success rate' and 
that it was displaying a high level of 'user satisfaction'. 
The 'successful outcome' expressed as "73% of 
respondents" does not equate to the settlement of the 
controversy but to some lesser outcome short of 
resolution. Similarly, since less than a quarter of the 
respondents to the survey were direct parties the claim 
that the results of the survey provide evidence of "a high 
level of acceptance of the process" is not reliable.^^ 
Mediations conducted January 1992 -
December 1994 
The second survey reviewed consisted of an examination 
of "all Court files for matters that were the subject of 
mediation in the period January 1992 to December 
1994".35 One hundred and seventy files were examined in 
that study. Its purpose was to review the success of the 
33Pearlman J, Letter to the Editor 67 Australian Law Journal 941.. 
34|d.. 
35D TOW & M Stubbs, op cit., note 24 above, 1; note however D Rollinson, 
note 22 above, records 178 mediations conducted in this period. 
court-based facility as a guide to the wider application of 
ADR methods in planning disputes. 
The research method consisted of transcribing details 
from the front of Court files of matters referred to 
mediation, and analysing the information obtained The 
following details were recorded: 
(1) the nature of the parties involved, local government, 
State authority, development/real estate company, 
planning consultant, third-parties (ie objectors), 
environmental group and private individual (as applicant). 
(2) the location of the dispute, either the Sydney 
metropolitan area, coastal or regional. 
(3) the Class of the dispute. 
(4) the nature of the dispute, such as the detemnination of 
a development application, building applications, 
injunctions or compensation determination. 
(5) the outcome of the mediation, in terms of 
"successfully mediated", "partially resolved" or 
"unresolved". 
For the purpose of this study the raw data entries made by 
these researchers were re-examined to obtain information 
to answer the following questions: 
(1) What was the Class of the dispute mediated? 
(2) Who were the parties to the dispute? 
(3) What was the nature of the dispute? 
(4) What was the outcome of the mediation?^® 
Findings 
The following results were tabulated to answer these four 
questions. 
CLASS OF DISPUTE 
Table 1 
Class of dispute 
Class Mediations Total Matters Mediation 
1992 - 4 before the Court Total 
1992 -4 Matters 
Numbe ' % Number % % 
1 102 60 2236 43 4.5 
2 37 22 1015 20 3.6 
3 23 13 1267 24 1.8 
4 8 5 687 13 1.1 
Total 170 1 00 5205 100 3.3 
It can be seen that Class 1 disputes dominated the work 
of the Court in temns of mediations (60%), and less so in 
terms of hearings (43%) However the proportion of Class 
1 disputes going to mediation is small, at only 4.5%. 
Similarly the proportion of disputes in all Classes being 
mediated (successfully or otherwise) is small, at 3.3%.37 
36Data examined courtesy of D Tow, personal communication, 30 May 
1996. 
37D TOW & M Stubbs, op cit., note 24 above, 3 (NB. the 'total matters' 
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21 12 












other (as either) 20 12 
It can be seen that the great majority of disputes going to 
mediation involved a local government body as respondent 
(83%) and a private individual as applicant (71%).38 In 
virtually all the remaining disputes the respondent was a 
state authority such as the Environment Protection 
Authority (15%). In only one matter was an environmental 
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DA involving other 
unspecified 
33 19 
Appeals over conditions 








Compensation 17 10 
Others 16 9 
TOTAL 17739 100 
It can be deduced from this data that approximately half 
of the disputes were concerned with the determination of 
Development Applications, either for residential use 
(21%), commercial use (6%) or industrial development 
3^Some mediations involved more than one issue. 
(4%). The data recorded did not permit an allocation of the 
remaining 19%. 
The emphasis on residential disputes was reflected in the 
proportion of mediations concerned with matters 
pertaining to residential Building Applications for 
construction or modification of dwellings 
It is possible to deduce from the data that a significant 
proportion of the matters mediated involved disputes over 
residential, commercial or industrial land use. But to 
conclude that such disputes are consistent with disputes 
over competing amenities and are therefore environmental 
disputes must be only very tentative. 
RESULT 
Table 4 
Outcome of mediations 
Number Percentage (%) 
Resolved 124 73 
Not Resolved 46 27 
T o t a l 170 100 
These results show that a total of 73% of disputes 
mediated were "successfully resolved". A successful 
resolution was defined as a matter in which agreement 
was reached on a mutually acceptable approval (usually by 
way of consent orders) or where the proceedings were 
withdrawn. Matters which subsequently proceeded to a 
^OD TOW & M Stubbs, op cit., note 24 above, 4. 
hearing were classified as unsuccessful and 27% of 
disputes were in this category. It was noted that the data 
on the court file did not allow a determination as to 
whether there had been some partial agreement in the 
sense of lessening the areas of dispute, 
This study was subject to a number of limitations 
recognised by the authors which arose because of the 
confidential nature of the mediation proceedings. Neither 
the Court nor the mediator kept written records of the 
mediation process or outcome. The only record of the 
proceedings was a notation on the front of the file that it 
had been referred to mediation. The outcome of the 
mediation was not recorded and could only be detemiined 
from the course of the proceedings following the 
mediation conference, for instance, whether consent 
orders were subsequently filed, the matter was 
discontinued or a hearing date was obtained. This 
presented a number of limitations: 
(a) there was no evidence of any partial agreement 
(b) there was no evidence of participants other than those 
on the record. 
(c) there was no evidence as to whether any agreement 
reached was implemented. 
41 Id., 5. 
These restrictions hampered the methodology of Tow & 
Stubbs study. More adequate records of the mediations 
conducted would have assisted more comprehensive 
analysis of the effectiveness of the Mediation Scheme. 
Steps to address this inadequacy will be addressed later 
in this study. To overcome these restrictions, the Tow & 
Stubbs methodology was modified when examining 
mediations in the Court in the 12 month period to 
December 1995. 
Mediations conducted January 1995-
December 1995 
A review of the Court files of matters which were the 
subject of mediation conducted in the period 1 January to 
31 December 1995 was carried out for this r e s e a r c h . 4 2 
The files were examined to elicit as much information as 
possible about the nature of the disputes mediated. 
The aim of this study was to provide data on the 
effectiveness of the mediation scheme and to compare the 
results with those obtained in the two eariier studies. 
With the co-operation of the Court registry, the files of 
all matters the subject of mediation in this 12 month 
period were examined. Notations recorded on the front of 
the file were read and the body of the file was examined 
4273 files were examined; D Roilinson note 22 above, records 74 
mediations conducted in this period. 
to peruse pleadings, affidavit material and expert reports 
filed. Details were then transcribed and recorded in the 
categories, using a data entry sheet adapted from Tow and 
Stubbs, to provide data on the following matters: 
Class: 
Whether the dispute was in Class 1-4 in terms of the 
Court's division of jurisdiction. 
Parties: 
Whether the parties consisted of only an applicant and a 
respondent or whether objectors or third parties were 
involved; whether the respondent was a local or state 
government authority. 
Nature: 
Where the dispute involved a development application 
whether it involved a residential or commercial / 
industrial development and the type of developments 
involved; what kinds of building application disputes were 
mediated; what type of compensation disputes were 
mediated. 
Outcome: 
Whether the dispute was solved by mediation. Solution 
was taken to have occurred in two situations: 
(a) where consent orders were agreed to by the parties to 
provide for the approval of an amended or substituted 
application; or 
(b) where the appeal was discontinued on the basis that 
agreenfient as to a course of action had been reached 
between the parties. 
Unsolved mediations were taken to be those which 
subsequently proceeded to a hearing in the Court. 
By using this methodology significantly more information 
was available for analysis than was available in the Tow & 
Stubbs study. The data collection went further than that of 
Tow & Stubbs in two important respects. 
Firstly, more details were collected as to the nature of 
the dispute. The extent of Tow & Stubbs' data collection in 
this area went to listing the matters as development 
application, building application, injunction or 
compensation. Data collection in the present study 
extended this to include whether the development 
application related to residential, commercial or 
industrial development and the type of development 
involved in terms of single dwelling, dual occupancy, 
medium density, subdivision (for residential) and business 
premises, factories and plants (for commercial/ 
industrial). Similar data was collected as to the type of 
building applications made. It was anticipated that from 
this additional data some tentative conclusions could to 
be reached as to the nature of the matters mediated. 
Secondly, further data was collected as to the nature of 
the outcome reached. Tow & Stubbs collected data to 
determine whether the dispute was "successfully 
resolved, partially resolved or unresolved". They conceded 
there was no data on which matters could be classified as 
"partially resolved". Data collection in the present study 
attempted to extend this to determine whether the nature 
of the settlement reached equated to a 'solution'. From 
this additional data, it was anticipated that it may be 
possible to draw some conclusions as to the extent to 
which the outcomes reached equated with some objective 
measure of success. 
Findings 
The following results were tabulated in relation to these 
matters. 
CLASS OF DISPUTE 
Table 5 
Ciass of Dispute 
Class Mediations 
1995 




to ta l 
matters 
Number % Number % % 
1 40 55 1038 60 3.9 
2 20 27.5 225 13 8.9 
3 12 16.5 208 12 5.8 
4 1 1 256 15 .4 
Total 73 100 1727 100 4.2 
4377je Land and Environment Court Annual Review, Year Ended 31 
December 1995, Annexure A "Caseflow in the Court, Registrations' 
The vast majority of matters were in Classes 1 or 2 
(82.5%).44 Class 3 matters relating to compensation and 
valuation accounted for a further 16.5%. Of the matters 
mediated there was one Class 4 matter, which was an 
objection to a development consent for a restaurant 
extension. The 73 mediations conducted in 1995 
represented only a small proportion, 4.2%, of all matters 
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There was no formal notation on the file as to parties 
attending. In only 3 of the 73 matters (4%) was there any 
evidence of objectors or third parties attending the 
mediation as a party. One case involved a third party 
appeal where the applicant opposing a development 
44The proportion of overall matters in Class 1 as compared with Class 2 
had changed significantly over the period 1992-95, essentially reflecting a 
trend in the Court for a predominance of matters to be filed as Class 1 
proceedings. 
consent and the developer was present at the mediation, 
not yet having been added as a party. In the second case, 
the objector was an adjoining owner supporting a 
demolition order against his neighbour. In the third case, a 
group of community objectors were noted as attending to 
oppose a development application for a concrete batching 
plant on the North Coast of New South Wales. 
In all other cases (96%), the file notation did not disclose 
any participants other than the applicant, respondent and 
mediator, who was either the Registrar or Deputy-
Registrar of the Court. 
In all cases, the respondent was a government 
instrumentality, either in the form of a local government 
planning authority (83.5%) or State government body, such 
as the Roads and Traffic authority (16.5%). 
NATURE 
Table 7 
Nature of the Dispute 
Number Percentage 
( % ) 
DA -dual occupancy 10) 14) 
DA -medium density 9 ) total 12) total 
DA -subdivision 4)resident'l 5)resident'l 
DA -single dwelling 9) 32 12) 44 
DA - commercial 7 10 
DA -industrial 2 3 
BA -residential 13 18 
BA - commercial or industrial 0 0 
Compensation - residential 12 16 
Other - demolition/remedial 7 10 
TOTAL 173 1100 " 
Of the 73 files examined, 41 of these, or 56%, related to 
Development Applications, either in terms of appeals 
against the planning authority's refusal to approve the 
application or against the conditions of approval. As a 
proportion of all the files examined, 32 of these matters 
(44%) were concerned with development applications for 
residential use (dual occupancy, medium density, 
subdivision, single dwellings); 7 mediations involved 
commercial developments (10%) and 2 mediations 
concerned industrial developments involving a factory and 
the concrete plant referred to above (3%). 
All of the 13 Building Applications, which accounted for 
18% of all mediations, related to residential land use. 
"Other matters", relating to demolition or removal orders, 
constituted 10% (7) of mediations. The balance of 12 
matters (16%) dealt with claims for compensation due to 
highway construction. All of the demolition orders and all 
the compensation disputes related to residential 
properties. 
The total number of matters which could be classifies as 




Outcome of mediations 
Number Percentage (%) 
Solved 53 73 
Not Solved 20 27 
Total 73 100 
A total of 73% of the mediations were successful in the 
sense of being solved in accordance with the definition 
adopted. Files which indicated the matter was not solved 
at the mediation conference itself or subsequently and 
therefore proceeded to a hearing were categorised as 
unsuccessful and constituted 27% of the mediation in that 
year. 
Can the controversies mediated in the 
period January to December 1995 be 
ciassified as environmental disputes? 
The method suggested for classifying an environmental 
controversy as a dispute is to use the characteristics 
detailed in Chapter 3. For simplicity sake, the comparison 
is confined to the three key characteristics which are said 
to capture the essense of the irreconcilable conflict over 
values or goals. 
The three key characteristics are: 
*value conflicts 
*scientific uncertainity questions 
^public interest concerns. 
A controversy which does not display these three 
characteristics is classified instead as an environmental 
dispute. 
A review of the characteristics of the 73 mediations 
conducted in the period January-December 1995 is used to 
determinine whether these controversies exhibit the three 
key characteristics.45 it ¡s to be emphasised that the data 
obtained from the files does not allow this classification 
to be made in any conclusive fashion. Allowing for 
limitations as to the extent and nature of the infomiation 
available a tentative conclusion is offered. 
Do the mediated matters exhibit vaiue conflicts? 
Any distinction in value conflicts is really one of degree. 
To the participants the values in dispute may be perceived 
as fundamental, though objectively they might not be of 
the fundamental nature necessary to equate to an 
environmental conflict. 
Nothing in the information available supports a conclusion 
about whether the controversies mediated involve such 
fundamental value conflicts. There is no data available as 
to the subjective considerations of the parties involved in 
^^For full details of the characteristics disclosed see Appendix B. 
the matter. But the nature of the subject matter of the 
controversies certainly does not suggest matters 
involving conflicting fundamental values. 
Each of the controversies could be said to involve a value 
conflict in the simple sense of a difference of opinion 
about what is a valuable or beneficial development in a 
residential context. Such a controversy may involve a 
disagreement about what is valuable to the proponent of a 
residential development and what on the other hand is 
deemed valuable in terms of the consent authority's 
planning instmment or in terms of what objectors value in 
their neighbourhood. 
But to call this a value conflict is substantially removed 
from the fundamential divergence in values that mark 
environmental conflicts, described by Tillett as "values 
about the relative rights of human beings and other 
species, or the merits of exploiting natural resources or 
conserving them, or what constitutes an acceptable 
quality of life for people in a particular community.'^e 
Hence the subject matter of the controversies mediated is 
not considered to involve value conflicts of 
this order. 
Do the mediated matters involve questions of 
scientific uncertainity? 
46g Tillett, Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach (1991) Sydney 
University Press, Sydney, 138. 
There is nothing in the nature of the controversies to 
suggest the ecoiogical complexity or uncertainty that 
mark out environmental conflicts. Certainly there are 
issues affecting one or more parties' amenity through the 
approval of a new dwelling or through a building 
alteration. But this is vastly different in degree to 
questions of scientific uncertainity producing ecological 
damage. 
The assumption that issues of scientific uncertainity do 
not arise is supported in some measure by the fact that 
the only expert reports on the files relate to planning or 
valuation questions which can be resolved with a 
considerable degree of certainity. In only one matter, 
involving a concrete batching plant, were any issues 
requiring scientific evaluation such as, dust control, 
noise, soil contamination and the like raised and the likely 
effects of these could be determined with some degree of 
certainity. 
Do the mediated matters display pubiic interest 
concerns? 
It will be recalled from our discussions in Chapter Two 
that all environmental controversies involve the public 
interest. The distinction was made however between those 
in which the public interest was dormant (environmental 
disputes) and those in which the public interest was 
aroused (environmental conflicts). All of the respondents 
in the matters mediated were government bodies, 
implicitly representative of, and responsive to, public 
interest. But there was nothing in the subject matter of 
the controversies, nor in the information gleaned from the 
court files, to suggest that the public interest had been 
aroused. In only one case, namely the concrete batching 
plant referred to, did the file indicate public interest 
concern. This was apparent from the fact that resident 
groups were noted as being involved and expert reports 
were only on the Court file in this one matter. 
In the case of residential developments the public interest 
may be domriant. In larger designated development 
matters, involving for example extractive industries, the 
public interest may well be aroused. But such subject 
matter was not evident in any of the 73 files of mediated 
matters examined. 
The conclusion reached following this review is that the 
controversies subject to mediation in the Court's 
mediation scheme do not exhibit the key characteristics of 
environmental conflicts. The matters mediated were 
therefore classified as disputes. This conclusion can at 
best be tentative in view of the sparcity of information 
available on the files. The controversies are analysed as 
examples of the effectiveness of ADR methods in the 
resolution of environmental disputes. 
Conclusion 
From the data obtained for the 12 month period to 
December 1995, the results can be summarised as follows: 
1. In a small number of the matters coming before 
the Court the parties agree to mediation. 
Of the 1727^7 matters registered in the Court in Class 1-4 
in 1995, 4.2% were subject to mediation. 
Mediation is 'offered' by the Court in all Class 1-4 matters 
but it is difficult to determine how rigourously the policy 
is policed. Parties are issued with a document when they 
first lodge proceedings in the Court setting out details of 
the mediation service. This document must be served on 
the other parly when serving the initiating process to 
draw that party's attention to the availability of the 
alternative.48 The parties are reminded at the first call-
over that mediation is available and they are asked to 
indicate if they wish to mediate. As the Court's emphasis 
is on strict voluntariness, if both parties do not indicate 
The Land and Environment Court Annual Review, Year Ended 31 
December 1995, Annexure A "Caseflow in the Court: Registrations'. 
48ln this regard see the comments of Lynn Taylor, Solicitor, who said that 
in addition to sending the prescribed form her firm also sends a letter 
making overtures as to using ADR methods, 'To date, we have never had an 
answer- ever -from the council' in Parliamentary Accounts Committee, 
Proceedings of the Interactive Seminar on "Dispute Management in Local 
Government' (1998) PAC Report No. 24/51, NSW Parliament, 1998, 30. 
consent at this time the alternative of mediation seems to 
be pursued no further. 
2. Mediation is being effectiveiy used to resoive 
environmentai disputes, the subject of 
administrative proceedings in the Court. 
Using agreement rates as a tangible measure of 
effectiveness, the data for the 1995 year disclosed a 
'success rate' of 73% which was identical to the earlier 
study. Without overstating the empirical findings, on the 
limited data available it has been asserted that the 
matters mediated in the Court satisfy the definition of 
environmental disputes. The data does not allow a 
conclusion as to whether the solutions reached equate to a 
'settlement' or a "resolution' of the matters in dispute in 
the sense of satisfying all or some of the needs of the 
parties. 
3. i\/lediation is used primariiy for residential 
disputes 
The data only allows this conclusion to be made 
tentatively. It discloses that 87.5% of matters mediated 
could be classified as disputes relating to residential 
matters. The 'success rate' for such disputes at 61% was 
lower than the average of 73%. One tentative explanation 
for this discrepancy is that the option of mediation may be 
taken up in more 'difficult' residential disputes than is the 
case with 'difficult commercial/ industrial disputes. 
Drawing together the results of the review of the two 
eariier studies and the study carried out for this research 
some further tentative conclusions can be made. The 
results show that an effective mediation scheme has been 
developed in the Court since its introduction in May 1991. 
The scheme resolves about 75% of the matters referred 
with the consent of the parties to mediation. These 
matters represent a small proportion of the controversies 
which are dealt with by the Court, either administratively 
or adjudicatively. In the vast majority of the 
controversies dealt with mediation is operating as an 
adjunct to an administrative dispute resolution function. 
The controversies mediated do not exhibit the key 
distinguishing characteristics of conflicts and have been 
classified as environmental disputes. It was anticipated 
that disputes by their nature had the potential to be 
negotiated, even though the perception of incompatibliity 
of interests existed. The hypothesis advanced was that 
such disputes would be amenable to mediated settlement. 
This was confirmed by the empirical results obtained, 
subject to the caveat that the matters mediated could 
only tentatively be classified as environmental disputes. 
Yet mediation has not become the preferred method of 
resolving such disputes. Disputants still prefer the 
dispute to be resolved by the Court exercising its 
administrative function as distinct from a settlement the 
parties reach themselves. The reason for this continued 
reluctance and whether it is the reluctance of applicants, 
government respondents or the court itself has been 
considered in Chapter Seven and warrants further 
attention. The Court sees the scheme as a "customer 
service" but it remains at present a largely under-utilised 
one. The suggestion that "given sufficient resources the 
Court could potentially introduce a range of ADR methods 
to supplement" the formal system may indicate that the 
basis of the limited use is funding.^Q it may be that the 
Court's own agenda is suited by minimising the use of 
mediation in the absence of increased funding. 
49j H Keogh, "Dispute Resolution Systems in the NSW Land and 
Environment"(1996) 7(3) Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal 169 at 
180. 
CHAPTER NINE 
NEGOTIATING THE FORESTRY CONFLICT 
- A CASE STUDY 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the use made of ADR 
methods in the resolution of environmental conflicts. 
Environmental conflicts are defined as: 
"Environmental controversies dealing with competing interests, 
needs and goals over environmental issues, in particular the 
apparently non-negotiable issues of value conflicts, questions 
of scientific uncertainity and public interest concerns." 
Environmental conflicts include major conflicts over uranium 
mining and land use. The main ADR method adopted in this area 
has been direct negotiation rather than assisted negotiation 
methods, such as mediation. 
This aim is addressed by an examination of the use of 
negotiation in the resolution of an environmental conflict. The 
controversy over forest use was chosen on the intuitive 
expectation that it represented an environmental conflict. This 
expectation is tested by an examination of the characteristics 
of the forest controversy. 
Two examples of the use of negotiation in forestry 
controversies are examined. The first is a review of the use of 
negotiation in the Salamanca Process conducted in Tasmania in 
1989-1990 which produced a negotiated outcome. A more 
detailed case study approach is used to examine a series of 
stakeholder negotiations in the Interim Assessment Process 
(lAP) conducted in New South Wales in 1995-96 to resolve 
conflict over the implementation of forest policy. 
It is intended to examine the use of negotiation in each process. 
In the case of the Salamanca Process, this is confined to an 
oven^iew of the negotiation process. In the case of the lAP, the 
assessment draws upon responses obtained in a series of 
interviews with the participating parties at the time these 
negotiations were conducted in April 1996. 
The resolution of environmental controversies is usually by an 
administrative mechanism, either by ministerial or bureaucratic 
action. Accordingly, the examples reviewed consider the use of 
negotiation as an adjunct to the administrative mechanism of 
dispute resolution. 
The Forestry Debate: an environmental conflict? 
The forestry debate is a long standing controversy over the use 
of environmentally significant native forests, centred 
particularly on the forests of the North East and South East 
coasts of New South Wales and in Tasmania. The controversy 
centred on logging for timber and woodchips and the 
environmental consequences of this practice. Tlie significant 
issues in dispute include the effect on habitats considered 
crucial for endangered species, the benefits of preserving old 
growth forests and the need to balance long term security of 
wood supply to the timber industry with the requirements of 
ecologically sustainable forest management. 
In order to determine whether the forest controversy can be 
classified as an environmental conflict, it is necessary to see if 
it displays the characteristics of environmental controversy. In 
particular, does it display the three key characteristics isolated 
as indicative of the irreconcilable disagreement which marks an 
environmental conflict namely: value conflicts, questions of 
scientific uncertainity and public interest concerns? 
A value conflict cleariy exists between conservationists and the 
forestry union and the timber industry. Conservationists, on the 
one hand, value forests in terms of their biodiversity, the 
irreplacability of old growth forests and the ecological, social 
and cultural benefits of the remaining wilderness areas and 
endangered species habitats. The timber industry and the 
forestry union, on the other hand, value forests in terms of 
protecting the collective worth of forest industry employment, 
the social and economic well being of communities reliant on 
the timber industry and the benefits of maintaining a 
sustainable timber industry supplying a renewable resource. 
Both sides profess to value the forests in environmental terms 
but the aspects they value are diametrically opposed. 
Questions of scientific uncertainity centre upon the 
interpretation of what ecologically sustainable forest 
management entails. There is a wide divergence of views as to 
what constitutes old growth forest and wilderness areas and 
the extent to which they exist in native forests and their 
importance in preserving biodiversity. Both sides accept that 
old growth forests should no longer be logged and that such 
forests are an irreplaceable resource, but the debate rages over 
the nature of the timber resources which satisfy this 
classification. There are also questions of scientific 
uncertainity in terms of the effects of disturbance of 
endangered species habitats and the destruction of forest 
biodiversity. Hence questions of scientific uncertainity clearly 
arise in forestry controversies. 
Both sides of the debate vehemently assert that they represent 
the public interest. The effects of any long term resolution of 
the forest controversy is widely reported in the media. Thus 
forestry controversies generate and activate public interest 
concerns. 
On the basis of this brief examination, it is assumed that this 
conflict satisfies the three key characteristics of 
environmental conflicts. This conclusion can be reached with 
more certainty than was possible in the case of the 
controversies mediated in the Land and Environment Court. 
Accordingly, for the purposes of this study, the forest debate is 
classified as an environmental conflict. 
The Salamanca Process 
The Salamanca Agreement Process (so called after the venue of 
the original negotiations) is a negotiation process which 
"evolved from the rubble of the 1988 Helsham lnquiry".i The 
process began with some informal discussions held before the 
1989 Tasmanlan State election between members of the 
Tasmanian Fanners and Graziers Association and 
conservationists over the long running forest conflict.^ 
A Parliamentary Accord between Labor and the Green 
Independents put the Field Labor government into power in May 
1989. Part of this Accord was an agreement to attempt a non-
traditional approach to resolving forest conflict. The formal 
Salamanca Agreement to conduct such negotiations was entered 
into on 31 August 1989. The parties to the agreement to 
negotiate were representatives of the Forest Industries 
Association of Tasmania (FIAT), the Tasmanian Trades and Labor 
Council (TTLC), the Tasmanian Fanners and Graziers Association 
(TFGA), the Tasmanian Forestry Commission (TFC), the 
Wilderness Society and the Australian Conservation Foundation 
[the latter two to later combine as the Combined Environment 
Groups (CEG)] and the Tasmanian Govemment. The Agreement 
bound the parties to work together for 12 months to develop a 
draft strategy for forest management. 
"•R Sandford, "The Merits of Negotiation and Mediation in Resource Management 
Disputes" (1991) paper delivered to IIR Environmental Dispute Resolution 
Conference, Sydney, May 1991, 4. 
2H Wootten, "Environmental Dispute Resolution" (1993) 15 Adelaide Law 
Review 33 at 74. 
The Agreement was institutionalised by tlie establisliment of 
tlie Forests and Forest Industries Council of Tasmania (FFIC) in 
February 1990.3 It was the task of the FFIC to develop a final 
Forests and Forest Industries Strategy (FFIS) by 1 September 
1990. Essentially the FFIS was intended to provide a strategy 
which would guarantee security of resource supply, security of 
employment and security and protection of conservation 
values.The wide ranging scope of the FFIS saw the membership 
of the Council expanded to include further representatives from 
the Commonwealth Government, the Municipal Association of 
Tasmania, the Woodcraft Guild and the Tasmanian Guild of 
Furniture Manufacturers. Subsequent additions were made to 
include representatives of the Tasmanian Logging Association, 
Tasmanian Beekeepers Association and the Tasmanian 
Traditional and Recreational Land Users Federation."^ 
The Council formed the following subgroups: 
1. "Technical/Scientific Working Groups" within the FFIC to 
focus on specific issues and areas of dispute, 
2. "A Balanced Panel of Experts" to advise on the consen^ation 
values of contentious areas, 
3. "A Forest Planners Group" to advise on resource options. 
^Sandford, op cit., note 1 above, 4. 
4|d., 5. 
At the ssimG time broader public participation was encouraged 
througli an extensive consultation process involving the 
formation of 14 "Regional Advisory Groups". 
On 1 June 1990 the draft "Key Issues and Principles Likely to 
Shape a Forests and Forest Industry Strategy for Tasmania", was 
agreed to and adopted by all parties. A period of two months of 
public consultation then followed. On 14 September 1990, the 
recommendations for the final FFIS was released in the form of 
a final strategy "Secure Futures for Forests and People". 
However the CEG did not agree to the final strategy as they 
considered it would have allowed export woodchipping to 
increase by up to 50%. The Environmental Groups then withdrew 
from the process.® 
The Tasmanian Labor Cabinet endorsed 'in principle' the 
recommendations in the final strategy on 1 October 1990. The 
Green Independents considered this a breach of the 
Pariiamentary Accord and for this and other political reasons 
the Labor/Greens Accord was broken. The Salamanca Agreement 
Process effectively ceased from that time. 
The exercise was not successful in the sense that it did not 
reach a consensus agreement which was subsequently 
implemented. However Sandford pointed out in 1991 that: 
5t Bonyhady, Places Worth Keeping (1993) Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 23. 
'the Salamanca process is not about failure. A lot of common 
ground has been identified and there are many issues of 
economic, social and environmental importance that have been 
or are still being, worked on by the parties."® 
Similar sentiments are expressed by Wootten^ and BonyhadyS, 
namely that the use of negotiation to resolve environmental 
conflict was an ambitious endeavour which warranted 
revisiting. 
The use of negotiation was revisited in the successful 1991 
Conondale Ranges Agreement over the management of native 
forests in South East Queensland^ and in the 1996 Interim 
Assessment Process designed to implement revised forest 
policy in New South Wales. It is the latter which is examined in 
detail here. 
The Forestry Conflict and the Interim 
Assessment Process 
The origins of the Interim Assessment Process lie in the 
framework set by the joint Commonwealth and State 
Governments' National Forest Policy released in 1992. This 
policy set a number of benchmari<s and its adoption was agreed 
to by the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments in a 
^Sandford, op cit., note 1 above, 5. 
^Wootlen, op cit., note 2 above, 75. 
^Bonyhady, op cit, note 5 atx>ve, 23. 
^Id., and see earlier discussions in Chapter 5. 
joint National Forest Policy Statement (NFPS) later that year. In 
particular, the NFPS provided for the establishment of "a 
comprehensive, adequate and representative (CAR)"io forest 
reserve system on public land by the end of 1995, supplemented 
by relevant private forests by 1998. 
The CAR forest reserve system as implemented in New South 
Wales was interpreted to mean: 
(1) "Comprehensive": a network of forest parks protecting the 
full range of native forest communities found in NSW 
(2) "Adequate": a reserve system large enough to protect the 
vast range of forest dwelling plants. 
(3) "Representative": a reserve system including all natural 
varieties within each forest type or species.^ ^ 
The political will to ensure the implementation of this policy 
was laid through a series of pre-election commitments made by 
the then Labor Opposition prior to its election to government in 
March 1995. Post-election pressure to meet these 
committments was substantial and on 13 June 1995 the NSW 
Government announced the NSW Forestry Policy which included 
adoption inter alia of the CAR reserve system. 
^^National Forest Policy Statement (1995) AGP, Canberra. 
11ntergovernmental Technical Working Group, Report: Broad Criteria for the 
Establishment of a Comprehensive, Adequate and Representative Forest Reserve 
System (July 1995) JANIS, Canberra and see also The Joint Commonwealth-
NSW Government Report, Deferred Forest Areas (December 1995) AGP, 
Canberra. 
Following this, In July 1995 specific criteria for achieving the 
CAR forest resen/e system were proposed by the Commonwealth 
Government. The Commonwealth's criteria were developed by an 
advisory panel of scientists chaired by Australia's Chief 
Scientist. These criteria included: 
* a broad benchmark of 15 per cent of the pre-1750 distribution 
of each forest community to be protected within conservation 
reserves; 
* the retention in reserves of at least 60 per cent of existing 
old growth, increasing up to 100 per cent for rare old growth; 
* the protection of 90 per cent or more, wherever practicable, 
of high quality wilderness; and 
* endangered species p r o t e c t i o n . 
These criteria were endorsed as a "broad benchmark" by the NSW 
government in the Scoping Agreement signed with the 
Commonwealth on 25 January 1996. However given the long-
standing dispute between stakeholders in the forestry debate 
particularly in New South Wales, implementation of these 
benchmarks on a regional basis were considered likely to 
produce further conflict. Accordingly, it was necessary to find 
an acceptable implementation mechanism to achieve these 
criteria. 
Progressing to a full CAR reserve system in one step was not 
considered feasible and so a short-term, interim protection for 
National Forest Conservation Reserves, Comniionwealth Proposed Criteria, A 
Position Paper, July 1995, AGP. 
areas which might be required for the CAR reserve system was 
required. The NSW Government policy allowed for an initial 
Interim Assessment Process (lAP) to provide this temporary 
solution to the implementation problem. This was an interim 
arrangement to ensure that any areas which might be needed for 
the reserve system were not logged before the CRAstage took 
place. 
Implementation methods were to be addressed through the 
formation of a Resource and Consen^ation Assessment Council 
(RACAC). Following its creation RACAC was to adopt a three 
stage process for identifying those forest areas which would be 
reserved from logging and those which would be released. 
The first phase consisted of the formation of a Steering 
Committee and a number of Working Groups. The Conservation 
Working Group (CWG) was fomned to develop methodologies and 
guidelines for applying the resen^e criteria. In so doing the 
group was to establish forest type and fauna databases for all 
public land tenure areas in NSW. The CWG was supported by 
specialist "Flora and Fauna Panels'. The panels comprised 
representatives of the National Parks and Wildlife Services, the 
State Forests and two independent experts.^^ In addition, a 
Social-Economic Working Group (SEWG) was formed to provide 
information and advice on the social and economic implications 
of the adoption of a CAR resen/e system.^^ 
AC AC, Draft Interim Forestry Assessment Report{June 1996) RACAC, 
Sydney, 1. 
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The second stage of the process was the lAP negotiation stage, 
anticipated to be completed by mid-1996. In the negotiation 
stage representatives of all stakeholders were to negotiate the 
specific implementation of the conservation targets set in the 
Scoping Agreement on a regional basis utilising the data bases 
established by the Working Groups. 
The third phase was termed the Comprehensive Regional 
Assessment process (CRA), an extended series of data collection 
exercises and further negotiations and public consultations 
expected to be concluded by the end of 1998 which would 
finalise the reserve system. 
It is the second of these phases, the negotiation process itself, 
upon which this study focuses. 
The lAP Negotiation Process 
The lAP negotiations were a series of face-to-face negotiations 
conducted between the major stakeholders in the conflict over 
forest use in New South Wales. Representatives of the following 
stakeholders were included: 
The Commonwealth Govemment 
State Forests of NSW 
National Parks and Wildlife Service 
NSW Forest Products Association 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 
Aboriginal Communities 
Conservation Groups represented by the Nature Conservation 
Councips 
The aim of the lAP was to identify those forest areas which 
would be set aside for interim protection while they were being 
considered for inclusion in a CAR reserve system. The 
negotiations would allow stakeholders to participate in the 
selection of those parts of State Forests which would be 
deferred from logging to fully or partially meet the reservation 
targets derived from the Commonwealth-State agreed 
conservation criteria.^ ® 
Before the negotiations, the targets required under the 
consen/ation criteria had been set In terms of hectare areas of 
forest types, biodiversity targets, old growth reservation 
targets and habitat area reservations for endangered species (so 
for example a reservation of 200 ha was set for each breeding 
area of the sooty owl species). Forest areas reserved were also 
to consider the need for adequate allowance for wood supply 
targets to meet existing mill quotas. The stakeholders were 
thus set the task of negotiating both conservation and resource 
outcomes but within defined parameters. 
In order to be able to take account of all these factors RACAC 
developed a computer modelling system capable of predicting 
the likelihood that a particular forest compartment would need 
^̂ RACAC News, Issue No.3 May 1996. 
ISRACAC, Draft Interim Forestry Assessmer)t Report, note 13 above, 3.. 
to be conserved to meet the reservation targets. This was 
quantified in terms of an 'Irrepiaceability Index". Conversely the 
importance of a particular forest compartment for a sustainable 
wood supply was measured in tenns of a "Wood Sustainability 
Index'.i7. 
A refinement of this system allowed the data produced to be 
used "interactively", in the sense that the satisfaction of the 
two indexes could be recalculated each time a decision on a 
compartment of forest was made. The system also allowed a 
continuous review of the extent to which a conservation or a 
resource criteria had been met at any stage in the process.^^ 
Prior to the negotiations the conservation representatives 
consulted with local environmental groups as to forest 
compartments they considered should be subject to reservation. 
Additionally representatives of the relevant regional 
consen/ation groups attended the negotiations when that region 
was being examined.^^ This was an important preliminary stage 
because the Nature Consen^ation Council (NCC) operated as a 
peak body representing some 100 regional organisations and 
affiliates. Similarly the NSW Forest Products Association (FPA), 
representing small to medium timber industries consulted with 
their members on a regional basis 20̂  as did the employee 
17|d., 12-15. 
18|d., 13. 
idpersonal comments of Dalian Pugh, Conservation Representative, 3 October 
1996. 
20personal comments of Col Dorber, FPA, 25 February 1997. 
representative the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy 
Union (CFMEU).2i 
The objective of the negotiation process was to produce 
outcomes providing varying levels of satisfaction of 
conservation and resource targets.22 This allowed the 
government adequate flexibility when it considered adopting the 
recommendations made. In the course of negotiations, these 
levels were reduced to four conservation/wood supply scenarios 
for each of ten regions in eastern NSW. It is crucial to recognise 
that these four scenarios were imposed upon the negotiators by 
the NSW Government from the outset. The effect of this was to 
dictate the whole scope of the negotiations. The negotiators 
were never free and unfettered but were always confined to 
reach a decision within the parameters set by the government. 
The first scenario was based essentially upon achieving as far 
as possible the criteria set for the CAR reserve system. This 
was the 'preferred conservation option' for the conservation 
groups.23 This option was achieved by progressively building up 
a deferred forest area using the databases in order to satisfy all 
consen^ation targets as far as possible, and minimising where 
possible the effect on timber volumes but primarily seeking to 
satisify the CAR reserve system.24 
The three other scenarios were based upon a 'rollback' or scaling 
back of the first scenario to allow for continued logging at 
21 Personal comments of Mark Greenhill, CFMEU, 9 April 1997. 
22RACAC, op cit., note 13 above, 18. 
23Nature Conservation Council, Environment NSW, Autumn 1996, 1. 
24RACAC, op cit., note 13 above, 2. 
three different levels relative to quota allocations as at July 
1995, but calculated with wood supply from identified 
wilderness areas excluded. 
In summary the four scenarios provided for the following 
outcomes: 
1. Conservation Criteria Outcome: Meeting the conservation 
criteria as fully as practicable. 
2. 30% Wood Supply Outcome: Meeting the consen^ation criteria 
as fully as possible while preserving wood supply at 
approximately 30% of current (July 1995) quota log allocation. 
3. 50% Wood Supply Outcome: Meeting the consen^ation criteria 
as fully as possible while preserving wood supply at 
approximately 50% of current quota log allocation. 
4. 70% Wood Supply Outcome: Meeting the conservation criteria 
while preserving wood supply at approximately 70% of current 
quota log allocation (this corresponded to the Government's 
stated policy for a reduction to this level for quotas in 
1995/6).25 
In some instances the full range of outcomes were not developed 
for each region. This was either because the starting point as 
disclosed by the database was less than one or more of the yield 
25RACAC, Draft Interim Forestry Assessment Report: Summary (1996) 
RACAC, Sydney, 1. 
outcomes (usually In the case of substantially cleared areas) or 
because one or more of the yield outcomes fully satisfied the 
full conservation outcome (usually in the case of relatively 
uncleared areas).26 
The exception to this process was the Eden Management Area 
which was subject to separate later negotiations conducted in 
November 1997. These negotiation were subject to resolution of 
two specific outcome requirements, namely the proposing of 
additional national park reserves to produce a maximum 90,000 
hectare reserve and the ensuring of the supply of a minimum 
sawlog quota of 26,000 cubic metres per year^^. The first 
requirement was In order to satisify the Government's electoral 
promise and the second to facilitate a proposal for a new 
sawmill at Eden.28 
Negotiators in the lAP were provided with computer models 
showing the location of reserved areas and colour coding of 
State Forest compartments according to their Irreplaceability 
Index (for instance areas considered totally irreplaceable were 
coloured 'dark red'). As the negotiations proceeded, 
compartments selected for deferral or deselected to be made 
available for logging were identified by a colour change on the 




28Nature Conservation Council et al, Forest Parks Couritdown (July/August 
1996) NCC, Sydney. 1. 
29RACAC. op cit., note 13 aboye, 19. 
The negotiation process itself involved tlie following sequence 
of events: 
1. The negotiations were conducted over a four week period from 
23 April 1996. 
2. The Eastern Forests of NSW were divided into 11 regions and 
approximately two days of negotiations were conducted on each 
region. 
3. A position statement was made by each of the stakeholders at 
the start of negotiations for each new region indicating the 
stakeholder's preferred conservation or resource outcomes in 
that region. 
4. The first step in negotiations on each region involved the use 
of the databases' interactive system to make an agreed number 
of automatic selection steps to select or deselect forest 
compartments based upon consen/ation criteria or resource 
outcomes. 
5. For the conservation criteria outcomes, these steps were 
based upon a combination of features described as: 
a. high overall irreplaceability 
b. high summed irreplaceability of individual features 
c. significant contribution to forest type targets 
d. significant contribution of percentage area of old growtli 
forest.30 
6. For the resource outcomes, these steps were based upon a 
combination of features described as: 
a moderate to high timber values 
b. low summed irreplaceability of individual timber types 
c. low contribution to forest type targets 
d. low percentage contribution to old growth forest. 
7. The second stage of the negotiations involved the use of the 
computer model to make manual selections for the three 
rollback scenarios. These scenarios set at timber supply of 
approximately 30%, 50% and 70% of 1995 quota allocations and 
equated to a decreasing achievement of the conservation 
criteria targets. These reductions were achieved by agreed 
deselection of forest compartments know to be important for 
factors such as continuity of operations, the occurrence of 
plantation areas, the extent of regrowth or the existence of 
over-reserved forest types, 
8. The adapted data was then examined by RACAC to detemriine 
whether the selections made were in accordance with the 
Commonwealth Proposed Criteria for Reserve design. These 
criteria provided for a number of factors to be considered in 
formulating reserve options including size, ecological integrity 
30|d., 19. 
31 Id. 
and refugia location but subject to the overriding consideration 
tliat, 
"where information is limiting, the precautionary principle 
should be applied in the form of conservation land use 
decisions".32 
Ancillary to this negotiation process, social and economic 
impact studies were undertaken by the SEWG. However the 
results of these studies were not factored into the negotiation 
process as "the data obtained was not of a nature that could be 
formally considered in determining outcomes."33 j h e studies 
conducted were said to be primarily intended to be considered 
subsequently by the government when reaching its decision on 
RACAC's recommendations for the implementation of the CAR 
reserve system. 
Two specific studies were undertaken. Firstly a pilot social 
impact assessment was undertaken to determine the effect of 
the reorganisation of the timber industry on dependent 
communities and the mitigative measures necessary to 
minimise these effects.^^ 
Secondly an economic impact analysis to determine the 
economic effect of adopting forest reform policy was carried 
out. Its preliminary results suggested: 
32Quoted Id., 20. 
33|d., 18. 
34|d.. 33-36. 
1. If the reduction in log supply was 30%, most mills would 
make Intemal adjustments; there would be limited structural 
change and the overall reduction In activity and employment 
would be less than 30%. 
2. If the reduction in log supply was 50% or higher, substantial 
structural change would occur, including mill rationalisations 
producing significant loss in employment.^^ 
It was in anticipation of such economic effects on the 
implementation of the CAR reserve system that part of the 
Government's Forestry Policy announced in July 1995 was the 
Forestry Structural Adjustment Package which provided for $60 
million (matched in a similar sum by the Commonwealth 
Government) for timber industry restructuring and worker 
relocation. 
At the end of the negotiation period the outcomes were 
considered by RACAC and a draft Interim Assessment Report 
was released for public comment in June 1996. The 
recommendations within the report are described under the 
heading "Consultation" as : 
'the result of input from key stakeholders representing a range 
of viewpoints and providing a basis for rigorous and transparent 
decision-making processes. 
35RACAC, Questions and Answers (1996) RAC, Sydney, 3. 
3®RACAC, op cit., note 13 above, 38. 
37|d.. 8. 
Following the release of the report a consultation period was 
allowed during which the RACAC visited communities in the 
affected areas and sought submissions. This period closed on 11 
July 1996 and the final report in essentially the same terms 
was then issued to the NSW Govemment for decision. 
It is apparent from this summary that while the parties to the 
negotiations were able to negotiate over how policy was to be 
implemented on a regional basis, the scope of the negotiations 
did not extend to the policy contents itself. The parties were 
asked to devise four options, not to choose the options, this was 
left to an administrative determination. 
Implementation of the lAP negotiated outcome 
One of the criteria used to measure the effectiveness of any 
negotiation process is whether the outcome reached meets with 
the approval of all stakeholders. For this reason it is important 
to follow the events that occurred after the lAP negotiations to 
assess whether the outcome produced met with stakeholder 
approval. 
Strenuous political lobbying occurred between the submission of 
RACAC's report to the NSW government in July 1996 and the NSW 
Cabinet decision which provided the final outcome on the issue 
on 23 September 1996. In this period the major NGO 
stakeholders took up more entrenched positions that was the 
case in the negotiation process. 
The environmental lobby in the fomn of 12 environmental groups 
made a joint submission as the "Forest Parks Countdown" to the 
government in the form of a 'Forest Reserve Plan'. The 
environmental lobby were now advocating their preferred option 
in seeking: 
1. A logging moratorium over the areas covered in Scenario One 
of the lAP Report (ie rejecting the other 3 options as 
inadequate) 
2. Immediate declaration of a number of new national paries and 
wilderness areas (ie permanently embargoing some of the areas 
in scenario one rather than on an interim basis) 
3. Rejection of the timber industry's call for 'resource security' 
(the Industry had sought guaranteed 5 year wood supply 
contracts). 
The NCC has estimated that some 22,000 submissions 
principally in the form of a letter of support for the 'Forest 
Reserve Plan' were lodged with RACAC.^^ In addition, in July 
1996 a letter seeking support for the 'Forest Reserve Policy' 
was sent to all Members of the NSW Pariiament by this 
environmental alliance.^o 
^^Nature Conservation Council et al, op cit. note 28 above, 3. 
^^Nature Conservation Council, Environment NSW, Winter 1996, 1 
40|d. 
The industry lobby through its peak body, the Forest Product 
Association, made a submission to the government in the form 
of "A Sustainable Management Option" seeking: 
1. Wood supply quotas set at 70% of 1995 allocations (ie, 
scenario 4) 
2. Term agreements for renewable 5 year contracts set at a 
minimum of 60% of 1995 allocations 
3. No wilderness declarations being made without independent 
analysis to identify genuine undisturbed old growth forests, 
with shortfalls in resource allocations being met from 
compartments established as being 'extensively disturbed'.^^ 
The industry groups engaged political lobbyist and former 
politican Peter Anderson to lobby on their behalf.^z The industry 
position emphasised the need for immediate 'resource security' 
rather than leaving it to be determined in the Comprehensive 
Regional Assessment (CRA) to be completed in 1998. The 
industry lobby sought eariy provision of the guarantee of 
renewable 5 year contracts to mills for wood supplies from 
mid-1996. 43 
The union lobby through the CFMEU lobbied the NSW Labor 
Council to also support scenario four, ie wood supply at 70% of 
NSW Forest Products Association, unpublished Briefing Note No.3, 30 July 
1996, 3-5. 
^^The Australian, 15 May 1996, 29. 
43see C Dorber, in Sydney Morning Herald, 21 June 1996, 12. 
1995 quota levels. To strengthen their position the union was 
claimed to have released to the media the consultant's report 
prepared for the SEWG detailing prospective job losses which 
made headline news ("Thousands of timber jobs at risk")^^ In 
addition, threats to march on Parliament House by unionists 
heightened the political pressure. 
It can be seen at this lobbying stage that the two major 
stakeholder groups were expressing diametrically opposed 
views. The conservation lobby sought implementation of the 
scenario which equated to full CAR reserve system 
implementation. The resource lobby sought implementation of a 
reduction of the full CAR reserve system equal to the existing 
forest policy position announced in June 1995, that is the 30% 
reduction provide for in the Govemment's Forest Policy as a 
trade off for the Forestry Structural Adjustment Package. The 
CFMEU essentially endorsed the industry position. 
The positions of each of the major stakeholders were markedly 
different from the breadth of options in the Report. Each had 
plainly taken a much more entrenched position. The negotiations 
had given the govemment a number of options from which to 
choose. The need to choose between different options remained a 
matter of political judgement, with such choice influenced by 
all the aspects of the political process. This in particular 
involved traditional political lobbying, in which the 
^^Sydney Morning Herald , 20 July 1996, 
stakeholders from the negotiation process now pressed for their 
preferred option. 
The political process involved the preparation of a 
recommendation for Cabinet by its Forestry Subcommittee 
comprising the Environment, Planning and Forests Ministers. The 
lobbying by all stakeholders was intense before this 
recommendation was formed: 
'Just a week ago, the Government was set to lock up nearly 70% 
of the State's forests in what was regarded as a significant 
environmental victory. 
Furious lobbying from the timber industry and key Labor unions 
have forced the Govemment to retreat, particulariy as it became 
clear that many ministers were being persuaded to the industry 
cause. 
Senior Government sources said the turning point came when a 
consensus position was reached by the members of the Cabinet's 
forestry subcommittee...'After that, all the lobbying became 
irrelevant' one source said."^® 
The Govemment's decision was released on 23 September 1996. 
It provided for moratorium levels essentially in terms of 
scenario two, that is at 30% of 1995 allocations but at the same 
time providing for the possibly contradictory provision of term 
agreements for renewable 5 year contracts set at 50% of 1995 
allocations . This involved setting aside for conservation 
45|d., 19 September 1996, 4. 
approximately 670,000 hectares of State Forest on an interim 
basis with an additional 320,000 hectares permanently reserved 
by way of national park or wilderness area creation 
The attempt to satisfy both criteria, however, left serious 
doubts as to whether the allocations allowed could be filled 
from forest compartments outside the moratorium areas. There 
was a fundamental contradiction in the decision. It allowed 
logging to continue at levels which could not realistically be 
met from the reduced wood supplies provided. The policy 
decision also provided for community based Harvesting Advisory 
Panels to be set up in each of the 11 regions to monitor logging 
compliance pending the completion of the Comprehensive 
Regional Assessment (CRA) process in 1998. 
Following the Government's decision, the major stakeholders 
affirmed their committment to the negotiation process but were 
highly critical of the outcome announced. The NSW Forest 
Products Association, decried the decision in their press 
release ("Another win for the Greens"), but concluded: 
"The RACAC Interim Forest Assessment Process has been a 
valuable lesson for this industry and we have today recommitted 
ourselves to working within the Process"^^ 
Similar qualified support was expressed by the Nature 
Conservation Council on behalf of conservation stakeholders: 
46|d., 24 September 1996, 4. 
47Forest Products Association, Press Release, 23 September 1996. 
"the IAP...has been the best process ever applied in Australia for 
determining the areas of public forest most likely to be needed 
for CAR reserves'.^® 
Assessment of the Effectiveness of Negotiation 
in the Impiemetation of Environmental Poiicy 
in the lAP 
It should be remembered that it was not the case that 
stakeholders to the lAP had agreed upon a settlement in relation 
to logging or conserving State Forests and that the government 
had then adopted this resolution. The form and scope of the 
decision remained at all times with the Government. The 
decision making process could be crystalised into the following 
sequence: 
1. The intergovemmental agreement set the broad parameters of 
Forest Policy; 
2. A negotiating process was created with the stakeholders 
presented with a number of options detailing the 
implementation of these broad parameters (ie the lAP); 
3. The negotiators were required to select particular areas to be 
logged or conserved to satisfy such parameters; 
4. A report issued from this process detailing how the criteria 
could be met in four possible scenarios; 
48Nature Conservation Council, Environment NSW, Winter 1996, 6. 
5. A period of political lobbying followed; and 
6. A Cabinet decision choosing one of the options and including 
qualifications was released by the Government in apparent 
resolution of the environmental conflict. 
Case Study 
The balance of this chapter is concerned with gauging the 
effectiveness of the use of negotiation in resolving the 
environmental conflict over forest use. The review of 
effectiveness is based upon a survey of the main participants 
through a series of interviews conducted at the conclusion of 
the negotiations. 
Case Study Methodology 
The purpose of the evaluation project was to assess the success 
of the use of negotiation as a dispute resolution method in this 
process. 
The methodology used in the evaluation project was to 
interview the representatives of the three Non Government 
Organisations (NGOs) who attended the negotiation sessions 
(industry, union and environmental groups) and obtain responses 
to a series of evaluation questions. 
Rationale for Method 
The number of stakeholders in the lAP was small, consisting of 
twelve participants plus a chairman. Eight of the twelve were 
government representatives, one was a scientific representative 
and the remaining three were NGO representatives. The 
evaluation was limited to these three NGO representatives. The 
small size of this sample was compensated for by the fact that 
these representatives were not part of the normal 
administrative dispute resolution process and thus could be 
expected to show a fresh perspective. Secondly, they had had 
first hand experience of the use of negotiation in the lAP in that 
they were all the key negotiator for their constitutency. 
Additionally, the use of an interview technique allowed for 
substantial depth and detail of response. However, because of the 
small sample, the analysis of the data is limited to descriptive 
comments and a liberal use of quotes to substantiate 
observations made. 
Format 
A semi-structured interview schedule (See Annexure D) was 
used to elicit comments on broad issues dealing with the 
research questions: 
1. Whether the lAP represented an interest-based or position-
based negotiation process 
2. Whether the real issues in dispute were subject to 
negotiation 
3. Whether the process was effective 
4. Whether the subsequent government decision reflected the 
agreed outcome. 
Focus of Inquiry 
The focus of the evaluation project was to determine whether 
negotiation was used effectively. 
There are substantial difficulties involved in defining and 
measuring effectiveness and success. One useful definition of 
effectiveness is "the achievement of a certain group's goals'.-^® 
Another commonly used yardstick for measuring the 
effectiveness of mediation has been agreement rates. This is 
not considered an appropriate measurement for negotiation 
because the purpose of negotiation may not always be final 
agreement.50 Bardow and Gibson provide a number of other 
indicators of success. They list five "indices of effectiveness", 
agreements rate, client satisfaction, level of compromise, 
stability of the mediated agreement and cost savings.si 
Choosing and adapting from these to allow for the nature of the 
lAP process, this evaluation project focuses on an assessment 
of the effectiveness of negotiation as measured by the indices 
of: 
Y. Wadsworth, Do it Yourself Social Research (1984) Victorian Council of 
Social Services, Melbourne, 15. 
50 s. Bardow and J. Gibson, Evaluation of the Family Court Mediation Service 
(1994) Family Court of Australia Research and Evaluation Unit, Canberra, 76. 
51 Id., 76.. 
* Participant satisfaction 
* Level of compromise 
* Level of implementation of the negotiated agreement. 
Participants 
Three stakeholders from the lAP negotiations participated in 
the interview process. Each of the participants had been the 
stakeholder representative conducting negotiations on behalf of 
their constituency and as such had first hand experience of the 
negotiation process. Each interview followed the format of the 
semi-structured interview schedule with the interviewer 
elicting comments on the four issues selected. 
The representatives were: 
Col Dorber, Executive Director of the NSW Forest Products 
Association who was interviewed as the industry 
representative. 
Dailan Pugh who was interviewed as the non-Government 
conservation representative on behalf of the Nature 
Conservation Council. 
Gavin Millier, NSW Branch Secretary. Construction, Forestry, 
Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) was the union representative on 
RACAC but the lAP negotiations were conducted by Mark 




Whether The lAP Represented An Interest-Based 
or A Position-Based Negotiation Process 
(a) Nature of Negotiations 
For the purposes of this evaluation, the broad concept of 
negotiation is understood to be: 
"an attempt by parties to reach agreement concerning some 
matter in dispute between them.'^a 
The Iiterature53 suggests there are essentially two major 
strategic approaches to negotiation: position-based and 
interest-based. 
Position-based negotiation involves positional bargaining in 
which each party begins by advocating a single and usually 
extreme solution. Agreement can therefore only be reached by 
the parties successively conceding to new positions. It is 
suggested that in the process of maintaining successive 
positions, parties may lose sight of their real objective and any 
52 E Clark, The Role of Non-litigious Dispute Resolution Methods in 
Environmental Disputes'(1995) 2 The Australasian Journal of Natural Law 
and Policy 2 aX S. 
Fisher & W Ury, Getting to Yes (1981) Business Books Ltd., London. 
agreement reached may not be reflective of the interests of the 
parties, this may in turn lead to implementation difficulties.^^ 
Interest-based negotiation, on the other hand, involves a focus 
not on positions but on the underlying interests or needs of the 
parties in order to understand why they have adopted a 
particular position.ss The rationale for focussing on interests is 
said to be that for every stated interest, there may exist 
several possible solutions. Therefore it may be feasible to find 
one that meets the interests of all parties.^e 
Fisher and Ury's model of interest-based negotiation relies upon 
four principles: 
1. Separate the people from the problem 
2. Focus on interests, not positions 
3. Generate a variety of options for mutual gain 
4. Insist that the results be based upon some objective 
criteria.57 
Applying these principles, RACAC's framewori< for the 
negotiations suggests a negotiation process modelled upon the 
principles of interest-based negotiation. 
Using data obtained in the interviews, the four principles appear 
to be addressed as follows: 
54 B Wolski. "The Rde and Umitations of Fisher and Ury's Model of Interest-
Based Negotiation in Mediations" (1994) Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Journal, August 1994, 210 at 211. 
55 R Fisher & W Ury, op cit, note 53 above, 11. 
56b Wolski, op cit, note 54 above, 211. 
57R Fisher & W Ury. op cit, note 53 above. 11-12. 
1. Separate the people from the problem. 
NGO stakeholders were provided with 'guidelines for behaviour* 
prior to the commencement of the negotiation process 
emphasising the need to avoid personalising the debate. 
Negotiators were told to satisfy other's interests as well as 
their own.5® 
2. Focus on interests, not positions. 
The process provided for each of the stakeholders to make 
statements prior to the negotiation sessions on each separate 
Forest Area. In this statement they set out their constituency's 
needs and interests with respect to that particular area. 
3. Generate a variety of options for mutual gain. 
Implicit in the negotiation process (and acting as a constraint 
upon the negotiations) was the imposition of a range of 
scenarios by the New South Wales Govemment, involving 
differing levels of satisfaction of each stakeholder's interests. 
4. Insist that the results be based upon some objective criteria. 
There were comprehensive attempts in terms of the CWG and the 
SEWG to provide objective forest and fauna databases, and also 
^^RACAC, Guidelines for Negotiations in the Interim Assessment Process, 
1996. 
data on the social and economic implications of each option 
considered. The level of data available was considerable, though 
there were doubts expressed by the stakeholders about its 
reliability. 
In view of the way RACAC sought to address the four principles 
of Fisher and Ury's model, it is considered that the use of 
interest-based negotiation was encouraged by the process. It is 
necessary to review the stakeholders' responses given in the 
interviews to determine whether they ,as participants, 
considered the process represented interest-based negotiations. 
(b) Stakeholders Responses^^ 
The perception of the industry representative was that the FPA 
had entered into the lAP with a "complete sense of cooperation". 
At the start of the process, he considered that 'nothing was on 
the table". His organisation considered the process was to deal 
with the satisfaction of broad forest policy outcomes only. More 
specific options based on certain levels of reduction of Wood 
Supply Quotas were then provided and the parameters of the 
negotiations and subsequent negotiations remained constrained 
within these parameters. 
Given these constraints, this representative considered that 
five weeks of "extremely effective negotiations" involving 
59D Pugh, 'Major Findings of 'An Appraisal of the Reliability of State Forests' 
Wood Resources Study"(1996) unpublished paper, September 1996, 1. 
6^hese summaries are based upon file notes of the interviewees' responses to 
the questions in the Interview Schedule, see Appendix D. 
"massive horsetrading sessions' then ensued. These sessions 
involved 'hard bargaining' which produced an agreed range of 
outcomes within the specified parameters for each forest area. 
He considered this 'a consensus process', where 'we both had to 
give a lot of ground'. He considered the negotiation process 
centered upon the problem not the personalities and that the 
focus was upon interests. He was not satisfied that the ability 
to generate options was given sufficient scope given the 
constraints of the four scenarios. These scenarios were 
presented to the parties as a fait accompli, forcing them to 
work within them. He was satisfied the results were based upon 
objective criteria provided by the CWG and the SEWG groups. 
The conservation representative from the NCC indicated that 
their involvement was influenced by 'a political imperative' set 
by the New South Wales Govemment. The Government wished to 
implement its Forest Policy which had in part delivered it to 
government in 1995. The conservation representative 
considered that the stakeholders could 'either agree on a method 
of implementation' or 'have one imposed on them'. They 
considered the need to produce an outcome was crucial to their 
and the other stakeholders active participation in negotiations. 
He considered genuine negotiation took place, "quite tense, quite 
hard, quite heated at times". However, he considered that both 
industry/union and conservation representatives "thought we 
would win in the sense that we would get the outcome we 
wanted politically, that is outside the lAP", later on. He 
considered this made both sides "more flexible than we might 
otherwise have been prepared to be". If this belief had not 
existed "the negotiations would have been a lot tougher". 
Nevertheless he was of the opinion that if one scenario rather 
than four had been negotiated to provide "one outcome over 
State Forests" to the government, the Government would have 
accepted it without substantial amendment but "it was not 
possible to ever get a single agreed criteria". 
He also agreed the focus was upon the problem and not 
personalities and upon interests and not positions. He agreed to 
allow options to develop even though they departed from full 
compliance with the conservation criteria. He was not satisified 
that the results were always based upon objective criteria. For 
instance, he considered one of the objective criteria used (the 
Wood Resource Study prepared by State Forests) "grossly over-
estimated resources".® 1 
The union representative from the CFMEU came new to this form 
of negotiation. He had had previous good relations with industry, 
less experience dealing with Government Departments and a 
"very cool" relationship with the conservation movement. He 
considered that the negotiation process was marked by " a lot of 
theatrics eariy on" and "lots of stunts". He was of the opinion 
that what happened "at the time looked like real negotiation but 
in fact it wasn't". The representative always expected the 
RACAC report issued following the negotiations would not be 
Pugh, op cit., note 58 above, 1. 
accepted as the basis for a final decision. He was of the view 
that negotiations would continue 'on a political level". In fact he 
reported that there were a series of concurrent lobbying 
sessions which paralleled the negotiation process. He said this 
was well known to the other participants. When stalemates 
arose, the union representative reported that he would routinely 
say 'all this will be sorted out politically later on". 
The tenor of his comments did not suggest that he considered 
true interest-based negotiation was taking place in the lAP. 
Question 2. 
Whether the Real Issues in Dispute were Subject 
to Negotiation 
(a) Real Matters at Issue 
The stakeholders were asked to evaluate the extent to which the 
real issues as perceived by them were addressed in the 
negotiation process. For the industry and union representatives, 
the real matters at issue were the need to maintain the 
viability of the forest industry. Their aims were closely allied, 
being to minimise as far as possible the effect on the industry 
and forest workers of any reduction in supply quotas. The 
conservationist considered the real matters at issue were the 
need to preserve, initially temporarily but in the long term 
pemnanently, as many high consen/ation value forest areas as 
possible. 
(b) Stakeholder Responses 
The real Issue for the industry representative was the likely 
impact on forestry industries' quotas due to reduction of wood 
supply. Industry sources wished to negate or minimise any 
reduction in wood supply quotas. But the representative 
considered a proper airing of this issue was constrained by the 
negotiation parameters set: 
"We wanted to see economic and social impact assessment at 
10% increments of reduction of 1995/96 wood supply quotas. 
(We were) told (this) couldn't be done by the consultants, so 
then (the options were) reduced to 30-50-70% levels." 
These reduction options then became the only options discussed. 
The effect of this was that discussion of the real issues 
("maintenance of a viable timber industry") as far as the 
industry representative was concerned, was subject to an 
imposed constraint. 
The conservation representative considered that the New South 
Wales government had indicated there was a need to produce "an 
outcome over State Forests" and by his involvement the 
representative sought to produce an outcome which was 
acceptable to his constituency. His aim was 'to achieve the full 
consen/ation outcome as far as was possible." 
Realistically, he also "expected that Resource Security would be 
given" but he hoped to achieve conditions in logging licenses 
which could be monitored by conservationists. However, he 
considered that the Imposition of the four scenarios "served 
another purpose". It locked the stakeholders Into giving the 
government a breadth of options through which It could produce 
an outcome which departed significantly from the real issues 
negotiated by the stakeholders. 
There was an acceptance by the conservation representative 
that the real Issues under negotiation were not the specifics of 
government forestry policy since this had already been 
politically determined but its "Implementation In specific 
forest areas." The negotiation process gave the opportunity to 
the stakeholders to "agree on a method of implementation only". 
This level of consultation not been granted In other States, such 
as Victoria and Western Australia, "where there was no NGO 
consultation." 
The real Issue so far as the union representative was concemed 
was the maintenance of adequate resource security to protect 
Its members' jobs. The unions had consented to a prior 
government decision to reduce the resource allocation to 70% of 
pre-1995 quotas. The union representative wished to prevent 
any Increase on this agreed 30% reduction. Equally Important, he 
wished to see a corresponding land base (le wood supply) being 
guaranteed to avoid the situation of quotas being set at 70% and 
yet Inadequate supply being available to fill the quotas. Like the 
other stakeholders, the union representative was not content 
with the four scenarios set, but considered "we had no choice on 
these stages." 
These 'real issues' from the union representative's perspective 
were the subject of negotiation, however he shared the view of 
the conservation representative that the negotiation process 
would not be conclusive of the outcome: "I said, all this will be 
sorted out politically later on." As indicated previously, with 
this in mind the unions maintained "lots of meetings 
concurrent(ly)" to lobby the NSW Labor Council and government 
members. 
Questions. 
Whether the Process was Effective 
(a) Measures of Effectiveness 
The stakeholders were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the negotiation process. The indices of effectiveness used were 
participant satisfaction, level of compromise reached and level 
of implementation achieved. The participants interviewed were 
asked to consider whether the negotiations were effective In 
terms of each of these indices. 
(b)Stakeholder Responses 
Participant Satisfaction 
On the basis of the interview data, all of the stakeholders 
considered the process effective in terms of the indicia of 
participant satisfaction. 
The industry representative's view was tliat the process was 
successful, 'it assisted us in develop(ing) an understanding of 
each other's positions', 'we learned to work together without 
personalising the debate' and 'we felt that if left to our own 
devices we could (have) come up with an agreed position". 
Similarly, the conservation representative considered the 
process successful in terms of the indicia of participant 
satisfaction, considering that the "dynamics of the 
negotiations' were good, "lots of good feeling, (it) has improved 
communications, (we) understood where (the) other party (was) 
coming from." He was less concerned with effectiveness 
measured in this sense, since he considered success in terms of 
outcomes a more important measure of effectiveness. 
The union representative had 'never done this form of 
negotiation before' and remained sceptical of the process and 
less forthcoming than the other stakeholders in assessing the 
process as effective in terms of participant satisfaction. He 
considered it more in the context of 'groundwork for the 
political lobbying later on.' He conceded: 
'the other representatives- conservation and industry- were 
more enamoured with the processs, but I knew that there had 
been tactics, such as media leaks throughout the process, and I 
knew this would escalate after the interim decision and before 
the Cabinet decision.' 
Level of Compromise 
Using the indicia of level of compromise, the industry 
representative evaluated the process as effective: 'we agreed on 
a range of outcomes which took into account the resolving in 
each area of the specific environmental dispute.' This 
represented 'a consensus process- we both had to give a lot of 
ground.' 
As regards the indicia of level of compromise, the conservation 
representative considered there had been a high level of 
compromise but that this was essentially artificial, since each 
party believed that compromises made could be abandoned or 
modified in the subsequent political lobbying period. For 
instance, the conservation representatives considered their 
unique form of strong grass roots political lobbying ('16,000 of 
the 20,000 subsequent public submissions were from 
conservation groups') would win the day for them in the end. 
In this sense, the level of compromise reached was not an 
accurate measure of the effectiveness of the process because 
the compromise reached was not truly genuine. Compromises 
made were not subsequently adhered to. The conservation 
representative conceded: 
'In the political phase our focus changed, (we were seeking) 
moratorium areas, opposing Resource Security, (seeking) 
declaration of National Paries now.' 
This approach to the negotiation process on the part of the 
conservation representative exhibited a political pragmatism 
which was not apparent in the industry representative. The 
industry representative admitted in this regard that his 
"constituency thought me politically naive" in the level of 
compromise to which he committed them during the process. 
As regards the indicia of effectiveness in terms of level of 
compromise, the union representative considered the 
compromise evident in the process was artifical. Though "at 
times it looked like real negotiation" the outcome when finally 
announced by the government did not reflect the arguments or 
compromises reached. He was in no doubt that the negotiated 
agreement represented by "the RACAC report wouldn't be 
accepted". Again, he considered (rightly so) that the real 
solution would be one "sorted out politically later on." 
Level of Implementation 
In terms of the indicia of level of implementation, no single 
negotiated agreement was reached. A range of options for 
implementing government policy was presented to the relevant 
administrative authority for consideration. The industry 
representative's view was that: 
"RACAC was presented as a body which would take the results of 
the negotiations and incorporate the(se) in one comprehensive 
recommendation to government, not as four scenarios." 
His view was that "RACAC had failed to present a solution to 
government", so in terms of a durable agreement the negotiation 
process was a failure. He concluded that "the process was a 
success, the outcome was a failure." 
In terms of the indicia of producing an agreed outcome, the 
conservation representative considered the process effective. 
Specifically, he believed that "getting an agreed data base was a 
big achievement..the biggest success" and that this had been 
"generally achieved, with some disagreement." Further, he 
considered that the agreed outcome was effective in that the 
"majority of high conservation areas (were) identified as 
moratorium areas." 
As to whether the process was effective in terms of the level of 
implementation, his comments are again indicative of a 
political pragmatism: 
"I think it was not possible to produce an outcome everyone 
would be happy with, because there is just not enough resource 
to satisify both interests, (there is) not enough room there for 
compromise (given) the size of the resource." 
Nevertheless, he expressed the global view about the 
effectiveness of the process, "I think it is an ideal process." 
The union representative's view was markedly different. He 
considered the outcome was a product primarily of the lobbying 
process and not of the negotiations in any significant sense. 
Question 4. 
Whether the Subsequent Government Decision 
Reflected the Agreed Outcome. 
(a) The Government Decision 
The negotiation process did not produce an agreed compronfiise 
resolution which could be then implemented. It operated only as 
an advisory process to assist in an administrative dispute 
resolution. 
The Government decision released on 23 September 1996 did not 
duplicate any of the four scenarios. Rather it reflected an 
attempt to placate all interests. It provided for a moratorium 
from logging, pending the CRA process, equivalent to 30% of July 
1995 log quota allocations. There was thus substantially less 
areas available for logging, this was seen as a 'win' for 
conservationist interests. It also provided for resource security 
by the grant of renewable 5 year log supply agreements to 
sawmills set at 50% of 1995 allocations. As these benchmark 
allocations were commonly regarded as grossly excessive this 
was seen as a 'win' for industry and union interests. However, 
the decision in attempting to produce a 'win-win' solution in 
fact left the conflict unresolved. Since by quarantining large 
areas of State Forest from logging, (ie., leaving only 30% of the 
supply source previously available), the effect would be that 
loggers would be either forced to virtually denude approved 
areas of all timber or alternatively push for permission to enter 
forests under moratorium in order to fully exploit the logging 
quotas allowed (ie., 50% of previous log numbers). 
(b)Stakeholder Responses 
The industry representative's view was that the Government 
decision did not reflect the negotiated outcome. The Cabinet 
Subcommittee produced "a political solution unrelated to our 
negotiated settlement.' The Cabinet decision was "a 
hotchpotch", while it allowed logging at 50% 1995/96 supply 
levels (scenario three), it did not then provide the corresponding 
resource required to achieve the supply permitted 
He called it a 'bastardisation of a mediation process, a 
deliberate act of political cunning." He considered it did not 
reflect any of the agreed outcomes and did not provide the 
resource base necessary for "the maintenance of a viable timber 
industry." 
The conservation representative was also firmly of the view 
that the subsequent govemment decision did not reflect the 
agreed outcome. He considered giving resource security at levels 
above the wood supply permitted, ensured that "inevitably there 
will be a need to log into moratorium areas to achieve the 
quotas." The result of this in his view was that "the political 
outcome, attempting to placate both sides, has not resolved the 
conflict over the limited resource." 
He expressed some confidence that the ongoing CRA process 
might remedy this deficiency but considered that to date "the 
political decision pre-empted the process" and thereby robbed it 
of much of its effectiveness. 
For the union representative, the government decision also did 
not reflect the agreed outcome but this was never expected. For 
him, particularly as a Labor government was in power, the real 
resolution of the conflict was always going to be one brought 
about by political persuasion. 
He outlined a concerted political campaign after the RACAC 
report was presented to the Cabinet subcommittee. There was 
"lots of political pressure at State Conference to have the ALP 
embrace the union post-lAP position" which was 60% of 1995 
quotas with resource security. The union lobby presented a "very 
strong hardline position..lots of media, lots of party lobbying, 
then lobbying of parliamentary committees." This mounted in the 
last two weeks prior to the Cabinet decision to a team of 
unionists lobbying each member of Cabinet individually. 
The union lobby used the socio-economic reports on the effects 
of logging reductions to create concern, particularly amongst 
politicans in marginal seats centred on timber towns 
("Thousands of timber jobs at risk"®^). The Labor Council of NSW 
lobbied parliamentary members on a factional basis to support 
adoption of the union post-lAP position. 
^^Sydney Morning Herald, 20 July 1996, note 44 above, 1 
The political pressure was further escalated in the final week 
before the Cabinet decision was due. "Lots of media, (an) 
editorial in the Sydney Morning Heralcfi^ , press conferences, 
picket lines on the Wilderness Society in three States..a big 
political exercise." He said that, at the eleventh hour, the unions 
were: 
•contacted by a Carr staffer who said 'what do you really want? 
Would 60% and Resource Security do?' 
We said 'Yes, but we must have a corresponding land mass' and 
that's essentially what the decision of 23 September 1996 was." 
Given that he considered political lobbying won the day, it was 
his view that the level of implementation of the negotiated 
outcome achieved was minimal. 
Conclusions 
Using this analysis of the interview data, it is possible to draw 
some conclusions about the effectiveness of the use of 
negotiation in the lAP process. 
These conclusions can be summarised as follows: 
63-Division on forests" Sydney Morning Herald, 17 September 1996 which 
concludes the promises now being made to the industry are modest and the 
demands of the conservationists unreasonable." 
Interest-based negotiation rather than position-based 
negotiation toolc place 
The focus of all the stakeholders was on the underlying 
interests of their constituency: respectively timber industries, 
conservationists and timber workers. The negotiation were 
identified as non-personalised. While there was eventually a 
focus on positions (resource security for industry and union and 
full conservation criteria for conservationists), this was after 
the negotiation process had concluded. A variety of options were 
generated but these were essentially preordained by RACAC and 
not of the stakeholders' choosing. However, it seems apparent 
that no agreed recommendation would have been reached without 
some artificial framework being imposed. It is concluded that 
the negotiations exhibited the key features of interest-based 
negotiation. 
Negotiation was used In an Integrative form In the 
administrative mechanism of dispute resolution 
The administrative mechanism for resolving the environmental 
conflict was resolution by a sub-committee of the NSW Labor 
Cabinet to which RACAC reported following the negotiation 
process. Negotiation was integtated into this administrative 
mechanism. 
The negotiation process did not produce an agreed 
outcome which was implemented 
The negotiated outcome was not a single recommendation. The 
range of options would always be subject to selection and 
modification by the administrative mechanism. The role of the 
negotiation process was an thus advisory or consultative one 
not a dispute resolution one. 
The negotiation were perceived by the stalceholders as 
a r t i f i c i a l 
There were two reasons for this. Firstly, no matter how 
successful the negotiations were in reaching an agreed outcome, 
it was always subject to approval by the administrative 
decision maker. Secondly,the stakeholders, especially the union 
representative, were always confident that traditional methods 
of influencing an administrative decision maker outside the 
negotiation process (lobbying, media attention etc.) would 
always succeed over any carefully negotiated outcome. This 
confidence was bome out by the resolution imposed. 
The negotiation process was considered effective as 
measured by the indicia of participant satisfaction 
The two stakeholders who had been in the most confrontationist 
relationship prior to the negotiation process (industry and 
conservationists) considered the process had tended to 
normalise relationships and improved communications. By this 
measure, it was considered a success. 
The negotiation process was considered effective as 
measured by the indicia of ievei of compromise reached 
Both the industry and conservationist representative considered 
substantiai compromise occurred, the union representative iess 
so. The compromise perceived was that the implementation of 
government policy in terms of consen/ation and resource 
criteria was agreed on an area by area basis. This required a 
balance of the stakeholders' competing needs and interests. 
iHowever, the level of compromise reached was not such as to 
permit one single agreed outcome being recommended to the 
administrative decision maimer. 
The negotiation process was not considered effective 
as measured by the indicia of level of Implementation 
of the negotiated outcome 
No single negotiated outcome was ever attempted nor envisaged 
at the start of the process. The implementation of the 
negotiated agreement was never likely. Therefore in terms of 
the level of implementation, the negotiations were not a 
success. 
The negotiated outcome was not reflected by the 
subsequent administrative decision 
The Cabinet decision reached on the recommendation of its 
subcommittee was much more a product of the traditional 
political system of influencing administrative decision-making, 
than of the negotiation process. Knowing this, following the 
negotiations, the stakeholders returned to their position based 
approach and influenced the outcome much more effectively 
politically. This was particularly so in the case of the union 
representative, who saw the negotiation process as preparatory 
only to traditional position-based negotiations. 
Interest-based negotiation piayed a significant, but 
subsidiary, roie in the dispute resoiution process 
The negotiation process was always an advisory or consultative 
vehicle for public participation. It was never guaranteed the 
role of producing an agreed outcome. Its role remained a 
subsidiary one throughout. 
The interest-based negotiation process did not soive 
the environmental confiict 
The negotiation process contributed only to a solution reached 
administratively. Whether the outcome can be said to represent 
a solution of the environmental conflict over native forests 
remains to be seen. 
In summation, the hypothesis proposed was confimned in a 
number of respects. The forestry debate was identified as an 
environmental conflict. The ADR method of interest-based 
negotiation was seen to be used in the form of an integrative 
model. Surprisingly, and contrary to expectations, the use of 
CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
This research sought to critically examine the use of ADR 
methods in resolving environmental controversies. A system of 
classifying environmental controversies based primarily upon 
three key characteristics was developed. Controversies were 
classified in this way and placed along a continuum ranging 
from environmental disputes to environmental conflicts. This 
method of classification made it possible to systematically 
examine the use of ADR methods along the continuum. A case 
study method was used and the results of both case studies have 
been presented in detail. 
Conclusions 
The results of the two case studies show that ADR methods can 
have an effective role in the resolution of environmental 
controversies. Achieving the full potential of ADR methods in 
the resolution of environmental controversies is hindered by a 
number of constraints. Some of these constraints are based upon 
misconceptions. It is argued that property addressed these 
concerns can be overcome with a view to the wider adoption of 
ADR methods. 
The conclusions reached are summarised as follows: 
The effectiveness of ADR methods in environmental 
disputes 
When mediation was used to resolve environmental disputes in 
the Land and Environment Court of NSW it was highly effective, 
but under-utilised, it may be that the system is operating at the 
optimum level, with non-mediated disputes being unsuitable for 
mediation and appropriately subject to due process in the Court. 
Alternatively, the lack of effective measures to encourage 
reluctant parties, particularly government respondents, to 
participate may be more the explanation for under-utilisation. 
The case study provided no data to determine which of these 
two explanations is correct. It was suggested that a checklist 
for gauging the suitability of environmental disputes for 
mediation and a Mediation Report for reporting the results of 
successful mediations be devised. These guides would be 
suitable for circulation to local government bodies and other 
parties with a view to encouraging participation to develop. 
It is further suggested that the requirements that participation 
in mediation be voluntary and the process be confidential be 
reviewed. These suggestions are discussed below. 
The effectiveness of ADR methods in environmentai 
confi icts 
Environmental conflicts are predominantly the subject of 
administrative resolution. The use of ADR mechanisms as part 
of the resolution of these conflicts can be accommodated 
provided it does not involve the delegation of decision-making 
power. The role of ADR methods in the resolution of 
environmental conflicts has developed in an integrative role in 
these administrative mechanisms 
It is suggested that this is the proper role of ADR methods in 
environmental conflicts. Within this context, the use of ADR 
methods should allow the stakeholders to reach an agreement on 
a resolution to be presented to govemment and endorsed. 
Provided the requirements of voluntarism and confidentiality 
are relaxed, it is considered there are adequate safeguards that 
can be imposed to ensure effective protection of the public 
interest. 
There needs to be a realistic understanding of the limitations of 
the role of ADR methods in administrative processes. Both the 
process and the resolution are subject to political constraints 
and some environmental conflicts will not be suitable for ADR 
methods and should be left to existing mechanisms. 
The effectiveness of ADR methods along the continuum 
between disputes and conflicts 
The hypotheses set predicted that ADR methods would be 
effective in resolving environmental controversies in the 
environmental dispute half of the continuum but essentially 
ineffective for controversies in the environmental conflict half 
of the continuum. 
These predictions were not fully borne out by the research. The 
case study on the Land and Environment Court's Mediation 
Scheme tended to confirm the expectation. The Scheme 
successfully mediated what were tentatively concluded to be 
environmental disputes. But the case study on the Interim 
Assessment Process confounded the expectation. The forest 
conflict which could be more confidently classified as an 
environmental conflict was also amenable to solution using ADR 
methods. 
Without overstating the empirical basis for this research, these 
findings suggest that ADR methods have a potential role in 
environmental controversies along the whole of the continuum. 
Discussion 
Constraints on the use of ADR methods in environmental 
controversies 
From the review of the literature on the theory and practice of 
ADR methods in environmental controversies in the United 
States and in Australia, it appears that there are a number of 
critical factors that are restricting the wider application of 
ADR methods in resolving environmental controversies. The 
review of the practice has shown that in Australia the approach 
to ADR methods is still one of considerable caution. Wider 
implementation of these methods is constrained by these 
critical factors. These constraints are critically examined here. 
The constraints on expanded implementation have been 
identified in the literature reviews as concerns about: 
*The need for confidentiality 
*The requirement of voluntariness 
*The politics of environmental conflict resolution 
*The need to protect the public interest 
The results of this research challenge whether these 
constraints are real or artificial. It is suggested that they can 
be accommodated to allow for wider adoption of ADR methods, 
if these methods are have the opportunity to fulfil their earlier 
promise. 
The need for confidentiality 
One of tiie constraints on allowing the role of ADR methods to 
expand is the perception that a requirement of all ADR 
processes is a need to maintain strict confidentiality. 
This is viewed as an impediment to participation, particularly 
in the case of environmental conflicts. Solving the conflict in 
the public eye is seen by some parties as a necessary 
prerequisite for gaining the support of the community. 
Additionally, confidentiality is viewed as conflicting with other 
important values such as the transparency of decision making 
and the community's 'right to know'. 
It is suggested that since in the case of traditional adjudication 
and administrative dispute resolution methods, confidentiality 
is not normally a requirement, ADR processes should also be 
free of this constraint on the transparency of the process. 
Putting aside the question as to whether adjudicative and 
administrative methods are in fact transparent, we should 
consider whether the requirement of confidentiality in ADR 
processes, particularly with respect to mediation, is essential 
in the case of environmental controversies. If it is not, there is 
no reason why the requirement cannot be abandoned or at least 
significantly relaxed. 
Firstly, the requirement for confidentiality as to the result and 
to matters arising in the process is usually only of significance 
after an abortive mediation or negotiation. If tlie process is 
successful in producing an agreed outcome, confidentiality in 
most cases is really no longer an issue. This being so, the 
commitment to confidentiality given at the outset could be 
modified to allow for publication of the result or the subject 
matter of any successful outcome. 
If this relaxation is conceded, it leaves only the question of the 
necessity for confidentiality where the process is abortive. This 
abortive result need not, and in practical terms probably cannot 
be, confidential as it will be apparent from the need to take 
further dispute resolution steps that ADR methods did not work. 
This leaves open the question as to whether the process itself 
should, in terms for instance of allowing attendance by the 
general public or by interested parties, be made open. The usual 
response is to deny attendance, on the presumption that in order 
for the flexibility necessary for ADR methods to work the 
parties must be allowed to participate in the process frankly 
and freely. Critics assert the parties should be free to reveal 
confidential information, to concede weaknesses in their case 
and to make and receive concessions different from their 
avowed positions or interests if mediation is to be allowed its 
full scope. If this was done in an open or semi-open arena, it is 
asserted, the necessary frankness or forthrightness would 
substantially disappear. 
This concern is not borne out by the experience in the two case 
studies. In the Mediation Scheme of the Land and Environment 
Court, known objectors were invited to attend the mediation 
process J In the RACAC negotiations, regional organisations 
were free to attend, and did attend, the negotiations when 
particular forest compartments were the subject of discussion.2 
The reason this relaxation was possible was that not all of the 
mediation or negotiation processes required confidentiality. An 
essential feature of the process of mediation, for instance, is 
the private caucusing that takes place between the mediator and 
the respective parties. It is here that the mediator is made 
privy to confidences of strengths and weaknesses and potential 
degrees of compromise that do require confidentiality. It may be 
sufficient for the purposes of effective mediation if the 
confidentality is confined to these sessions alone. If the non-
necessity of confidentiality in other instances is conceded, a 
number of advantages could arise. 
Firstly, if the result of the mediation or negotiation can be 
reported ( as was the case of the RACAC proceedings) a number 
of positive benefits may accrue. Outcomes achieved by ADR 
methods have no value as precedent, but they may have value in 
terms of convincing other disputants of the effectiveness of the 
process aor in enticing participation by other parties or 
stakeholders in similar controversies. 
In the case of the Land and Environment Court, a solved matter 
is returned to the Court to deal with to finality by way of 
consent orders. The fact of the mediation and its success is 
1D Rollison, Deputy Registrar LEC, personal communication, 20 June 1996. 
2D Pugh, NCC, personal communication, 3 October 1996. 
recorded and it forms part of a published list of statistics 
concerning the efficacy of the mediation scheme. But nothing 
further is published. There is no reporting device through which 
the success might be circulated because there is no decision 
summary device on the file in which a result can be reported. 
This is considered a serious deficiency. As outlined in the case 
study, the scheme is effective, but seriously under-utilised. An 
effective reporting system documenting the success of the 
scheme might induce further participation, particularly by 
reluctant government respondents.^ 
Secondly, if the requirement for confidentiality remained in 
place for caucasing sessions and private negotiation sessions, 
the concern about confidences being revealed could be allayed. 
The necessary confidentiality could still be balanced with the 
need for transparency and one major reason for the reluctance 
to use ADR processes, particularly among environmental groups, 
would be removed. 
The requirement of voluntariness 
A further constraint on the effective use of ADR methods is the 
perception that these methods should only be used when they are 
entered into voluntarily and that participation should never be 
mandatory. The effect of this is that, whilesoever their use is 
optional, wider implementation remains unlikely. 
3With this in mind a draft of a suitable mediation summary reporting form has 
been prepared, see Appendix E 
The insistence upon ADR processes remaining voluntary fails to 
take account of the role ADR methods perform in environmental 
controversies. A common assumption is that environmental 
controversies are resolved adjudicatively and that therefore the 
proper role for ADR methods is court-annexed. 
There are two flaws in this reasoning. Firstly, as the answer to 
the first research question shows, environmental controversies 
in New South Wales are resolved almost exclusively by 
administrative mechanisms in various guises. They are not 
primarily resolved by adjudication. Secondly, as the review of 
practice generally and the case studies specifically shows, 
when ADR methods are used it is in an adjunctive, not an 
alternative, role. So it is not correct to assert that if 
controversies are compulsorily referred to mediation, the 
parties have been forced into an altemative mechanism not of 
their own choosing. Their compulsory participation is still in 
the administrative form of dispute resolution wherein the final 
resolution will be made. 
This is borne out by the comments of one of the stakeholders in 
the RACAC negotiation, the subject of the second case study. It 
was made clear to the parties that if they did not participate in 
the process and endeavour to reach agreement, a solution ( of 
which they may not have approved) would be made 
administratively.-^ There was a strong element of compulsion, 
but this did not affect the quality of their participation. It was 
4d Pugh, personal communication, 9 April 1997. 
not essential for the effectiveness of the process for their 
participation to be wholly voluntary. 
Based on this example, a cogent argument can be made that the 
requirement of voluntariness is unnecessary and that 
consideration should be given to removing it. If it was removed 
or modified the use of ADR methods could be increased 
substantially. 
This argument is given impetus when the concept of voluntarism 
itself is analysed more closely. Boulle concluded from his 
analysis of the concept that "although the ideology of 
voluntarism is an important element in the promotion and 
marketing of mediation, it cannot be taken at face value".^ 
Participation is seldom strictly voluntary since there are subtle 
pressures compelling involvement. The increased participation 
that may flow would have the effect of removing many of the 
misconceptions and suspicions now constraining the use of ADR 
methods. 
The Politics of Environmentai Confiict Resolution 
Wider political considerations arise when dealing with the 
solution of environmental conflicts. Environmental conflicts are 
by their nature political, involving as they do a struggle 
between stakeholders with competing interests, needs and goals 
5L Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (1996) Butterworths, 
Sydney, 17. 
attempting to influence the dispute resolution process. This is 
well illustrated by the RACAC case study where the "political 
mechanisms' both in the traditional forms of lobbying and non-
traditional forms of direct action and media campaigns were 
used by all parties in parallel with the negotiation process. 
If the premise that environmental conflict resolution is a 
political process is accepted, then the reluctance to participate 
in ADR processes because they are also political processes 
(involving the usual imbalances of power and resources) is 
difficult to understand. If the ADR processes are just as 
politically charged as the usual administrative mechanism of 
environmental dispute resolution, then the reluctance loses 
much of its validity. 
It follows that if ADR processes are seen as an integral part of 
an administrative dispute resolution mechanism, which itself is 
political, then there needs to be an acceptance that the ADR 
process will also be politicised. Participants need to be aware 
of the usual features of a political environment such as power 
struggles, power imbalances, distributional questions and 
irreconcilible value positions. Once the participants concede 
that they are involved in a political process already, much of the 
basis of the concern disappears and the parties can enter into 
the ADR process without any illusions. 
One of the criticisms of ADR is that it gives to parties the 
illusion of power. This is not strictly correct. While the process 
gives the appearance of significant and widespread 
participation, the administrative mechanism retains at all 
times the essential policy-making power. 
The RACAC case study is an example of this reality. The final 
power to resolve the environmental conflict over forest use 
remained at all times with the NSW Government. The parties 
knew this, and knew that the solution of the conflict would have 
devolved to the government if they did not participate in the 
ADR process. The parties' protection was this political realism. 
Is it enough though to recognise the political features of the 
ADR process? The criticism of opponents of ADR methods is that 
this is not enough. They say that in environmental conflicts the 
political constraints make participation itself a needless waste 
of scarce resources and energy. They argue that there can be no 
meaningful participation in a process where one party actually 
retains decisive power. The best response to this is that any 
non-ADR form of stakeholder participation in the administrative 
dispute resolution mechanism can be equally as illusory. 
During the lobbying stage after the RACAC negotiation process, 
each of the three NGO participants sought to Ilex their political 
muscle.' The aim of each was the same, namely to influence the 
Cabinet decision, though their methods were different. The 
environmental groups sought to give the impression that public 
consciousness had been raised to a level of urgency and crisis 
and that the government would ignore this shift in public 
opinion at its electoral peril. The union and industry groups 
similarly sought by more traditional lobbying to persuade 
parliamentarians that electoral risk would flow from ignoring 
their constituencies' demands. Yet, even in this stage of "using 
the political mechanism", it still remained a matter of 
attempting to influence ultimate dispute resolution power. 
There was never any realistic expectation in the stakeholders 
that they were exercising that power themselves. 
In this respect the political mechanism is just as much subject 
to the constraints of politics as ADR processes are. If there is 
an illusion of power, it exists in both processes. 
The constraints of environmental politics are very real, but the 
effect should not be to exclude the use of ADR methods. As the 
RACAC case study has shown, ADR methods can play a useful and 
significant role. 
The need to protect the public interest 
A further constraint on the use of ADR methods is the 
perception that these processes do not provide an adequate 
protection for the public interest and therefore should not be 
used. 
This is no such problem in the case of environmental disputes 
where the public interest usually remains essentially dormant, 
and if it is aroused there is a local council to represent it. In 
the Mediation Scheme case study, the situation was addressed, 
if it arose, by enabling interested objectors to attend the 
mediation and allowing them a voice. There was also the 
additional protection potentially available in the Court's 
overseeing role to reject mediated solutions if these were seen 
as contrary to the public interest. 
But where the public interest is an activated element in a 
conflict, consideration needs to be given to whether the public 
interest can be satisfactorily protected in ADR processes. 
This concern again raises an issue of visibility. Mediation, and 
to a lesser extent negotiation, are normally private and 
invisible. There is not usually the opportunity to see how the 
public interest is treated. But as the RACAC case study shows 
this can be addressed by imposing a requirement that specified 
information about the process and the nature of any resolution 
reached be publicly available and subject to public comment and 
review. 
This is well short of the visibility that adjudication allows, but 
as noted adjudication is not the mechanism by which most 
environmental controversies are resolved. Usually the resolution 
is administratively reached, by Ministerial or Cabinet decision 
or by bureaucrats theoretically accountable to the public 
through their Minister. The proper comparison is thus between 
the visibility and the protection of the public interest available 
in ADR processes and in administrative decision making 
processes. It is a question of comparing the adequacy of the 
participation opportunities available in each mechanism to 
monitor the protection of the public interest. 
The concern expressed about ADR processes is that the parties 
may reach an agreement which satisfies their competing private 
Interests but at the expense of the wider public interest. In the 
case of environmental conflicts however, this is largely an 
illusory concern. Whilst it is theoretically possible for the 
stakeholders to have delegated to them decision-making power, 
it is extremely unlikely that the administrator would do. The 
mediation or negotiation will remain part of the deliberative 
process only and the decision-making function will not be 
abdicated. Therefore if the public interest is neglected in this 
situation, it is not the fault of ADR methods. 
In fact, ADR processes may allow for a real improvement in the 
quality and scope of participation in environmental conflict 
resolution. The improved opportunities for input that arise may 
increase the participants' ability to have a voice in protecting 
the public interest. ADR processes allow for the implementation 
of innovative solutions formulated by the stakeholders 
themselves. They therefore have the capacity to ensure 
administrators adequately address questions of public interest 
in their decisions. In this sense, ADR methods may simply be a 
more effective form of public participation. Nonetheless, their 
role can be a significant one. 
Appendices 
Appendix A Land and Environment Court Young 
Lawyers' Survey Questions 
Appendix B Land and Environment Court Matters 
Referred to Mediation 1995 
Appendix 0 Tow & Stubbs' Land and Environment 
Court Research Record 
Appendix D Resource Assessment Council 
Participants Interview Schedule 
Appendix E Land and Environment Court, 
Proposed Mediator Report 
Appendix A 
MEDIATION IN THE LAND AND ENVIRONMENT COURT 
The Young Lav^yer's Environmental Law Committee is monitoring the effectiveness of 
mediation in the Land and Environment Court. 
In an attempt to look at this issue in more detail the group requests that you give us 5 minutes of 
your time to complete the questionnaire set out below. 
We thank you for your assistance. (Please tick the appropriate box.) 
OLTESTION I 
Do you consider the outcome of your mediation successful'^ 
(Whether or not it proceeded to a hearing) 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
QUESTION 2 (a) 
If you ansv^ered YES to Question 1 then, which of the following factors do you consider 
added to the success'^' (Please tick as appropriate and as many as you wish.) 
] skill of the mediator 
] narrowing of the issues 
] total resolution/settlement of the dispute 
] partial resolution of the dispute 
] less formal procedure 
] a better understanding by you of the other parties position/ needs 
QUESTION 2 (b) 
Do you consider any other factors contributed to the success of your mediation"^ 
Please give details below. 
QUESTION 2 (c) 
How many mediation sessions were required to reach settlement and hovy long was the 
total time spent in mediation sessions'^ 
Number of sessions = 
Total time spent = 
Period of time between first 
and final sessions (if more than one) = 
QUESTION 3 (a) 
If your answer to I was NO ie you did not think your mediation was successful: 
(a) How far towards resolution did you gef^ 
Nowhere at all 
Partial resolution 
Narrowing of the issues 
A better understanding of the other parties resolution 
Other (please specify ) 
QUESTION 3 rb) 
(b) Can you give a reason why? 
QUESTION 3 (c) 
Can you suggest any improvements to the present system? 
QUESTION 4 
Do you consider that the legal costs of your application were lower than they would have 
been if the matter had gone to a full hearing? 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
[ ] About the same [ ] Higher 
QUESTION 5(a) 
Do you consider that the other party to the mediation: 
(a) Had the authority to settle the matter? 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
QUESTION 6 (a) 
Did you experience any difficulties with; 
(i) Arranging a suitable time for the mediation to take place? 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
(ii) Having the other party agree to participate in the mediation? 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
(iii) If you are a Lawyer, convincing your client to participate in the mediation? 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
QUESTION 6 rb) 
How would you do things differently to overcome these problems? 
QUESTION 6 Tc) 
How long after you filed your Application with the Court did you go to the first call-over? 
Days/ weeks/ months 
QUESTION 6 (d) 
Was your matter set down for mediation at the first call-over? 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
QUESTION 6 (e) 
Why was your matter not referred to mediation at the first call-over? 
QUESTION 6(f ) 
How long was it between the date of the call-over and the date of the mediation? 
^Days/weeks/months 
QUESTION 6 (g) 
If this matter was originally set down for hearing, how many days was it set down for'?' 
^Days 
QUESTION 7 fa) 
Did you (and your client, if appropriate) understand that mediation remains a voluntary-
process at all times, and that a party may pull out of the process at any stage"^ 
[ ] Yes ^ [ ]' No 
QUESTION 7 (b) 
Do you feel that you received adequate information from the Court about mediation before 
you had to decide to take this option'^ 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
QUESTION 8 
In your opinion, is it likely that this matter would have settled sometime before the 
hearing even without the mediation process'!' 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
QUESTION 9 (a) 
Do you think that the current recession has influenced; 
(a) You or your clients decision to agree to mediation'' 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
QUESTION 9 (b) 
The amount of pressure the parties felt to achieve a cheaper and/or quicker resolution to 
their dispute than is offered by a normal hearing'^ 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
QUESTION 9 (c) 
The coming of a mediated resolution (if one was reached)'^ 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
QUESTION 10 
Any further comments you would like to make'?' 
QUESTION 11 (a) 
Are you satisfied with the way your mediated agreement was put into effect 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
QUESTION 11 (b) 
How was your agreement put into effect'?' 
O U E S T I O N l l (c) 
If your answer to (a) is NO, can you suggest a better method of putting the agreement into 
effect'' 
QUESTION 12 ra) 
If you did not resolve you matter at mediation, did you enter into negotiations after the 
mediation which resulted in settlement of the matter? 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
QUESTION 12 (b) 
If YES (ie to a) do you think that the mediation session helped with the settlement? 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
APPENDIX B 
LAND AND ENVIRONMENT COURT MATTERS 
REFERRED TO MEDIATION (1995) 
DISPUTE SUBJECT MATTER PARTIES RESOLUTION 
1 Class One Conditions re 
restaurant 
GHvBSC resolved 
2 Class One Dual occupancy 
conditions 
TvSSC resolved 
3 Class One Subdivision refusal HvWCC not resolved 
4 Class Two Erection of new 
dwelling- landscape 
detriment 
FvWCC not resolved 
5 Class One Alterations to dwelling FvNSC not resolved 
6 Class One Dual Occupancy refusal HvLCC resolved 




8 Class One Erection of townhouse CvSSC resolved 
9 Class One Erection of townhouse FvLSC not resolved 
1 1 Class One Retail outlet JT V PC resolved 
12 Class One Concrete Batching 
Plant- contrary to 
public interest 
{objectors) and zoning 
LvNC resolved 
13 Class Three Compensation payable 
for land acquistion 
DvSRA resolved 
14 Class One Dual Occupancy refusal MvNSC resolved 
15 Class One Dual Occupancy refusal HvWCC resolved 
16 Class One Erection of pontoon and 
ietty 
RvRSC resolved 
16 Class Two Building Approval PCvPC not resolved 
17 Class One Dual Occupancy refusal BvRC resolved 
18 Class Two Refusal to obey Notice J vSSC not resolved 
19 Class One Erection of dwelling MvLC resolved 
20 Class One Conversion of office 
space 
BvLC resolved 
DISPUTE SUBJECT MATTER PARTIES RESOLUTION 
21 Class One Childcare Centre CvPCC not resolved 
22 Class One Medium density 
residential 
L vTC not resolved 
23 Class One New residence J vLC resolved 
24 Class One Demolition & 
reconstruction 
GvLC not resolved 
25 Class One Subdivision CvSCC resolved 
26 Class One Retaining wall HvBMC resolved 
27 Class One Construction of 
verandah 
AvRCC resolved 
28 Class One Residential MVSSC resolved 
29 Class One Commercial BvBMC resolved 
30 Class Two Demolition order 
(objectors) 
GvWC resolved 
31 Class Two Swimming pool GvSSC resolved 
32 Class Two Demolition order BvSSC not resolved 
33 Class Three Compensation WH V RTA resolved 
34 Class Three Compensation CvRTA resolved 
35 Class Three Compensation D vRTA resolved 
36 Class Three Compensation HvRTA resolved 
37 Class Three Compensation WvRTA not resolved 
38 Class Three Compensation SvRTA not resolved 
39 Class One Residential AvNSC resolved 
40 Class One Medium density J vNSC resolved 
41 Class One Rural subdivision J vTC resolved 
42 Class One Subdivision BVBMC resolved 
43 Class One Residential BMDHvBMC resolved 
44 Class One Consent to commercial 
advertising 
DvMC resolved 
45 Class One Dual occupancy PvMC resolved 
46 Class One Dual occupancy SvCC resolved 
DISPUTE SUBJECT MATTER PARTIES RESOLUTION 
47 Class One Dual occipancy FvBMC not resolved 
48 Class One Medium density SRUvWCC not resolved 
49 Qass One Medium density CM V NSC resolved 
50 Class One Medium density TvBMC resolved 
51 Class One Dual occupancy CMP V NSC resolved 
52 Class One Industrial TPHvSSC resolved 
53 Qass One Dual occupancy WvCC resolved 
54 Class One Medium density Sv AC resolved 
55 Class Two Demolition order PvSSC resolved 
56 Class Two Addition/alteration CCvDC not resolved 
57 Class Two Garage KvSSC resolved 
58 Class Two Rural water connection WvCC resolved 
59 Class Two Demolition order CvSSC resolved 
60 Class Two Additions J vKC not resolved 
61 Class Two Additions LvPC not resolved 
62 Class Two New dwelling LvKC resolved 
63 Class Two Additions SvLC not resolved 
64 Class Two Demolition order NvBC not resolved 
65 Class Two New dwelling PvKC resolved 
66 Class Two New dwelling KvWC resolved 
67 Class Two Carport BPAvDC resolved 
68 Class Three Compensation M V RTA resolved 
69 Class Three Compensation CvRTA resolved 
70 Class Three Compensation GvRTA resolved 
71 Class Three Compensation U vRTA resolved 
72 Class Three Compensation RvRTA not resolved 




- A L T E R N A T I V E D I S P U T E R E S O L U T I O N R E S E A R C H 
B a c k g r o u n d Rescarcl i - L a n d Si E n v i r o n m e n t Cour t . 
File No: (numerical order) 
1. Parties Involved at mediation confcrcncc (circle) •' 
A. Local Government B. State Autliority/Department 
C. Development/Real Estate Company D. Planning Consultant 
E. Objcctor(s) F. Environmental Group 
G" Private Individual (as applicant) H. Other 
(note where tliere is legal representation with 'L ' ) 
2. Location of vSite in dispute (circle) 
A. Sydney Metropolitan Area 
(i) City/Inner City (ii) Suburban 
(iii) Fringe 
B. Coastal 
C Other Regional 
3. Class of Dispute C1 -4) 
4. Nature of Dispute fcirclc) 
A. Determination of development application. 
(i) dual occupancy (ii) medium density residential 
(iii) other residential (iv) commercial 
(v) industrial (vi) other 
B. Appeal over conditions of consent (DA). 
C. Matters pertaining to building application. 
D. Injunction/restraining orders sought. 
E Compensation determination. 
F. Judicial review of decision/consent. 
G. Other. 
5. Outcome fwherc possible) 
A) Dispute successfully mediated. 
B. Partial agreement achieved - areas of dispute lessened, 




RESEARCH QUESTION A. 
Was the lAP negotiation process an example of 
the use of ADR to resolve environmental 
disputes? 
1. What was your organisation's involvement In the lAP 
process generally & the negotiations specifically? 
(PROMPT: how were you invited to participate? 
Were you a willing participant? 
Was it just a continuation of an ongoing consultative 
process?) 
2. What was being negotiated in the lAP negotiation 
sess ions? 
(PROMPT: What was your wish list in terms of conservation or 
resource outcomes? 
What did you hope to achieve? 
Were the 4 scenarios on the table? 
A negotiated settlement that govemment would rubber 
stamp?) 
3. What happened at the negotiations in terms of 
achieving these aims? 
(PROMPT: Real negotiations in the sense of hard bargaining, 
compromises, heated exchanges? 
Or essentially a consultative process? 
Did what you did or said really matter?) 
RESEARCH QUESTION B. 
Was the negotiation process effective in 
resoiving tiie conflict? 
1. How do you rate the success of the negotiation 
process? 
(PROMPT: What is your measure of success? 
Durable agreement Implemented by government? 
Reduction of conflict? 
Improved communication? 
Greater understanding of other party's perspective?) 
2. If the negotiations did not produce a successful 
outcome [= Implementing the scenarios], why not? 
(PROMPT: What Intervened- lobbying, political Intervention? 
Is It a failure? 
Did you want the government to adopt each of the 4 
scenarios?) 
3. Did the cabinet decision of 23/9/96 (essentially 
scenario 3: logging @ 50% plus 5/5 contracts) resolve 
the conflict over logging In State Forests? 
(PROMPT: Can It be resolved? 
Are stakeholders Irreconcilably opposed? 
Can negotiation resolve such disputes?) 
APPENDIX E 




Number of Sessions: 
Total time In Session: 
Number of Parties: 
Local Council / State Authority as Respondent (tick): 
Number of Objectors / Third Parties: 
Degree of 
Resolution 




Factors Contributing to Agreement: 
Factors Contributing to Lacic of Agreement: 
Level of Conflict: High / l\Aoderate / Low 
Factors Contributing to Conflict: 
Balance of Power Held by: Applicant/ Respondent/ Third 
Party / Not an issue 
Type of Agreement: Verbal / Written / None 
Further Action: Consent Orders to be filed 
Application to be Withdrawn 
Hearing Date to be Allocated 
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